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2 **Socio-meteorology: flood prediction, social preparedness, and cry wolf effects**

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11



12 **Abstract**

13 To improve the efficiency of flood early warning systems (FEWS), it is important to
14 understand the interactions between natural and social systems. The high level of trust in
15 authorities and experts is necessary to improve the likeliness of individuals to take
16 preparedness actions responding to warnings. Despite a lot of efforts to develop the
17 dynamic model of human and water in socio-hydrology, no socio-hydrological models
18 explicitly simulate social collective trust in FEWS. Here we develop the stylized model
19 to simulate the interactions of flood, social collective memory, social collective trust in
20 FEWS, and preparedness actions responding to warnings by extending the existing socio-
21 hydrological model. We realistically simulate the cry wolf effect, in which many false
22 alarms undermine the credibility of the early warning systems and make it difficult to
23 induce preparedness actions. We found (1) considering the dynamics of social collective
24 trust in FEWS is more important in the technological society with infrequent flood events
25 than in the green society with frequent flood events; (2) as the natural scientific skill to
26 predict flood events is improved, the efficiency of FEWS gets more sensitive to the
27 behavior of social collective trust, so that forecasters need to determine their warning
28 threshold by considering the social aspects.

29



30

31 **1. Introduction**

32 The number of severe flood events is expected to increase in many regions due to climate
33 change (Hirabayashi et al. 2013, 2021). Based on the advances of weather forecasting
34 (e.g., Bauer et al. 2015; Miyoshi et al. 2016; Sawada et al. 2019) and hydrodynamic
35 modeling (e.g., Yamazaki et al. 2011; Trigg et al. 2016), Flood Early Warning Systems
36 (FEWS) have become the promising tool to efficiently mitigate the damage of severe
37 floods. However, to maximize the potential of FEWS, it is crucially important to
38 understand the interactions between flood and social systems. The likeliness of
39 individuals to take preparedness actions responding to flood warnings strongly depends
40 on the individual's risk perception which is controlled by the complex interaction between
41 natural hazards and stakeholders (Wachinger et al. 2013).

42

43 In the literature of weather forecasting, the “cry wolf effect” has been intensively
44 investigated as an important interaction between weather prediction and social systems.
45 In Aesop's fable, the “The Boy who Cried Wolf”, a young boy repeatedly tricks
46 neighboring villagers into believing that a wolf is attacking the sheep. When a wolf
47 actually appears and the young boy seriously calls for help, the villagers no longer trust



48 the warning and fail to protect their sheep. Many false alarms undermine the credibility
49 of the early warning systems. The cry wolf effect on mitigation and protection actions
50 against meteorological disasters has been investigated in economics, sociology, and
51 psychology. Simmons and Sutter (2009) performed econometric analysis of a disaster
52 database and revealed that tornadoes that occurred in areas with higher false alarm ratio
53 killed and injured more people. Ripberger et al. (2015) performed a web-based
54 questionnaire survey and revealed that subjective perceptions of warning system's
55 accuracy are systematically related to trust in a weather agency and stated responses to
56 warnings. Trainor et al. (2015) performed large-scale telephone interviews and revealed
57 the significant relationship between actual false alarm ratio and behavioral responses to
58 tornado warnings. They also found that there is a wide variation in public definition of
59 false alarms and actual false alarm ratio does not predict perception of false alarm ratio,
60 which illustrated the significant complexity associated with the analysis of false alarms.
61 Although Trainor et al. (2015) could not find the significant relationship between
62 perceived false alarm ratio and responses to warnings, Jauernic and van den Broeke
63 (2017) revealed that the odds of students initialing sheltering decreases nearly 1% for
64 every 1% increase in perceived false alarm ratio based on their online questionnaire
65 survey of 640 undergraduate students. While these previous works supported the cry wolf



66 effect as an important factor to be considered for the design of warning systems, many
67 existing studies discussed the myth of cry wolf effects implying that they do not exist.
68 For example, LeClerc and Joslyn (2015) performed a psychological experiment in which
69 participants decided whether to apply salt brine to a town's roads to prevent icing
70 according to weather forecasting. In their experiment, the effects of false alarms are so
71 small that they found no evidence suggesting lowering false alarm ratio significantly
72 increases compliance with weather warnings. Lim et al. (2019) performed an online
73 questionnaire survey and found no significant relationship between actual false alarm
74 ratio and responses to warnings. In addition, they found that the increase of perceived
75 false alarm ratio enhanced protective behavior, which contradicted the other works.
76 Although the existence of the cry wolf effect is still debatable, the warning threshold of
77 the actual weather warning systems can be justified only if the cry wolf effect is
78 considered (Roulston and Smith 2003). It is crucially important to understand the effect
79 of false alarms on behavioral responses to warnings to design efficient weather warning
80 systems.

81

82 Socio-hydrology is an emerging research field to contribute to understanding the
83 interactions between flood and social systems (Sivapalan et al. 2012, 2014; Di



84 Baldassarre et al. 2019). The primary approach of socio-hydrology is to develop the
85 dynamic model of water and human. Many socio-hydrological models used social
86 preparedness as a key driver of human-water interactions (e.g., Di Baldassarre et al. 2013;
87 Viglione et al. 2014; Ciullo et al. 2017; Yu et al. 2017; Albertini et al. 2020). The
88 pioneering work of Giron Lopez et al. (2017) revealed the effect of social preparedness
89 on the efficiency of FEWS. Their main finding is that social preparedness is an important
90 factor for flood loss mitigation especially when the accuracy of the forecasting system is
91 limited. However, to our best knowledge, the existing socio-hydrological models
92 simulated social preparedness as a function of social collective memory or personal
93 experience of past disasters, and they considered no effect of trust in authorities and
94 experts. Therefore, the cry wolf effect cannot be analyzed in the existing models. The
95 systematic review of Wachinger et al (2013) indicated that both personal experience of
96 past disasters and trust in authorities and experts have the substantial impact on risk
97 perception. It is crucially important to include the social collective trust in FEWS in the
98 socio-hydrological model to improve the design of FEWS considering social system
99 dynamics.

100



101 The aim of this study is to develop the stylized model of the responses of social systems
102 to FEWS as the simple extension of Girons Lopez et al. (2017). By modeling the
103 dynamics of social collective trust in FEWS as a function of the recent success and failure
104 of the forecasting system, we realistically simulate the cry wolf effect. By analyzing our
105 newly developed model, we provide useful implication to maximize the potential of
106 FEWS considering social system dynamics.

107

108 **2. Model**

109 Here we slightly modified the model proposed by Girons Lopez et al. (2017). For brevity,
110 the detailed explanation of equations shared with Girons Lopez et al. (2017) is omitted in
111 this paper. See Gironz Lopez et al. (2017) and references therein for the complete
112 description.

113

114 A synthetic time series of river discharge is generated. Following Girons Lopez et al.
115 (2017), a simple bivariate gamma distribution, Γ , is used:

$$116 Q \sim \Gamma(\kappa_c, \theta_c) \quad (1)$$

117 where Q is maximum annual flow. The bivariate gamma distribution is characterized by
118 shape κ_c and scale θ_c .



119

120 This maximum annual flow, Q , is forecasted. In our model, the ensemble flood forecasting
121 system (e.g., Cloke and Hornberger 2009) is installed and the probabilistic forecast can
122 be issued. The forecast probability distribution, F , is calculated by the following:

$$123 \quad F \sim N(Q + N(\mu_m, \sigma_m^2), N(\mu_v, \sigma_v^2)) \quad (2)$$

124 where $N(\cdot)$ is the Gaussian distribution, $N(\mu_m, \sigma_m^2)$ controls the prediction accuracy,
125 and $N(\mu_v, \sigma_v^2)$ controls the prediction precision. While Giron Lopez et al. (2017)
126 changes μ_m in their simulation, we set $\mu_m = 0$ assuming the forecast is unbiased.
127 While Giron Lopez et al. (2017) used the bivariate gamma distribution to model the
128 prediction precision, we used the Gaussian distribution to make it easier to interpret
129 results.

130

131 There is a damage threshold, δ , which is the proxy of levee height. When $Q > \delta$, flood
132 occurs. The forecast system calculates the probability of river discharge exceeding δ
133 and issues a warning if this probability of exceedance, P , is larger than a predefined
134 probability threshold, π . Table 1 summaries four different outcomes of forecasting: true
135 positive, false positive, false negative, and true negative. When forecasters choose lower
136 π , they issue many warnings with low forecasted probability of flooding, which inevitably



137 increases false alarms. When forecasters choose higher π , they can reduce the number of
138 false alarms by issuing the smaller number of warnings, which inevitably increases
139 missed events.

140

141 Based on these four different outcomes shown in Table 1, damages and costs are
142 calculated. Flood damage is assumed to be negligible when river discharge is smaller than
143 a damage threshold (i.e. $Q < \delta$). When $Q \geq \delta$, the damage function is defined as a
144 simple exponential function, which is often used in the socio-hydrological literature (e.g.,
145 Di Baldassarre et al. 2013):

$$146 \quad D_Q = \begin{cases} 0 & (Q < \delta) \\ 1 - e^{-\frac{Q-\delta}{\beta}} & (Q \geq \delta) \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

147 where D_Q is damage, β is a model parameter. If a flood event is successfully forecasted
148 and a warning is issued (i.e. $P \geq \pi$), this damage is mitigated by preparedness actions.

149 How much damage can be mitigated depends on social preparedness, P_r . The mitigated
150 damage (called residual damage in Girons Lopez et al. (2017)), D_r , is calculated by the
151 following:

$$152 \quad D_r = D_Q e^{-P_r \ln(\frac{1}{\alpha_0})} \quad (4)$$

153 where α_0 is a model parameter which determines the minimum possible damage. In
154 summary, the flood damage, D , can be described by equation (5):



$$D = \begin{cases} 0 & (Q < \delta) \\ 1 - e^{-\frac{Q-\delta}{\beta}} & (Q \geq \delta \text{ and } P < \pi) \\ \left(1 - e^{-\frac{Q-\delta}{\beta}}\right) e^{-P_r \ln\left(\frac{1}{\alpha_0}\right)} & (Q \geq \delta \text{ and } P \geq \pi) \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

156

157 Whenever a warning is issued, the cost, C , arises from mitigation and protection actions.

158 Following Girons Lopez et al. (2017), we assumed that the cost is calculated by:

$$159 \quad C = \begin{cases} 0 & P < \pi \\ \eta Q & P \geq \pi \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

160 where η is a parameter.

161

162 The dynamics of social preparedness, P_r , in this study is different from Girons Lopez et

163 al. (2017). We assumed that the social preparedness consists of social collective memory

164 and social collective trust in FEWS:

$$165 \quad P_r(t) = \gamma E(t) + (1 - \gamma)T(t) \quad (7)$$

166 where $E(t)$ and $T(t)$ are social collective memory and social collective trust in FEWS

167 at time t , respectively. γ is a model parameter that weights $E(t)$ and $T(t)$. In many

168 socio-hydrological models, social collective memory is driven by the recency of past

169 flood experience. Following Girons Lopez et al. (2017), the dynamics of social collective

170 memory is described by the following:

$$171 \quad E(t + 1) = \begin{cases} E(t) - \lambda E(t) & (D = 0) \\ E(t) + \chi D & (D > 0) \end{cases} \quad (8)$$



172 where λ and χ are model parameters.

173

174 We assumed that social collective trust in FEWS is affected by the recent accuracy of
175 FEWS. Previous studies pointed out that the recent forecast accuracy and false alarm ratio
176 affected the performance of preparedness actions (Simmons and Sutter 2009; Trainor et
177 al. 2015; Ripberger et al. 2015; Jauernic and van den Broeke 2017). It is reasonable to
178 assume that trust in FEWS increases (decreases) when prediction succeeds (fails)
179 (Wachinger et al. 2013). We propose the following simple equation to describe the
180 dynamics of social collective trust in FEWS:

$$181 \quad T(t+1) = \begin{cases} T(t) & \text{for true negative} \\ T(t) + \tau_{TP} & \text{for true positive} \\ T(t) - \tau_{FN} & \text{for false negative} \\ T(t) - \tau_{FP} & \text{for false positive} \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

182 where τ_{TP} , τ_{FN} , and τ_{FP} , are positive parameters. By changing the value of these
183 parameters, we can change the sensitivity of social collective trust in FEWS to the
184 accuracy of FEWS. We will analyze the behavior of our model associated with several
185 different combinations of these three parameters.

186

187 In our equations (7-9), we can consider both social collective memory and social
188 collective trust to analyze behavioral responses to warnings. For instance, please assume



189 that a severe flood occurs and substantially damages a community, and this flood events
190 cannot be predicted. In this case, social collective memory increases due to the large
191 damage (equation (8)). This increase of social collective memory $E(t)$ contributes to
192 increasing social preparedness towards the next severe flood events (equation (7)).
193 However, the failure of predicting this flood events decreases social collective trust in
194 FEWS and authorities related to warning systems (equation (9)), which negatively
195 impacts to the capability of a community to deal with the next flood events by decreasing
196 social preparedness (equation (7)).

197

198 If social preparedness is determined only by social collective memory as Girons Lopez et
199 al (2017) proposed, social preparedness constantly decreases and goes to 0 when no
200 floods occur for a long while. In our proposed model, high social collective trust in FEWS
201 can maintain the high level of social preparedness even if a community completely loses
202 past flood experiences (equation (7)). However, if a weather agency repeatedly issues
203 false alarms, social collective trust in FEWS decreases (equation (9)), which negatively
204 impacts to social preparedness (equation (7)). Therefore, the dynamics of social
205 preparedness in our proposed model is greatly different from Girons Lopez et al. (2017).

206



207 Many of the model parameters are fixed in our analysis. Table 2 summarizes the
208 description and values of the fixed parameters. Some parameters are changed in our
209 analysis to check their sensitivity to the performance of FEWS. Those parameters are
210 explained in the next section.

211

212 **3. Experiment design**

213 **3.1. Metrics**

214 We used several metrics to evaluate the performance of FEWS. The purpose of FEWS
215 is to reduce the total loss ($D + C$). We used the relative loss as Girons Lopez et al. (2017)
216 did. The relative loss, L_r , is defined by equation (10):

$$217 \quad L_r = \frac{L_{FEWS}}{L_{noFEWS}} \quad (10)$$

218 We performed the long-term (1000-year) numerical simulation by solving equations (1-
219 9) and calculated the total loss, L_{FEWS} . We also performed the simulation without FEWS,
220 in which flood damage is always calculated by equation (3) and D is always equal to D_Q .
221 The total loss of this additional simulation is defined as L_{noFEWS} . The relative loss
222 measures the efficiency of FEWS.

223



224 In addition to relative loss, we used hit rate, false alarm ratio, and threat score to evaluate
225 the prediction accuracy, which is not related to social system dynamics. They are defined
226 by equations (11-13):

$$227 \textit{ hit rate} = \frac{O_{TP}}{O_{TP}+O_{FN}} \quad (11)$$

$$228 \textit{ false alarm ratio} = \frac{O_{FP}}{O_{FP}+O_{TP}} \quad (12)$$

$$229 \textit{ threat score} = \frac{O_{TP}}{O_{TP}+O_{FP}+O_{FN}} \quad (13)$$

230 where O_{TP} , O_{FN} , and O_{FP} are the total number of true positive, false negative, and false
231 positive events, respectively.

232

233

234 **3.2. Simulation Settings**

235 We firstly compared the original model proposed by Girons Lopez et al. (2017) with our
236 modified model. When we set $\gamma = 1$ in equation (7), our model reduces to Girons Lopez
237 et al. (2017) since we have no contributions of social collective trust in FEWS to social
238 preparedness. In this paper, this original model is hereafter called the GL model. On the
239 other hand, when we set $\gamma = 0.5$ in equation (7), our model considers both social
240 collective memory and social collective trust in FEWS with same weights to calculate
241 social preparedness. This new model is hereafter called the SKK model.



242

243 In the experiment 1, the timeseries of state variables of the two models are compared to
244 demonstrate how differently the SKK and GL models work. The parameter variables in
245 the experiment 1 are shown in Table 3.

246

247 We mainly focused on the relationship between relative loss and a predefined probability
248 threshold, π . This warning threshold is important for forecasters to determine whether
249 they require general citizens to take preparedness actions. In the experiment 2, we used
250 the same damage threshold, δ , as Girons Lopez et al (2017) and compared the
251 relationship between relative loss and predefined warning thresholds in the GL model
252 with that in the SKK model under the different prediction skills and the cost parameter η .
253 The settings of the parameters in the experiment 2 can be found in Table 4.

254

255 In the experiment 3, we also compared the GL and SKK models under different damage
256 thresholds, δ . In socio-hydrology, previous works focused on the difference between
257 “green” and “technological” society (Ciullo et al. 2017). In green society, the flood
258 protection level is so low that many flood events occur, which increases social collective
259 memory of flood events. In technological society, the flood protection level is high. Since



260 flood events occur less frequently in the technological society, the high level of social
261 collective memory cannot be maintained. By changing the damage threshold, we
262 analyzed how differently the GL and SKK models behave in the different society. The
263 settings of the parameters in the experiment 3 can be found in Table 5.

264

265 In the experiment 4, we analyzed only the SKK model. The primary purpose of this
266 experiment 4 is to find the optimal predefined warning threshold, which minimizes
267 relative loss, in not only different society and prediction accuracy but also different
268 combinations of parameters related to the dynamics of social collective trust in FEWS
269 (i.e., τ_{TP} , τ_{FN} , and, τ_{FP} in equation (9)). The settings of the parameters in the
270 experiment 4 can be found in Table 6.

271

272 In experiments 2–4, we performed the 250-member Monte-Carlo simulation by randomly
273 perturbing a predefined probability threshold, π , and the initial conditions of social
274 collective memory and social collective trust in FEWS. We analyzed the sensitivity of the
275 efficiency of FEWS to predefined warning thresholds.

276

277



278 **4. Results**

279 Figure 1 shows the time series of social preparedness of the GL and SKK models in the
280 experiment 1 (see Table 3). In the GL model (Figure 1a), social preparedness (black line)
281 increases when flood occurs (red and green bars) and is not affected by false alarms (blue
282 bars). In the SKK model (Figure 1b), false alarms negatively impact social preparedness
283 by reducing social collective trust in FEWS (pink line). From $t = 430$ to $t = 440$,
284 consecutive false alarms substantially decrease social collective trust in FEWS and social
285 preparedness, so that the damage of severe flood at $t = 452$ in the SKK model is larger
286 than that in the GL model despite the accurate warning being issued. It is the cry wolf
287 effect.

288

289 Figure 2a shows the relationship between relative loss and predefined warning thresholds
290 simulated by the GL model in the experiment 2 (see Table 4). We firstly assumed that
291 there is no cost of the mitigation and protection action and is the relatively accurate
292 prediction system (the experiment 2.1; see Table 4). In this case, FEWS can minimize the
293 relative loss with the extremely small predefined warning thresholds (blue line). When
294 we degrade the prediction skill (the experiment 2.2; see Table 4), forecasters still maintain
295 the same level of relative loss by setting low (or zero) predefined warning thresholds



296 issuing many false alarms (orange line). It is apparently unrealistic. In the framework of
297 the GL model, this unrealistic model's behavior can be eliminated by setting the high cost
298 of the mitigation and protection action responding to the issued warning. When we
299 assume the high cost of preparedness actions (the experiment 2.3; see Table 4), the small
300 predefined warning threshold induces high relative loss (green line). Forecasters need to
301 avoid issuing false alarms when the cost which should be paid with false alarms is large.

302

303 The SKK model can give different explanation of the avoidance of false alarms. Figure
304 2b shows the relationship between relative loss and predefined warning thresholds
305 simulated by the SKK model in the experiment 2 (see Table 4). Although we assumed no
306 cost and an accurate prediction system (the experiment 2.4; see Table 4), forecasters need
307 to avoid issuing false alarms by the relatively high predefined warning thresholds to
308 minimize relative loss (blue line). Due to the cry wolf effect found in Figure 1b,
309 forecasters need to decrease the number of false alarms to mitigate the damage of flooding
310 even if there were no cost of false alarms. In other words, forecasters in the SKK model
311 need to pay "implicit cost" of false alarms because false alarms induce not only the cost
312 of mitigation and protection actions for nothing at the current time but also the increase
313 of damages of the future floods by reducing the social collective trust and preparedness.



314 When we degrade the prediction accuracy (the experiment 2.5; see Table 4), relative loss
315 is more sensitive to predefined warning thresholds (orange line) because the selection of
316 the threshold is more important to accurately detect flood events and reduce the number
317 of false alarms when the prediction is more inaccurate and uncertain. When we consider
318 the high cost of mitigation and protection actions (the experiment 2.6; see Table 4), small
319 predefined warning thresholds further increase relative loss (green line).

320

321 Figure 3a compares the GL and SKK models in the green society. In the previous
322 experiments 1 and 2, the damage threshold, δ , is set to 0.35, which is same as Girons
323 Lopez et al. (2017). In the experiments 3.1 and 3.2 (see Table 5), the damage threshold is
324 reduced to 0.20, so that the number of flood events increases. In this case, the GL and
325 SKK models behave similarly. Figure 3c shows time-averaged social collective memory,
326 social collective trust in FEWS, and social preparedness as functions of predefined
327 warning thresholds. In the green society, frequent flood events make social collective
328 memory high. In addition, it is easy to maintain the high social collective trust in FEWS
329 since there are many opportunities to gain trust when flood frequently occurs. Therefore,
330 both social collective memory and social collective trust in FEWS are large in the green



331 society. Although the GL model neglect the social collective trust in FEWS to calculate
332 social preparedness, the social preparedness of both GL and SKK models is high
333
334 On the other hand, the GL and SKK models work more differently in the technological
335 society than the green society. The damage threshold, δ , is increased to 0.45 in the
336 experiments 3.3 and 3.4 (see Table 5), so that the number of flood events is smaller than
337 Girons Lopez et al. (2017). Figure 3b indicates that the relationship between relative loss
338 and predefined warning thresholds in the GL model is substantially different from that in
339 the SKK model. The SKK model produces smaller relative loss than the GL model when
340 the appropriate predefined warning threshold is chosen. The sensitivity of relative loss to
341 predefined warning thresholds is larger in the technological society than the green society.
342 Figure 3d indicates that it is difficult to maintain the high level of social collective
343 memory in the technological society, so that considering social collective trust in FEWS
344 can increase social preparedness. In addition, the choice of a predefined warning
345 threshold is more important to maintain the high level of social collective trust in the
346 technological society than the green society.
347



348 In the experiment 4, we further analyze the SKK model to discuss the optimal predefined
349 warning threshold and to provide the useful implication for the design of FEWS in the
350 various kind of social systems. We have three sets of parameters in equation (9) (see also
351 Table 6). The first set of parameters is same as the experiments 1-3. Changes in social
352 collective trust by false negative and false positive are same ($\tau_{FN} = \tau_{FP}$). In the second
353 set of parameters, we assume social collective trust substantially decreases by false
354 positive (false alarms) ($\tau_{FN} < \tau_{FP}$): $[\tau_{TP}, \tau_{FN}, \tau_{FP}] = [0.1, 0.1, 0.8]$. In the third set of
355 parameters, we assume social collective trust substantially decreases when forecasters
356 miss a flood event ($\tau_{FN} > \tau_{FP}$): $[\tau_{TP}, \tau_{FN}, \tau_{FP}] = [0.1, 0.8, 0.1]$. The blue, orange, and
357 green lines in Figures 4a-4d show that the optimal predefined warning threshold depends
358 on how social collective trust is affected by false alarms and missed events. When social
359 collective trust is affected by false alarms more substantially than missed events (orange
360 lines), forecasters need to have relatively high predefined warning thresholds to maintain
361 the high level of social collective trust (see Figures 4e-h) and minimize relative loss.
362 Figures 4a-4d also shows that the differences of optimal predefined warning thresholds
363 in three sets of parameters become larger as forecasts become accurate. The optimal
364 predefined thresholds are bounded by the range in which the high threat scores can be
365 obtained (see Figures 4i-4l). Thus, more accurate prediction systems make it more



366 important to change the predefined warning threshold according to the dynamics of social
367 collective trust. It implies that forecasters need to prioritize the meteorologically accurate
368 forecasting by maximizing threat scores. Then, they have a room for improvement to
369 change their warning thresholds based on the dynamics of social collective trust in FEWS.

370

371 **5. Discussion and conclusions**

372 In this study, we included the dynamics of social collective trust in FEWS into the existing
373 socio-hydrological model. By formulating social preparedness as a function of social
374 collective trust as well as social collective memory, we realistically simulate the cry wolf
375 effect, in which many false alarms undermine the credibility of the early warning systems.
376 Please note that the previous version of the model proposed by Girons Lopez et al. (2017)
377 cannot do it. Although our model is simple and stylized, we can provide useful implication
378 to improve the design of FEWS. First, considering the dynamics of social collective trust
379 in FEWS is more important in the technological society with infrequent flood events than
380 in the green society with frequent flood events. Second, as the natural scientific skill to
381 predict flood is improved, the efficiency of FEWS gets more sensitive to the behavior of
382 social collective trust, so that forecasters need to determine their forecasting threshold by
383 considering the social aspects.



384

385 Although our model is the small extension of Girons Lopez et al. (2017), the implication
386 of our study is completely different from Girons Lopez et al. (2017). Girons Lopez et al.
387 (2017) mainly focused on the influence of the recency of flood experience on social
388 preparedness and the efficiency of FEWS. Since their social preparedness is determined
389 only by the flood experiences and they did not consider social collective trust in FEWS
390 and weather agencies, the outcome of prediction did not directly influence the people's
391 behavior in the model of Girons Lopez et al. (2017). By formulating social preparedness
392 as a function of both social collective memory and trust, we could evaluate the effects of
393 missed events and false alarms on preparedness actions. We contributed to connecting the
394 modeling approaches of system dynamics in socio-hydrology to the existing literature
395 about complex human behaviors against disaster warnings such as cry wolf effects in
396 economics, sociology, and psychology (e.g., Simmons and Sutter 2009; Ripberger et al.
397 2015; Trainor et al. 2015; LeClerc and Joslyn 2015; Jauernic and van den Broeke 2017;
398 Lim et al. 2019)

399

400 Our findings of the optimal predefined warning thresholds are similar to Roulston and
401 Smith (2003). Roulston and Smith (2003) developed the simple model to optimize



402 predefined warning thresholds considering the damage, cost, and imperfect compliance
403 with forecasting (i.e., the cry wolf effect). They also revealed that it is necessary to choose
404 high warning thresholds if intolerance of false alarms of the society is high. However,
405 there are substantial differences between our study and the previous cost-loss analysis
406 such as Roulston and Smith (2003). First, Roulston and Smith (2003) developed the static
407 model in which the cry wolf effect is treated exogeneously while our model is the dynamic
408 model in which the cry wolf effect is endogeneously simulated. Therefore, our model can
409 consider the temporal change in the design and accuracy of FEWS, the flood protection
410 level, and social systems, which may be the significant advantage to analyze the actual
411 socio-hydrological phenomena. Second, by fully utilizing the previous achievements of
412 Girons Lopez et al. (2017), we can also consider social collective memory of past
413 disasters, which is not considered by Roulston and Smith (2003). This feature of our
414 model can reveal that the social collective memory also contributes to the optimal
415 predefined warning thresholds.

416

417 The major limitation of this study is that our modeling of social collective trust is simple
418 and is not fully supported by empirical data. Although intuition and theory suggest that
419 many false alarms reduce the preparedness actions responding to warnings, the existence



420 of the cry wolf effect in the weather-related disasters is still debatable (see a
421 comprehensive review of Lim et al. (2019)). Simmons and Sutter (2009) indicated that
422 the recent false alarms negatively impacted the preparedness actions, so that we modeled
423 the change in social collective trust by the recent forecast outcome. However, Ripberger
424 et al. (2015) could not find the statistically significant short-term effect of false alarms
425 although they found the statistically significant cry wolf effect using the long-term data.
426 It should be noted that most of previous studies related to the cry wolf effect focused on
427 tornado disasters and the systematic econometric analyses have not been implemented for
428 flood disasters. The effect of social collective memory on catastrophic disasters in the
429 actual society is also debatable (e.g., Fanta et al. 2019). As Mostert (2018) suggested, it
430 is crucially important to perform case study analyses, obtain empirical data, and integrate
431 those data into the dynamic model to deepen our understanding of the hypothesis of the
432 models (e.g., Roobavannan et al. 2017; Ciullo et al. 2017; Barendrecht et al. 2019;
433 Sawada and Hanazaki 2020).

434

435 In socio-hydrology, researchers have mainly focused on the functions of land use change
436 and water-related infrastructures such as dams, levees, and dikes in the complex social
437 systems. Although the interactions between social systems and weather forecasting such



438 as the cry wolf effect are interesting, the function of FEWS and weather-related disaster
439 forecasting has not been intensively investigated in socio-hydrology. We call for the new
440 research regime, socio-meteorology, as extension of socio-hydrology. In socio-
441 meteorology, researchers may focus on how social systems interact with water-related
442 disaster forecasting, how the efficiency of weather forecasting is affected by the other
443 hydrological factors such as land use and flood protection infrastructures, and how
444 weather forecasting affects the design of land use and flood protection infrastructures.
445



446

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448 We used the source code of Girons Lopez et al. (2017) which can be downloaded at
449 <https://github.com/GironsLopez/prep-fews>. This study does not contain any data. This
450 study was supported by the JST FOREST program (grant no. JPMJFR205Q).

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559 **Table 1.** Summary of the outcomes of the flood early warning system. Loss by each outcome is also shown
560 (see also Section 2).

561

	$Q < \delta$	$Q \geq \delta$
$P < \pi$	True negative: 0	False negative: D_Q
$P \geq \pi$	False positive: C	True positive: $C + D_r$

562

563



564 **Table 2.** Fixed model parameters

565

	description	equation	values
κ_c	shape of the bivariate gamma distribution to generate river discharge timeseries	(1)	2.5
θ_c	scale of the bivariate gamma distribution to generate river discharge timeseries	(1)	0.08
μ_m	mean of prediction error	(2)	0
β	parameter of the damage function	(3)	0.2
α_0	minimum residual damage fraction	(4)	0.2
λ	social collective memory decay rate	(8)	0.028
χ	psychological shock magnitude	(8)	1.0

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568

569 **Table 3.** Model parameters in the experiment 1.

570

	description	equation	values
σ_m	standard deviation of prediction error	(2)	0.075
μ_v	mean of prediction precision	(2)	0.15
σ_v	standard deviation of prediction precision	(2)	0.075
δ	Damage threshold	(3,5)	0.35
η	cost parameter	(6)	0.02
γ	Parameter controlling weights of social collective memory and trust	(7)	1 (GL model) 0.5 (SKK model)
τ_{TP}	Increment of trust for true positive	(9)	0.1
τ_{FN}	Increment of trust for false negative	(9)	0.1
τ_{FP}	Increment of trust for false positive	(9)	0.1

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573

574 **Table 4.** Model parameters in the experiment 2

575

	description	equation	values					
			exp2.1	exp2.2	exp2.3	exp2.4	exp2.5	exp2.6
σ_m	standard deviation of prediction error	(2)	0.05	0.075	0.05	0.05	0.075	0.05
μ_v	mean of prediction precision	(2)	0.05	0.15	0.05	0.05	0.15	0.05
σ_v	standard deviation of prediction precision	(2)	0.025	0.075	0.025	0.05	0.075	0.025
δ	Damage threshold	(3,5)	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
η	cost parameter	(6)	0	0	0.1	0	0	0.1
γ	Parameter controlling weights of social collective memory and trust	(7)	1 (GL model)	1 (GL model)	1 (GL model)	0.5 (SKK model)	0.5 (SKK model)	0.5 (SKK model)
τ_{TP}	Increment of trust for true positive	(9)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
τ_{FN}	Increment of trust for false negative	(9)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
τ_{FP}	Increment of trust for false positive	(9)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

576

577



578 **Table 5.** Model parameters in the experiment 3

579

	description	equation	values			
			exp3.1	exp3.2	exp3.3	exp3.4
σ_m	standard deviation of prediction error	(2)	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
μ_v	mean of prediction precision	(2)	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
σ_v	standard deviation of prediction precision	(2)	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
δ	Damage threshold	(3,5)	0.20	0.20	0.45	0.45
η	cost parameter	(6)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
γ	Parameter controlling weights of social collective memory and trust	(7)	1 (GL model)	0.5 (SKK model)	1 (GL model)	0.5 (SKK model)
τ_{TP}	Increment of trust for true positive	(9)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
τ_{FN}	Increment of trust for false negative	(9)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
τ_{FP}	Increment of trust for false positive	(9)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

580

581



582 **Table 6.** Model parameters in the experiment 4.

583


	description	equation	values
σ_m	standard deviation of prediction error	(2)	0.05 (accurate forecast) 0.075 (inaccurate forecast)
μ_v	mean of prediction precision	(2)	0.05 (accurate forecast) 0.15 (inaccurate forecast)
σ_v	standard deviation of prediction precision	(2)	0.025 (accurate forecast) 0.075 (inaccurate forecast)
δ	Damage threshold	(3,5)	0.20 (green society) 0.45 (technological society)
η	cost parameter	(6)	0.02
γ	Parameter controlling weights of social collective memory and trust	(7)	1 (GL model)
$[\tau_{TP}, \tau_{FN}, \tau_{FP}]$	Increment of trust for true positive, false negative, and false positive	(9)	[0.1, 0.1, 0.1] (blue lines in Figures 4a-4h) [0.1, 0.1, 0.8] (orange lines in Figures 4a-4h) [0.1, 0.8, 0.1] (green lines in Figures 4a-4h)

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


587

588 **Figure 1.** Timeseries of (a) the GL model and (b) the SKK model of the experiment 1 (see section 3 and Table
589 2 for model parameters). Black, purple, and pink lines are social preparedness, half of social collective memory,
590 and half of social collective trust in FEWS, respectively. Since social preparedness is identical to social
591 collective memory and social collective trust is not considered in the GL model, there are no purple and pink
592 lines in (a). Blue, red, and green bars show total loss by the outcomes of false positive, false negative, and true
593 positive, respectively.

594

595



596

597 **Figure 2.** The relationship between relative loss and predefined warning thresholds in (a) the GL model and


598 (b) the SKK model in the experiment 2. In (a), blue, orange, and green lines show the results of the

599 experiments 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, respectively. In (b), blue, orange, and green lines show the results of the

600 experiments 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, respectively. Each dot shows the result of the individual Monte-Carlo simulation

601 and we smoothed them by Gaussian process regression. See also Table 4 for detailed parameter settings.

602



603


604 **Figure 3.** (a-b) The relationship between relative loss and predefined warning thresholds in (a) the green
605 society and (b) the technological society. In (a), blue and green lines show the results of the experiments 3.1
606 and 3.2, respectively. In (b), blue and green lines show the results of the experiments 3.3 and 3.4,
607 respectively. (c-d) The relationship between time-averaged social preparedness and predefined warning
608 thresholds in (c) the green society and (d) the technological society. Black, purple, and pink lines show time-



609 averaged social preparedness, social collective memory, and social collective trust in FEWS. Each dot shows
610 the result of the individual Monte-Carlo simulation and we smoothed them by Gaussian process regression.
611



612



613

614 **Figure 4.** Results of the experiment 4. (a-d) The relationship between relative loss and predefined warning
615 thresholds in (a) the green society with accurate forecasts, (b) the green society with inaccurate forecasts, (c)
616 the technological society with accurate forecasts, (d) the technological society with inaccurate forecasts.
617 Increments of trust for true positive, false negative, and false positive are set to 0.1, 0.1, and 0.1 (blue lines),
618 0.1, 0.1, and 0.8 (orange lines), and 0.1, 0.8, and 0.1 (green lines). See Table 6 for detailed model
619 parameters' settings. (e-f) Same as (a-d) but for time-averaged social collective trust in FEWS. (i-l) Same as
620 (a-d) but for threat score (black lines), hit rate (purple lines), and false alarm ratio (pink lines). Each dot



621 shows the result of individual Monte-Carlo simulation and we smoothed them by Gaussian process

622 regression.

623