Water sharing policies conditioned on hydrologic variability to inform reservoir operations

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Abstract Water resources infrastructure is critical for energy and food security, however, the development of large-scale infrastructure, such as hydropower dams, may significantly alter downstream flows, potentially leading to water resources management conflicts and disputes. Mutually agreed upon water sharing policies for the operation of existing or new reservoirs is one of the most effective strategies to mitigate conflict, yet this is a complex task involving the estimation of available water, identification of users and demands, procedures for water sharing, etc. A water-sharing policy framework that incorporates reservoir operating rules optimization based on conflicting uses and natural hydrologic variability, specifically tailored to drought conditions, is proposed. First, the trade-off between downstream and upstream water availability utilizing multi-objective optimization of reservoir operating rules is established. Next, reservoir operation with the candidate (optimal) rules is simulated, followed by their performance evaluations, and the rules selections for balancing water uses. Subsequently, a relationship between the reservoir operations simulated from the selected rules and drought-specific conditions is built to derive water-sharing policies. Finally, the reservoir operating rules are re-optimized to evaluate the

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effectiveness of the drought-specific water sharing policies. With a case study of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River, it is demonstrated that the derived water sharing policy can balance GERD power generation and downstream releases, especially in dry conditions, effectively sharing the hydrologic risk in inflow variability among riparian countries. The proposed framework offers a robust approach to inform water sharing policies for sustainable management of water resources.

Keywords: Reservoir operation; Water sharing policy; Drought mitigation; Multi-objective optimization; Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

1. Introduction

Rapid population growth and socio-economic development exacerbate stress on the management of water resources globally (Vörösmarty et al., 2000;WWAP, 2019). Surface-water reservoirs and their effective management is one of the most efficient means to reduce this stress by reallocating water resources spatially and temporally (Gaudard et al., 2014). Thus in recent decades, many models and strategies have been investigated to inform and improve reservoir operation decision-making (Chaves and Chang, 2008;Cancelliere et al., 2002;Herman and Giuliani, 2018;Karamouz and Houck, 1982;Giuliani et al., 2014;Oliveira and Loucks, 1997). For example, Karamouz and Houck (1982) optimize monthly reservoir releases by deterministic dynamic programming and build a linear reservoir operation model conditioned on the relationship between optimal releases and reservoir state variables. Cancelliere et al. (2002) built a non-linear reservoir operation model by using neural network techniques to improve reservoir irrigation water supply during drought conditions. Herman and Giuliani (2018) design a tree-based policy which is flexible and interpretable for reservoir operation over multiple timescales. In general, reservoir decisions (e.g., water releases and power generation) are determined using reservoir operating

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38   rules with available input variables including reservoir state (e.g., reservoir water level) and hydrological

39   conditions (e.g., reservoir inflow) (Oliveira and Loucks, 1997).

40   Reservoir operating rules are typically derived using fitting-based and simulation-optimization-based

41   approaches. In fitting-based rules derivation (policy fitting), reservoir operation decisions are optimized

42   and subsequently fitted with input variables using linear regression (Bhaskar and Whitlatch Jr, 1980),

43   artificial neural networks (Cancelliere et al., 2002), fuzzy inference (Chang and Chang, 2001), and

44   decision trees (Wei and Hsu, 2008). In simulation-optimization methods, the parameters of reservoir

45   operating rules are optimized with an iterative simulation-based search algorithm in which the

46   performance is evaluated directly from reservoir operation simulations (Le Ngo et al., 2007;Rani and

47   Moreira, 2010). For example, Giuliani et al. (2015a) approximated reservoir operating rules by using

48   artificial neural networks and radial basis functions (RBFs) and optimized the rules for multi-purpose

49   water reservoirs with an evolutionary algorithm. A policy fitting approach requires an optimal set of

50   reservoir inflows, storages, and releases and its effectiveness highly depends on the performance of the

51   optimized reservoir operation model; however, the rules derivation is interpretable and intuitive when

52   optimal reservoir decision-making is highly correlated with state variables. In contrast, simulation-

53   optimization-based approaches do not rely on existing optimal reservoir operations and thus it is generally

54   more flexible than fitting-based rules.

55   Most of these approaches are implemented in water resources systems contained within a basin or

56   jurisdiction in which the benefits (e.g. power generation, water supply, and ecosystem function

57   maintenance) can be quantified and evaluated (Reddy and Nagesh Kumar, 2007;Feng et al., 2018;Yang

58   et al., 2016). Reservoir operations are necessarily more complex after considering a wide variety of social,

59   political, economic, and cultural conditions in river basins (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). Disputes and

60   conflicts are not uncommon between riparian states in river basins when water sharing agreements are

61   non-existent or non-enforceable and claims may be defined based on historical use. For example, the Nile

62   River serves eleven countries, 250 million people (Nile Basin Initiative, 2017), and is vital to agriculture,

63   industry, and hydropower, (Paisley and Henshaw, 2013), yet no mutually agreed upon water sharing

64   policies exist. The 1959 agreement (Guariso and Whittington, 1987) has been repudiated by upstream

65   riparian states. Acknowledging significantly divergent interests and a history of conflict and distrust,

66   quantifying the impact of reservoir operation on downstream benefits is challenging, hindering

67   development of water sharing strategies (Link et al., 2016).

68   According to the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (McCracken and Wolf, 2019), the

69   existing 310 international river basins across the world are shared by 150 countries and disputed areas,

70   cover 45% of the Earth's land surface, and contribute to 60% of the world's freshwater resources. As

71   suggested by Sadoff and Grey (2002), it is critical to understand and account for the range of inter-related

72   benefits resulting from the development of international rivers in a cooperative way. Such cooperation of

73   water resources development in international river basins has been widely investigated in recent years (Li

74   et al., 2019;Luchner et al., 2019;Arjoon et al., 2016;Wheeler et al., 2018;Degefu et al., 2016). For example,

75   Arjoon et al. (2016) proposed a benefit-sharing method based on the optimization results from a hydro-

76   economic model and evaluated the value of cooperative water management in the Eastern Nile River basin;

77   Li et al. (2019) analyzed the water benefits of stakeholders from cooperation under different reservoir

78   operation scenarios by using cooperative game theory methods; Luchner et al. (2019) simulated reservoir

79   operations and water allocation in an international river basin in Central Asia and found that international

80   cooperation in the power sector can ease the conflict between upstream hydropower production and

81   downstream irrigated agriculture.

82   Most previous studies focus on illustrating the importance of a cooperative strategy through water

83   system optimization and simulation (Dombrowsky, 2009;Tilmant and Kinzelbach, 2012) and evaluating

84   the benefits of cooperative operation (Goor et al., 2010;Anghileri et al., 2013;Uitto and Duda,

85   2002;Luchner et al., 2019). There is less literature (Wheeler et al., 2016;Li et al., 2019;Degefu et al.,

86   2016;Teasley and McKinney, 2011), however, addressing strategies for reaching an agreement or

87   consensus on water resources development amongst downstream and upstream riparian countries. Also,

88   although cooperation can result in a win-win situation for both downstream and upstream stakeholders,

89   cooperative water use strategies are obstructed by single-sector interests, especially when long-term

90   commitments are involved (Wu and Whittington, 2006). More specifically, it is often difficult to achieve

91   a mutually agreed-on cooperation strategy given divergent solution preferences by stakeholders.

92   Additionally, benefit sharing policies rely heavily on hydro-economic modeling and cost-benefit

93   analysis (Jeuland et al., 2014), which strives to maximize overall aggregated benefits and subsequently

94   allocate benefits in an equitable way. However, (1) the aggregation of benefits can hide important trade-

95   offs and may increase the risk of floods and droughts for maximum economic benefit; (2) there is no

96   standard that regulates how benefits of water use from various sectors (e.g., drinking, agriculture, industry,

97   recreation, and navigation) are quantified and what mechanism should be applied to equitably

98   allocate/share the benefits (Acharya et al., 2020); and (3) there is presently no basin-wide authority to

99   enforce benefit allocations (e.g. payments from one country to another) although institutions such as the

100   Nile Basin Initiative could serve in this role (Arjoon et al., 2016). Thus, water sharing policies considering

101   the trade-off between economic benefits and drought risk, rather than benefit sharing policies based on

102   cooperative operation strategies analysis, are investigated in this study. The policies will be flexible,

103   interpretable, and more importantly drought-focused such that downstream drought mitigation will

104   become an inherent part of the water sharing framework.

105   In this study, a systemic framework is proposed to derive operational reservoir water-sharing policies

106   using multi-objective optimization for water use conflict mitigation. Specifically, (1) optimize reservoir

107   operating rules and establish trade-off between upstream benefits and downstream drought risks, (2)

108   simulate reservoir operation with the candidate (optimal) rules, evaluate performance, and select the most

109   suitable rules for balancing benefits, (3) derive water-sharing policies conditioned on reservoir operations

110   and water availability, and (4) re-optimize reservoir operating rules incorporating derived water-sharing

111   policies to evaluate effectiveness and performance. The drought-focused water-sharing policies are

112   interpretable as they are derived from and evaluated on reservoir operation simulations from existing

113   optimal rules. Further, the policies are considered flexible by offering opportunities for informing

114   upstream-downstream negotiations. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Ethiopia is

115   selected to demonstrate the framework and illustrate how operational water-sharing strategies, reflective

116   of upstream and downstream demands and natural hydrologic variability, can promote water-sharing

117   agreements between upstream and downstream countries.

118   **2. Study Area and Data**

119   The Blue Nile River, the largest tributary of the Nile River, originates at Tana Lake in Ethiopia and

120   merges with the White Nile River in Khartoum, Sudan. Average annual rainfall in the upper part of the

121   basin varies between 1200 and 1800 mm/yr (Conway, 2000), with a dominant rainy season in June–

122   September contributing approximately 70% of mean annual precipitation. During this season, the Blue

123   Nile contributes nearly 80% of the total Nile River streamflow (Swain, 2011) and the average annual

124   runoff of the Blue Nile at Roseries, near the Ethiopia–Sudan border, is approximately 49 km^3/yr (Wheeler

125   et al., 2016), thus it plays a significant role in livelihood and development in Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt.

126   Ethiopia started constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) across the Blue Nile

127   River in 2011, approximately 15 km upstream of the Sudanese border (Fig. 1). When completed, the

128   GERD will become the largest hydroelectric dam (installed capacity more than 5,000 MW) in Africa

129   (Government of Ethiopia, 2020) and will have a total reservoir capacity of 74 billion cubic meters. The

130   GERD is expected to produce an average of 15,130 GWh of electricity annually (with mean output of

131   1727 MW) (Tan et al., 2017;Tesfa, 2013), which will contribute to Ethiopia's national energy grid and

132   feed the East African power pool (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012). There is uncertainty in media reports

133   regarding the total installed capacity for GERD which ranges from 5,150 MW (Ezega News, 2019b) to

134   6,000 MW (Ezega News, 2019a;Zelalem, 2020). A value of 6,000 MW, which was applied both in the

135   annual electricity production estimation and previous publicly available scientific studies (Tesfa,

136   2013;Yang et al., 2021), is opted for this study. It is worth noting that re-running the simulations with an

137   installed capacity of 5,150 MW instead of 6,000 MW does not change principal conclusions. Although the

138   GERD is primarily designed for hydropower, and thus non-consumptive, operating to maximize power

139   generation may result in a water release schedule significantly different from the natural annual cycle,

140   particularly considering drought periods, with implications to Sudan and Egypt. This is the crux of the

141   current hydro-political confronting the riparian countries.

142   In this study, GERD reservoir operation rules are developed considering power generation and

143   downstream water release (including turbine outflows and spillage losses) simultaneously to mitigate

144   upstream-downstream water use conflicts, particularly tailored to drought periods. The study investigates

145   water-sharing (drought mitigation) policy derivation procedures (reservoir operation simulation and

146   optimization, power generation and downstream water release analysis, drought mitigation policy

147   extraction and validation) balancing GERD production and downstream flow volumes. Historical monthly

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148 inflow at El Diem gauging station (located just downstream of the GERD site) for 1965-2017 (Fig. 2) are

149 applied.

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151 Fig. 1 Blue Nile basin with Ethiopia country borders and the location of the GERD reservoir

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153 Fig. 2 Monthly inflow into the GERD reservoir during 1965-2017.

3. Models and Methods

The procedure for water sharing policy derivation and evaluation including large-scale reservoir operations is introduced in this section (Fig. 3). In summary, the process is as follows:

- <u>First</u>: optimize the reservoir operating rules approximated with Radial Basis Functions (RBFs) and obtain the Pareto front for upstream and downstream benefits trade-off.

- <u>Second</u>: select feasible solutions on the Pareto front according to the requirements of power generation and drought mitigation; specifically, for a given power generation level, the distribution of annual water release is analyzed with special attention to low flow years.

- <u>Third</u>: define the relationship between annual reservoir inflow and releases based on the selected feasible solutions; the policy can be further framed as a function of reservoir annual inflow predictions.

- <u>Fourth</u>: incorporate the policy into general RBFs-based rules to evaluate policy effectiveness and robustness.

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168   Fig. 3 Procedure of drought mitigation policy derivation and evaluation for reservoir operation.

169   3.1. **Reservoir operation model**

170   The primary purpose of the GERD reservoir is hydropower production; this objective function can

171   be described as follows:

$$Max \quad E = \sum_{t=1}^{T} P_t \cdot \Delta t, \quad P_t = \eta \cdot g \cdot \rho \cdot Q_t^P \cdot H_t^P / 1000 \tag{1}$$

173   where E is hydroelectricity generation (kW h) during total number of operational periods T; P_t is the

174   power generation output (kW) during time period t and Δt is the time (h) of a single period; η, g, and ρ

175   refer to the dimensionless hydropower generation efficiency of the turbines (set as 0.9 in this study),

176   gravitational acceleration (9.8 m/s^2), and water density (1000 kg/m^3), respectively; and Q_t^P and H_t^P are

177   reservoir release for power generation (m^3/s) and average power head (m) in period t, respectively.

178   In lieu of modeling specific water requirements downstream of the GERD, minimizing annual water

179   release variance is applied. This approach favors reliable releases yet also reflects natural hydrologic

180   variability, and can be described as below.

181
$$Min \quad Std\left(Q_y^{out}\right) = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{y=1}^{Y}\left(Q_y^{out} - \bar{Q}_y^{out}\right)^2}{Y}} \tag{2}$$

182   where Q_y^{out} is the reservoir water release (which includes turbine outflows and spillage losses) in year y

183   and $\bar{Q}_y^{out}$ and $Std\left(Q_y^{out}\right)$ are the mean value and standard deviation of reservoir annual water release across

184   all operational years Y, respectively.

185   Physical and operational reservoir constraints are listed as below.

186   (a) Water balance:

187
$$S_{t+1} = S_t + \left(Q_t^{in} - Q_t^{out}\right) \cdot \Delta t - EP_t \tag{3}$$

188   where S_t and S_{t+1} are reservoir storage (m³) in period t and $t+1$, respectively, Q_t^{in} represents reservoir

189   inflow (m³/s) in period t, Q_t^{out} is reservoir release (m³/s) in period t, and EP_t is the sum of evaporation and

190   seepage from the reservoir (m³) in period t.

191   (b) Reservoir capacity limits (Jameel, 2014):

192   The reservoir structural and operational constraints can be expressed as:

193     $$S^{\min} \leq S_t \leq S^{\max} \tag{4}$$

194   where $S^{\min}$ and $S^{\max}$ are the minimum (14.8 billion m³) and maximum (74 billion m³) allowable reservoir

195   storage.

196   Additionally, S^{begin} and S^{end} represent the initial and final reservoir storage (m³) for simulations

197   (both of them are set as 65.1 billion m³), respectively, and are prescribed as:

198     $$S_t = \begin{cases} S^{begin} & t = 1 \\ S^{end} & t = T \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

199   (c) Reservoir release limits:

200   The reservoir release constraints are expressed as:

201     $$QL_t \leq Q_t^{out} \leq QU_t \tag{6}$$

202   where QL_t and QU_t are the minimum and maximum release (m³/s) in period t, respectively. The

203   expected guidelines for GERD reservoir water release are not explicitly available, thus releases are set

204 higher than zero and lower than the maximum reservoir inflow (21.9 billion m³/month) during the high-

205 flow season to reduce or eliminate downstream floods.

206 (d) Power generation limits (Tesfa, 2013):

$$PL_t \le P_t \le PU_t \tag{7}$$

208 where PL_t and PU_t are the minimum (0 MW) and maximum (6000 MW) power limits in period t,

209 respectively.

210 3.2. **Reservoir operating rules**

211 In this study, reservoir water releases are conditioned on radial basis functions (RBFs), a non-linear

212 function approximating method (Buşoniu et al., 2011) which can provide universal approximation (Tikk

213 et al., 2003) and ensure a flexible reservoir operating rules structure. For more applications of RBF models

214 in reservoir operation see Giuliani et al. (2015a). The reservoir operating rules are defined as below.

$$Q_t^{out} = \sum_{u=1}^{U} \omega_u \varphi_u(X_t) \quad t=1,...,T \quad 0 \le \omega_u \le 1 \tag{8}$$

$$\varphi_u(X_t) = \exp\left[-\sum_{j=1}^{M} \frac{\left((X_t)_j - c_{j,u}\right)^2}{b_u^2} \right] \quad c_{j,u} \in [-1,1], b_u \in (0,1] \tag{9}$$

217 where U is the number of RBFs, $\varphi(\cdot)$ and ω_u are the weights of the uth RBF, M is the number of input

218 variables X_t, and $\mathbf{c}_u$ and b_u are the M-dimensional center and radius vectors of the uth RBF, respectively.

219   Because water release generally depends on the reservoir state (Revelle et al., 1969) and inflow, with

220   intra- and inter-annual variability, reservoir storage S_t, inflow Q_t^{in}, and seasonal information τ_t (where τ_t

221   refers to the position of the current period (month) t within a water year) are selected as input variables

222   and $X_t = \left(S_t, Q_t^{in}, \tau_t \right)$.

223   In this study, the number of RBFs is set to four (as in Giuliani et al. (2015b)), thus $U=4$ and $M=3$ (three

224   input variables) in equation (8)-(9) resulting in 20 parameters in the RBFs-based rules. The parameters in

225   RBFs-based rules are optimized with a simulation-optimization model (Rani and Moreira, 2010), using

226   the Pareto-Archived Dynamically Dimensioned Search (PA-DDS) evolutionary algorithm which has been

227   successfully applied to reservoir operating rules optimization (Yang et al., 2020). The procedure of the

228   PA-DDS algorithm has been described in detail by Asadzadeh and Tolson (2013).

229   ### 3.3. **Drought-focused water sharing policy**

230   To ensure downstream water supply, the GERD reservoir will need to be operated under minimum annual

231   water release constraints. Apart from the RBFs-based rules determining the reservoir water release in each

232   time step (months), a drought mitigation policy is also adopted to address dry periods. The policy is based

233   on annual time steps and represented as a linear regression between annual reservoir inflow and water

234   release. More specifically, the minimum annual reservoir water release can be determined by the following

235   equation:

236
$$R_y^{\min} = \alpha \cdot Q_y^{in} + \beta + z \cdot \sigma_d \qquad (10)$$

237   where Q_y^{in} and $R_y^{\min}$ refer to reservoir inflow and minimum reservoir water release during year y,

238   respectively; α and β are regression parameters estimated from simulations containing reservoir

14

239   inflow values below the historical average (approximately 49 billion cubic meters per year, BCM/yr). An

240   exceedance parameter z is multiplied by the standard deviation of the regression residuals σ_d to vary how

241   conservative the drought mitigation policy is (see Fig. 4 for a visualization of exceedance parameters).

242   This policy design favors downstream releases under drought conditions by supplementing what would

243   occur under natural flow conditions, however as a trade-off, the minimum reservoir release in any year

244   will not exceed the historical average reservoir inflow (see the horizontal line in Fig. 4).

245   The drought policy is conditioned on reservoir inflows and releases for a transparent, interpretable, and

246   intuitive process, which is important especially when negotiations are involved. The gradient of the policy

247   line is highly correlated with variability in reservoir releases, in general, as the slope increases, so does

248   the variability in releases. Thus, the parameter α can be estimated from the trade-off between reservoir

249   power generation and downstream water release variability. The exceedance parameter z further controls

250   the degree of drought mitigation; larger z values indicate higher drought thresholds (see the intersection

251   between the policy line and 1:1 dash line in Fig. 4). In the drought policy design, these two parameters

252   can be estimated separately to isolate their impact on drought mitigation performance. This case study

253   mainly focuses on the impact of the first parameter as the exceedance parameter z is eventually set as 0%.

254   In this study, the drought mitigation policy is designed with annual streamflow data, however reservoir

255   operating rules are derived for monthly operation. With reservoir storage in current month S_m, reservoir

256   inflow in current month Q_m^{in}, and the predicted reservoir inflow during the rest of the year $Q_{m+1}'^{in}$, …, $Q_{12}'^{in}$,

257   the reservoir water release in current month Q_m^{out} and the rest of year $Q_{m+1}'^{out}$, …, $Q_{12}'^{out}$ can be obtained from

258   equations (8) and (9), thus the annual reservoir inflow and water release can be estimated as below.

259
$$Q_y'^{in} = \sum_1^m Q_m^{in} + \sum_{m+1}^{12} Q_m'^{in} \tag{11}$$

260
$$Q_y'^{out} = \sum_1^m Q_m^{out} + \sum_{m+1}^{12} Q_m'^{out} \qquad (12)$$

261 The minimum reservoir water release in year y can be estimated from equation (10) as $R_y'^{\min}$. To ensure

262 the minimum annual water release obligation is met, if the estimated annual reservoir water release $Q_y'^{out}$

263 is lower than $R_y'^{\min}$, the release in current month Q_m^{out} will be corrected according to the following:

264
$$Q_m^{out} = Q_m^{out} + \left(R_y'^{\min} - Q_y'^{out} \right) \times \frac{Q_m^{in}}{\sum\limits_m^{12} Q_m'^{in}} \qquad (13)$$

265 The estimated variables $R_y'^{\min}$, $Q_y'^{out}$, and $\sum\limits_m^{12} Q_m^{in}$ are updated in each time step. In the last month of each

266 year, the annual reservoir inflow estimation $Q_y'^{in}$ will be equal to actual annual inflow $\sum\limits_1^{12} Q_m^{in}$ and the

267 estimated minimum annual release $R_y'^{\min}$ will be $R_y^{\min}$. If $Q_y^{out} < R_y^{\min}$, the reservoir water release in the last

268 month Q_{12}^{out} will be corrected as $Q_{12}^{out} + \left(R_y^{\min} - Q_y^{out} \right)$ and the Q_y^{out} will be equal to $R_y^{\min}$. Thus annual

269 reservoir release Q_y^{out} will always be greater than or equal to the specified minimum reservoir water release

270 $R_y^{\min}$ and it can be inferred that the minimum annual release $R_y^{\min}$ is mainly determined by the policy

271 parameters α, β, and z, rather than forecast accuracy.

272 As illustrated in equation (10) and Fig. 4, the minimum annual reservoir release can be estimated from the

273 annual reservoir inflow after the drought policy line is determined. Considering actual annual reservoir

274 inflow will not be available until the last month of each year, the annual reservoir inflow forecast is used

275 instead. In this study, both a climatology inflow forecast ($Q_t'^{in}$ set as the long-term average streamflow for

276 that month) and a perfect inflow forecast ($Q_t'^{in}$ set to observed reservoir inflow Q_t^{in}) are used to evaluate

16

277 the performance of the drought mitigation policy. To avoid adverse downstream and upstream flood

278 caused by spillage, both the monthly and annual water release will be less than the maximum reservoir

279 inflow in flood seasons and wet years.

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281 Fig. 4 Sample drought mitigation policy with varying exceedance levels (z=0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80%)

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. **Multi-objective reservoir operation with no drought policy**

284 Multi-objective optimization of GERD reservoir operating rules illustrates that there is a trade-off between

285 reservoir power generation and deviation in reservoir annual water releases (Fig. 5 (a)). More specifically,

286 GERD monthly mean power generation output is estimated at 1788, 1708, 1737, and 1707 MW for annual

287 release standard deviations of 9, 7, 6, 5, and 4 BCM/yr, respectively. Although the reservoir operating

288 rules are not optimized for maximum annual water release, less $Std\left(Q_y^{out}\right)$ typically leads to relatively

289 more releases in dry conditions (e.g., 5th, 10th, 15th, and 20th percentiles), especially when the mean output

290 is greater than 1750 MW (Fig. 5 (b)). Thus downstream countries may benefit more from reservoir

291 operating rules favoring smaller $Std\left(Q_y^{out}\right)$ in drought conditions; this trade-off between power generation

17

292 and $Std\left(Q_y^{out}\right)$ can be used to balance GERD power generation and downstream water use benefits. There

293 also exists a trade-off between $Std\left(Q_y^{out}\right)$ and other power indicators such as firm output (see Fig. S1 in

294 Appendix S1).


(a)   (b)

295 Fig. 5 Multi-objective optimization results of reservoir operating rules in terms of (a) Pareto front and (b) the

296 relationship between power generation and 5th, 10th, 15th, and 20th percentile of annual water release.

297 The reservoir operating rules simulation results under various mean output levels illustrates that the

298 variance of annual water release shrinks and reservoir storage declines as power output decreases (Fig.

299 6). Although the median values of annual water release for all six output levels are approximately the

300 same (around 45 BCM/yr), the reservoir operating rules with more output generally have lower minimum

301 water releases (Fig. 6 (a) and (b)), especially in dry periods. In general, greater reservoir storage leads to

302 more power generation (see equation (1)) and vice versa, thus the reservoir operating rules generating

303 1788 MW of mean output produces the highest water level, and 1707 MW the lowest (Fig. 6 (d)). Also,

304 there is a clear trade-off between the variance of reservoir storage and water release (Fig. 6 (a) and (c));

305 smaller reservoir storage variance ensures higher reservoir levels, greater water release variance, and

306 lower minimum water releases. It is worth noting that the 75th and 90th percentiles of reservoir storage are

307   much more sensitive to power output than those of water release. More specifically, the 90th percentile of

308   water release for rule types 5 and 6 are almost the same, however, the corresponding percentile of reservoir

309   storage (as well as power output) are notably different (Fig. 6 (a) and (c)). This indicates that rule type 6

310   may be inferior to rule type 5 despite of the trade-off in Fig. 5 (a). Thus, it is necessary to analyze the

311   operation results (including water release and power generation) before selecting the reservoir operating

312   rules based on the Pareto front in Fig. 5 (a).

(a)   (b)

(c)   (d)

(e)

Fig. 6 Boxplots and values of annual reservoir (a)(b) water releases, (c)(d) storages, and (e) spillages for various reservoir operating rules; dished line in (b) refers to reservoir inflow.

Comparing across rule types, rules with high mean output of power generation generate more hydropower mainly in wet years. In particular, rule type 1 (1788 MW) can generate approximately 670, 760, and 670 MW more than rule 6 (1707 MW) in years 1988, 1998, and 2017, respectively. In these years, the annual reservoir inflow is greater than 65 BCM/yr (Fig. 6 (b)). It is worth noting that the annual reservoir inflow in the previous one or two years (i.e., year 1987, 1997, and 2015) is less than 38 BCM/yr (Fig. 6 (b)) and the reservoir storage of rule type 1 is much higher than in other rule types (Fig. 6 (d)). Thus, it can be inferred that rule types with larger power generation can increase the mean output by releasing less water during dry years to maintain relatively higher reservoir water levels. In this way, more water will be available and higher head (H_t^P in equation (1)) can be achieved for future wet years, leading to much more power generation.

However, releasing less water in dry years is not a strategy preferred by downstream countries. Although downstream releases are always greater than the minimum natural GERD inflow (which occurs in 2015), releases may clearly be less than natural flow in some dry years (e.g., 1965 & 1997, see Fig. 6 (b)), which

20

328   may aggravate drought conditions. According to the relationship between annual reservoir inflow and

329   water release simulated from rule type 1, water release is less than reservoir inflow in most cases (Fig. 7

330   (a)). In comparison, rule type 3 (1780 MW) releases more water than reservoir inflow in dry years. As

331   power generation decreases further the number of years with reservoir water releases exceeding inflow

332   increases. Applying a linear regression between annual reservoir inflow and water release (see the lines

333   in Fig. 7), a drought mitigation policy (equation (10)) can be extracted to constraint annual water release

334   in reservoir operation. Rule types favoring more power generation generally produce a steeper gradient in

335   the drought mitigation policy.

336

337   Fig. 7 Relationship between annual reservoir inflow and water release (points) and the corresponding drought

338   mitigation policy (lines) for various power generation levels.

339   4.2. **Drought policy selection and analysis**

340   To select the most suitable drought mitigation policy, both the corresponding power generation and

341   reservoir release benefits in drought years may be evaluated. In this study, annual reservoir release amount

342 and the deviation of annual releases are used as proxies for downstream benefits. For example, if annual

343 releases during drought years is greater than annual reservoir inflow (or natural flow), downstream

344 droughts are partially mitigated. In general, the statistical distributions of annual reservoir inflow and

345 releases are significantly different when reservoir operations are tailored to drought mitigation. This

346 difference is more pronounced for lower power generation levels (see Fig. S2 in Appendix S1).

347 Considering low flows, the 10th percentile of water releases increases as hydropower generation decreases,

348 from 35.6 BCM/yr for rule type 1 (1788 MW) to 42.7 BCM/yr for rule type 6 (1707 MW). Except for rule

349 type 1, all rule types ensure that the 10th percentile of releases is greater than the 10th percentile of annual

350 reservoir inflow (35.8 BCM/yr). This equates to supplementing downstream flows to address drought

351 conditions when the 10% exceedance value of annual reservoir inflow is used as the drought threshold.

352 Further, even when reservoir inflow is less than its 20th percentile value, water releases are greater than

353 annual reservoir inflow except for rule type 1 (Fig. 8). However, when the threshold exceeds the 25th

354 percentile, only solutions based on rule type 3-6 contain annual releases surpassing inflow. These

355 distributions (Fig. 8) can provide critical insights during riparian negotiations regarding trade-offs between

356 power generation and supplementing downstream flows during drought conditions. Although only six

357 candidate solutions are illustrated here, more representative solutions may be analyzed in practice.

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359 Fig. 8 Percentiles of annual reservoir inflow and water release under various power generation levels.

360   Incorporating these drought policies (Fig. 7), reservoir operating rules are optimized again for maximum

361   power generation and minimum deviation of annual release volumes, illustrating varying trade-offs for

362   drought policies 1-6 (Fig. 9). Drought policies produce similar but not exact hydropower generation as

363   the original operating rules (e.g. policy 1 original = 1788 MW, drought = 1791 MW); the standard

364   deviation of annual releases also does not change significantly. Comparing drought policies producing a

365   high level of hydropower production (e.g. moving from policy 1 to 2), a small trade-off in production (~4

366   MW) leads to approximately a 2 BCM/yr decrease in the standard deviation of annual releases. For lesser

367   hydropower production policies (e.g. moving from policy 5 to 6), a larger difference of 37 MW leads to a

368   smaller (~1 BCM/yr) change in the standard deviation of annual releases. Also, rules including drought

369   mitigation policy tend to have greater mean output and 10th percentile of water releases, but lesser standard

370   deviation of annual water release, spillage loss, and evaporation loss than original rules (see Fig. S3 in

371   Appendix S1).

373   Fig. 9 Multi-objective optimization of reservoir operating rules with drought mitigation policies.

374   After re-optimization with the drought policy information included, greater power generation and smaller

375   values of the standard deviation of annual water releases are produced. More importantly, the re-optimized

23

rules can fully ensure minimum annual releases under different reservoir inflow levels (Fig. 10). The reservoir operation results of the proposed drought policy are compared with those of conventional drought/water sharing policies. A conventional water sharing policy here refers to a "guaranteed quantity" or "minimum flow" strategy, i.e., GERD will guarantee a fixed volume of water release each year. Compacts adopting this strategy in whole or in part include the Colorado River Compact, Arkansas River Basin Compact, and Sabine River Compact, 68 Stat. 690 (1953) (McCormick, 1994;Draper, 2006). A comparison (Fig. 11) indicates that the flexible drought policy proposed here can generate more power than a conventional (static) drought policy with a similar statistical distribution of water releases. In addition, flexible policies can better mitigate drought conditions (see the kernel distribution as well as 10th percentile of water releases in Fig. 11) than static policies for similar power output levels. This is because the flexible policy is derived from optimal reservoir operation results, which tends to generate more power. In contrast, the static policy (which is presented as a horizontal line instead of sloped lines in Fig. 10) transfers the risk of water shortages (or hydrologic variability) completely to the upstream GERD, which will limit GERD's ability to produce more power.

391   Fig. 10 Relationship between annual reservoir inflow and releases using re-optimized reservoir operating rules;

392   drought policies represented by lines; gray points refer to the inflow and release relationship from which drought

393   policies are derived.

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395   Fig. 11 Comparison of reservoir operations using flexible and static drought policies based on power generation

396   output and water release distribution analysis. Policy type 1 refers to the comparison with a similar statistical

397   distribution of water releases; Policy type 2-6 refer to comparisons with similar power generation outputs.

398   These re-optimized rules produce slightly more power than the original rules for equivalent standard

399   deviation of annual release values (Fig. 12(a)) even though they are re-optimized constrained on annual

400   water releases for drought conditions). Performance of the re-optimized rules, however, mainly depends

401   on the exceedance parameter z in equation (10); more conservative drought mitigation policies (with larger

402   z values) can generate more power. Because the trade-off between power generation and the standard

403   deviation of annual releases is similar between the original rules and drought policy rules (Fig. 12(b)), it

404   is feasible to base negotiations on the original rules in this case, as the expected drought policy outcomes

405   are superior.

Fig. 12 (a) Pareto fronts of reservoir operation with and without drought policy; (b) boxplot of reservoir storage for solution A and B in the Pareto fronts and kernel distribution of annual reservoir water releases with and without the drought policies.

5. Conclusions

Reservoir operations in river basins will become more complex after considering diverse and potentially conflicting objectives between upstream and downstream stakeholders. With the water-sharing policy framework proposed here for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River, a relationship between downstream and upstream water availability is established, water-sharing policies are derived from multi-objective optimization results of reservoir operating rules, and the effectiveness of these policies during drought periods is analyzed. It is demonstrated that a framework incorporating RBF-based rules and a drought-focused water sharing policy can lead to robust reservoir decision-making. There is a clear trade-off between power generation and the standard deviation of reservoir releases; however, effective policies are available to balance this trade-off, even considering drought periods.

It is worth noting that there are limited drought periods in the historical streamflow time series, which may lead to greater uncertainty in water sharing during severe droughts and may result in underestimating

421   the impact of hydrologic variability on GERD operations. To address this, the GERD inflow record could

422   be extended by relating it to other long-term gauging stations in the Nile basin to capture more historical

423   droughts and better characterize hydrologic conditions for enhanced policy design. In addition, the trade-

424   off in objectives may be affected by land use or climate changes, and if significant, the drought policy

425   may need to be adjusted accordingly in the future. However, there will always exist a trade-off between

426   reservoir power generation and water release variability, which can be used to inform drought policy

427   design, and the linear feature of the drought policy makes it relatively easy to adjust. It is very important

428   to connect the characteristics of a water sharing policy with the trade-off between reservoir storage and

429   releases. In this study, greater variability in releases leads to a steeper gradient of the drought policy line.

430   These types of drought policy characteristics can provide guidance for stakeholders to effectively adjust

431   the water sharing policy. Thus, the interpretable drought policy proposed here can enhance the

432   understanding of water sharing and promote multilateral negotiations between upstream and downstream

433   countries.

434   This framework here is based on annual flows, however seasonal and monthly scale operations could be

435   of primary importance in smaller basins or for smaller-capacity reservoirs. Also, many other objectives

436   and constraints including firm power output, agricultural water supply reliability, and ecosystem functions

437   could be considered. Future research could explore drought-focused water sharing policies guiding

438   reservoir operations across multiple time scales simultaneously and the application of seasonal-to-sub-

439   seasonal inflow forecasts.

Appendix S1: Supplemental Figures

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
441

442   Fig. S1 Pareto front for maximum firm output (90% guarantee) and minimum annual water release variance.

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
Fig. S2 Kernel distribution of annual reservoir inflow (Qin) and water release (Qout) under different power

generation levels (1965-2017). Vertical lines represent the 10% exceedance value.

Fig. S3 Parallel plots of multiple objectives (A: mean output (MW), B: 10th percentile of annual water release (BCM), C: standard deviation of annual water release (BCM), D: spillage loss (BCM/yr), E: evaporation loss (BCM/yr)) of each policy corresponding to the Pareto fronts in Fig. 9. The bold green line refers to the reservoir operation without the drought policy.

Code and Data Availability Statement

Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Author Contribution

Guang Yang developed the model code and performed the simulations, visualizations, and original draft preparation. Paul Block conceptualized the idea and performed data curation and writing- reviewing and editing.

Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest in this work.

Acknowledgements

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