Preprints
https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-2021-578
https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-2021-578

  22 Nov 2021

22 Nov 2021

Review status: this preprint is currently under review for the journal HESS.

Socio-hydrological modeling of the tradeoff between flood control and hydropower provided by the Columbia River Treaty

Ashish Shrestha1,, Felipe Augusto Arguello Souza2,, Samuel Park3,, Charlotte Cherry4,, Margaret Garcia1, David J. Yu3, and Eduardo Mario Mendiondo2 Ashish Shrestha et al.
  • 1School of Sustainable Engineering and the Built Environment, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
  • 2Department of Hydraulics and Sanitation, São Carlos School of Engineering, University of São Paulo, São Carlos, Brazil
  • 3Lyles School of Civil Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
  • 4Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
  • These authors contributed equally to this work.

Abstract. The Columbia River Treaty (CRT) signed between the United States and Canada in 1961 is known as one of the most successful transboundary water treaties. Under continued cooperation, both countries equitably share collective responsibilities of reservoir operations, and flood control and hydropower benefits from treaty dams. As the balance of benefits is the key factor of cooperation, future cooperation could be challenged by external social and environmental factors which were not originally anticipated, or change in the social preferences of the two actors. To understand the robustness of cooperation dynamics we address two research questions – i) How does social and environmental change influence cooperation dynamics? and ii) How do social preferences influence the probability of cooperation for both actors? We analyzed infrastructural, hydrological, economic, social, and environmental data to inform the development of a socio-hydrological system dynamics model. The model simulates the dynamics of flood control and hydropower benefit sharing as a function of the probability to cooperate, which in turn is affected by the share of benefits. The model is used to evaluate scenarios that represent environmental and institutional change, and changes in political characteristics based on social preferences. Our findings show that stronger institutional capacity ensures equitable sharing of benefits over the long term. Under current CRT, the utility of cooperation is always higher for Canada than non-cooperation which is in contrast to the U.S. The probability to cooperate for each country is lowest when they are self-interested but fluctuates in other social preferences scenarios.

Ashish Shrestha et al.

Status: open (until 17 Jan 2022)

Comment types: AC – author | RC – referee | CC – community | EC – editor | CEC – chief editor | : Report abuse

Ashish Shrestha et al.

Ashish Shrestha et al.

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Short summary
Equitable sharing of benefits is key to successful cooperation in transboundary water resource management. However, external changes can shift the split of benefits and shifts in the preferences regarding how an actor’s benefits compare to other’s benefits. To understand how these changes can impact the robustness of cooperative agreements, we develop a socio-hydrological system dynamics model of the benefit sharing provision of the Columbia River Treaty and assess a series of scenarios.