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Linking economic and social factors to peak flows in an agricultural watershed using socio-hydrologic modeling

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29 **Abstract:** Hydrologic modeling studies most often represent humans through predefined actions
30 and fail to account for human responses under changing hydrologic conditions. By treating both
31 human and hydrologic systems as co-evolving, we build a socio-hydrological model that
32 combines an agent-based model (ABM) with a semi-distributed hydrologic model. The curve
33 number method is used to clearly illustrate the impacts of landcover changes resulting from
34 decisions made by two different agent types. Aiming to reduce flooding, a city agent pays farmer
35 agents to convert land into conservation. Farmer agents decide how to allocate land between
36 conservation and production based on factors related to profits, past land use, and willingness.
37 The model is implemented for a watershed representative of the mixed agricultural/small urban
38 area land use found in Iowa, USA. In this preliminary study, we simulate scenarios of crop
39 yields, crop prices, and conservation subsidies along with varied farmer parameters that illustrate
40 the effects of human system variables on peak discharges. High corn prices lead to a decrease in
41 conservation land from historical levels; consequently, mean peak discharge increases by 6%,
42 creating greater potential for downstream flooding within the watershed. However, when corn
43 prices are low and the watershed is characterized by a conservation-minded farmer population,
44 mean peak discharge is reduced by 3%. Overall, changes in mean peak discharge, which is
45 representative of farmer land use decisions, are most sensitive to changes in crop prices as
46 opposed to yields or conservation subsidies.

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52 **1. Introduction**
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54 Humans change the water cycle through actions that affect physical and chemical aspects
55 of the landscape, and these changes occur from global to local scales and over varying time
56 periods (Vorosmarty and Sahagian, 2000). Despite their significant impacts to the landscape,
57 humans remain the most poorly represented variables in hydrologic models (Sivapalan et al.,
58 2012). Land cover and land use are commonly treated as fixed in time in many hydrologic
59 models through the use of static parameters. When made dynamic, landscape change is often
60 limited to predefined scenarios that are developed without consideration of how economics, local
61 culture, or climate may combine to influence land use decisions. For example, the field of
62 integrated water resources management (IWRM), which attempts to explore the interactions
63 between humans and water, typically uses “scenario-based” approaches (Savenije and Van der
64 Zaag, 2008). While scenario-based studies allow quantification of the impacts of a management
65 decision on the hydrologic system, there are significant limitations (Elshafei et al., 2014;
66 Sivapalan et al., 2012). Human and environmental systems are highly coupled with feedbacks
67 from one system creating stress on the other system, which in turn affects the behavior of the
68 first system. Therefore, representing management decisions as pre-determined will not reproduce
69 the real-world variability that may arise as a result of complex feedbacks between the human
70 system and the physical system.

71 Arguments have emerged in the hydrological sciences and Water Resources Systems Analysis
72 (WRSA) fields for modeling in which humans and the environment are treated as co-evolving
73 (e.g., Di Baldassarre et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2015; Montanari, 2015; Rosengrant et al., 2002;
74 Sivapalan et al., 2012; Sivapalan and Blöschl, 2015; Wainwright, 2008). In this way, models can
75 account for disturbances to natural systems by humans and simultaneously assess physical

76 processes and economic and social issues. In the hydrologic literature, two approaches have been
77 used to simulate coupled human and natural systems: a classic top-down approach and a bottom-
78 up approach using agent-based modeling (ABM). In the first approach, all aspects of the human
79 system are represented through a set of parametrized differential equations (e.g., Di Baldassarre
80 et al., 2013; Elshafei et al., 2014; Viglione et al., 2014). For example, Elshafei et al. (2014)
81 characterizes the population dynamics, economics, and sensitivity of the human population to
82 hydrologic change through differential equations to simulate the coupled dynamics of the human
83 and hydrologic systems in an agricultural watershed. In contrast, the ABM approach consists of a
84 set of algorithms that encapsulate the behaviors of agents and their interactions within a defined
85 system, where agents can represent individuals, groups, companies, or countries (Axelrod and
86 Tesfatsion, 2006; Borrill and Tesfatsion, 2011; Parunak et al., 1998). System agents can range
87 from passive members with no cognitive function to individual and group decision-makers with
88 sophisticated learning and communication capabilities. The ABM approach has several
89 advantages over the traditional top down approach (Bonabeau, 2002). Agent-based models are
90 able to capture emergent phenomenon that result from interactions between individual entities. In
91 addition, simulating individual entities through ABM provides for a more natural description of a
92 system in contrast to developing differential equations that capture the behavior of the system as
93 a whole. ABMs also provide for greater modeling flexibility by allowing for different number of
94 agents, various degrees of agent complexity, and behavioral differences among the agents. ABM
95 has been used to study the influence of human decision making on hydrologic topics such as
96 water balance and stream hydrology (Bithell and Brasington, 2009), flooding (Du et al., 2017;
97 Jenkins et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2018), irrigation and water usage (Barreteau et al., 2004; Becu
98 et al., 2003; Berger et al., 2006; Berglund, 2015; van Oel et al., 2010; Schlüter and Pahl-wostl,

99 2007), water quality (Ng et al., 2011), and groundwater resources (Noel and Cai, 2017; Reeves
100 and Zellner, 2010).

101 A dominating topic in the hydrologic sciences that can be studied through use of ABMs
102 is the issue of land use change impacts on hydrologic flows in intensively managed agricultural
103 landscapes (Rogger et al., 2017). A number of studies have attempted to quantify the impact of
104 land use change on streamflow (Ahn and Merwade, 2014; Frans et al., 2013; Naik and Jay, 2011;
105 Schilling et al., 2010; Tomer and Schilling, 2009; Wang and Hejazi, 2011) Ahn and Merwade
106 (2014) is one such study that found that 85% of streamflow stations in Georgia indicated a
107 significant human impact on streamflow. Another study by Schilling et al., (2010) indicated a
108 32% increase in the runoff ratio in the Upper Mississippi River basin due to land use changes,
109 mainly due to increases in soybean acreage. Results of Wang and Hejazi (2011) are consistent
110 with Schilling et al., (2010). They found a clear spatial pattern of increased human impact on
111 mean annual streamflow over the Midwestern states due to increases in cropland area.
112 The above studies use more traditional methods such as hydrologic modeling, trend analysis, or
113 Budyko analysis to determine the impact of land use change on streamflow. We use the social–
114 hydrologic modeling approach to better understand the effects of land use change. Using ABMs
115 may allow for a more in-depth investigation of hydrologic changes and how they may be tied to
116 external economic variables and watershed population characteristics.

117 In this study, we develop a social-hydrologic model that simulates changes in conservation
118 land area over time within an agriculturally-dominated watershed as a function of dynamic
119 human and natural factors. Using a sensitivity analysis approach, we use this model to quantify
120 the impact of economic and human factors on land use changes relating to conservation

121 implementation and subsequently, how these land use changes impact the hydrologic system. We
122 explore the following research questions:

123 1) To what degree do economic and agronomic factors (specifically crop prices,
124 conservation incentives, and crop yields) impact the success of a conservation
125 program designed to reduce peak flows?

126 2) To what degree are hydrologic outcomes sensitive to various factors that commonly
127 influence agricultural land use decisions?

128 Using simulations of a historical 47 year period, we explore land use and hydrologic
129 outcomes for a typical agricultural watershed in Iowa under the following six scenarios
130 developed from economic data: crop yields 11% above and below historical values, corn prices
131 19% above and below historical values, and conservation subsidy rates 27% above and below
132 historical cash rent values. Additionally, we simulate land use and hydrologic outcomes for the
133 historical period without any perturbations to these economic data for comparison purposes. The
134 following model methodology is described using the ODD (Overview, Design Concepts, and
135 Details) protocol developed by Grimm et al. (2006).

136 **2. Model Purpose**


137
138 The purpose of the model is to understand the impact of land use decisions by upstream
139 farmers on flooding response in a downstream urban area under perturbations to extrinsic
140 economic and natural factors (e.g. crop prices, land rental values, climate), as well as intrinsic
141 factors (e.g. internal farmer behavior, local government incentives). System behavior under
142 changes in extrinsic and intrinsic factors is analyzed using a scenario-based ensemble approach.

143 144 **2.1 State Variables and Scales**

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146 The model links an agent-based model of human decision making with a rainfall-runoff
 147 model to simulate social and natural processes within highly-managed agricultural watersheds
 148 (Figure 1). The agent-based model consists of two types of agents: a group of farmer agents and
 149 a city agent.

150 The primary modeling domain consists of the watershed and the subbasins located within
 151 the watershed. The model user must define the subbasins based on external analyses of
 152 hydrologic flows and conditions. Each subbasin is populated by one or more farmer agents as
 153 specified by the user. A farmer agent modifies the land use of the subbasin in proportion to the
 154 subbasin area assigned to that agent. The most downstream subbasin in the watershed is
 155 populated by an urban center, which is represented by a city agent. The city agent impacts land
 156 use by providing subsidies to upstream farmer agents to change his/her land management.



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Figure 1. Flow of information within the agent-based model.

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2.1.1 Farmer agent state variables

161 The primary state variable for a farmer agent is the conservation parameter ($Cons_{max}$),
162 which characterizes the degree to which a farmer agent is “production-minded” versus
163 “conservation-minded”. This concept is based on McGuire et al. (2013) who identified that
164 US cornbelt farmers tend to fall along a spectrum from purely productivist to purely
165 conservationist. $Cons_{max}$ is randomly assigned to each farmer agent upon initialization and
166 provides variation in farmer agent behavior based on how an individual agent may prefer to
167 balance maximizing crop yields versus protecting the environment. $Cons_{max}$ represents the
168 maximum fraction of land a farmer is willing to put into conservation. The minimum value is
169 0.0, in which case a farmer is purely production-minded and is unwilling to convert any
170 production land into conservation. We set the maximum value at 10% ($Cons_{max} = 0.10$) based
171 on the conservation practice used in this study (Section 2.7.1). Therefore, a farmer is purely
172 conservation-minded at a parameter value of 0.1, and is willing to convert up to 10% of
173 his/her production land into conservation. This range of values corresponds to the percentage
174 of conservation land implemented over each of the last ten year for the entire state of Iowa
175 (~5-6% conservation land) and the Central Iowa Agricultural District (~3-4% conservation
176 land).

177 A secondary state variable of importance to the farmer agent is risk aversion attitude
178 (Prokopy et al., 2019). Risk aversion can be defined as the willingness to change land use
179 under uncertainty. Farmers with a high risk aversion are unwilling to change their land use
180 because they are trying to avoid risk. Keeping their land use consistent represents a more
181 predictable payoff, even if the revenue may not be as great as another land use choice.

182 Farmers that are more risk tolerant however, are more likely to adopt new practices such as
183 conservation. Farmer agents are further characterized by their decision-making preferences,
184 which describe the relative importance that farmer agents place on different decision variables
185 when adjusting their land use. The farmer agent decision characteristics are described in Sect.
186 2.7.2.

187 Each farmer agent is assigned state variables characterizing the percent of different soil
188 types associated with the farmer's land. Corn crop productivity and crop production costs
189 (including the land rental value) vary for each soil type. Thus, the soil types associated with a
190 farmer agent's land impact his/her revenue.

191 **2.1.2 City Agent State Variables**

192 The city agent is characterized by a conservation goal that defines the amount of acres of
193 conservation land desired. The purpose of the conservation land is to reduce flooding in the city,
194 and the conservation goal changes from year-to-year depending on prior hydrologic events. The
195 damage that the city agent incurs from a flood event is defined by a flood damage function. A
196 parameter, $ConsGoal_{max}$, in the agent model defines how responsive the city agent is to prior
197 hydrologic outcomes and determines by how much the city agent will change the conservation
198 goal after experiencing a flood event (Section 2.8)


199 **2.2 Model Overview and Scheduling**

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202 Each year, the agent-based model proceeds through monthly time steps to simulate the
203 relevant decision making. The hydrologic module proceeds in shorter hourly time steps to
204 capture flood discharge events associated with rainfall events. Figure 2 depicts the decision-
205 scheduling within the agent-based model. In January, the farmer agent calculates his/her

206 preferred land division between production and conservation based on their risk aversion
207 attitude, conservation-mindedness, newly acquired information about the global market (crop
208 prices, crop production costs, and crop insurance), conservation subsidies provided by the city
209 agent, as well as recent farm performance (profits and yields) (Figure 2, purple box).

210 In February, the city agent contacts farmer agents in random order to establish new
211 conservation contracts if an unmet conservation goal remains or to renew any expiring contracts
212 (Figure 2, yellow box). If the farmer agent wants to add additional conservation acreage, a new
213 contract is established for a 10 year period. The contract length is based on the Conservation
214 Reserve Program (CRP), which is a program administered by the Farm Service Agency that
215 promotes removal of environmentally-sensitive land from agricultural production in exchange
216 for an annual subsidy payment. However, if the farmer agent wants fewer conservation hectares,
217 expiring contracts are renewed for a smaller number of hectares or are ended. The farmer is
218 obligated to fulfill any contracts that have not yet expired (i.e. contracts less than 10 years old).
219 Any new acreage that has been established in conservation in addition to currently active
220 contracts is subtracted from the city agent's conservation goal that was established in January.
221 The city agent contacts as many farmer agents as needed until the conservation goal is reached.
222 If there are not enough farmer agents willing to enter into conservation contracts and the
223 conservation goal is not reached, the goal rolls into the next year. Because the farmer agents'
224 land use decisions change on a yearly basis, it may be possible for the city agent to establish
225 further contracts in the next year and fulfill the conservation goal.



226

Figure 2. Timeline of agent decisions and actions within the agent-based model.

227 Prior to May, the farmer agent establishes any newly contracted conservation land on the
 228 historically poorest yielding land. The farmer agent makes no further decisions during May
 229 through August (Figure 2). The city agent continuously keeps track of any flooding that occurs
 230 during the May-August period (when the maximum discharge is assumed to occur) (Figure 2,
 231 orange box). The associated flood damage cost is calculated in September and used to calculate
 232 whether any further conservation land should be added (Figure 2, green box). If no flooding
 233 occurred, the conservation goal remains unchanged. In October, the farmer agent harvests his/her
 234 crop and calculates yields and profits for that year (Figure 2, blue box).

235 **2.3 Design Concepts**

236

237 **Emergence:** Patterns in total conservation land and flood magnitude arise over time, depending
238 on a number of variables. Agent decision-making parameters and behavioral characteristics (e.g.
239 conservation-mindedness) influence the total acreage in conservation land, which in turn affects
240 the magnitude of floods through changes in runoff productivity of the landscape.

241 **Objectives and Adaptation:** The goal of the city agent is to reduce flood damage in the city.
242 The city agent attempts to meet this goal through an incentive program in which farmer agents
243 are paid to convert production land to a conservation practice that will reduce runoff. If the city
244 agent incurs a large cost from flooding in a given year, the city agent adjusts his/her
245 “conservation goal” upward in order to reduce future flood damage from events of similar
246 magnitude. The objective of the farmer agent is to balance profits with conservation and risk-
247 aversion attitude. The farmer agents incrementally adjust their land use on an annual basis by
248 taking into account profit variables, risk-aversion, and conservation-mindedness.

249 **Stochasticity:** Adjustments and stochastic variability are added to key agricultural variables,
250 which include crop yields, production costs, cash rent values, and opportunity costs associated
251 with conservation land in order to account for economic and environmental randomness within
252 the system (Supplement S1.1, S1.2, S2). Random factors for these variables are drawn from
253 uniform continuous distributions that are based on field data of crop yields, empirical survey
254 data, and estimates published by Iowa State University Extension and Outreach. Changes in
255 these distributions are also accounted for, depending on crop price levels.

256 **Learning:** As will be outlined further in Sect. 2.7.2, each year, the farmer agents calculate profit
257 differences between crop production and conservation subsidies. Farmer agents save this profit
258 difference information from the beginning of the simulation and use it to adjust their decision-

259 making space on an annual basis. The profit difference information is based on past crop prices,
260 production costs, and conservation subsidies.

261 **2.4 Model Input**

262 263 **2.4.1 Economic Inputs**


264
265 Inputs to the agent-based models are historical crop prices (\$/MT), production costs
266 (\$/Ha), cash rental rates (\$/Ha), and federal government subsidy estimates (\$/Ha). An example of
267 these model inputs is shown in Fig. 3 in comparison to mean Iowa crop yields.

268 **2.4.2 Production Costs**

269
270 Production costs are treated as a time series input, with total costs per hectare for each
271 year represented by one lumped value. Production costs used in this model application include
272 land rent, machinery, labor, crop seed, chemicals, and crop insurance (Plastina, 2017). Since
273 estimates put the amount of land rented out in Iowa for farming at 60-80%, it is assumed that all
274 farmer agents rent their land (Plastina et al., 2018; Zhang, 2015). This significantly increases
275 expenses as land rental costs account for approximately half of total production costs (Plastina,
276 2017).

277 **2.4.3 Conservation Subsidy and Costs**

278 The conservation subsidy is based on the CRP Contour Grass Strips practice (CP-15A)
279 which includes annual land rental payments and 90% cost share for site preparation and
280 establishment (USDA Conservation Reserve Program Practice CP-15A, 2011). Subsidies are
281 calculated using annual inputs of historical cash rental rates. The cost of establishing and
282 maintaining conservation land is based on analysis conducted by Tyndall et al., (2013). These
283 costs are adjusted based on the land quality of each farmer agent (Supplement S1.2).



284
 Figure 3. Example input time series of corn price, production cost, and cash rent as compared to
 285 mean crop yields.

285 **2.4.4 Federal Government Subsidies**

286 Calculation of federal government crop subsidies for individual farmer agents were not
 287 included in the agent-based model due to the complexity and variety of commodity programs
 288 available to US farmers, each of which focuses on different aspects of revenue protection (e.g.,
 289 protection against low crop prices, protection against revenue loss). Rather, federal crop
 290 subsidies are an input to the model and applied equally to each farmer agent. In this study, crop

291 subsidy inputs are based on historical estimates produced by Iowa State University Agricultural
292 Extension (Hofstrand, 2018).

293 **2.4.5 Environmental Variables**

294 The hydrology module requires hourly liquid precipitation (mm) as an input to simulate
295 discharge from short-term heavy rainfall events. The crop yield module requires inputs of mean
296 monthly precipitation and temperature to estimate crop yields (Section 2.6). The module
297 calculates mean monthly precipitation based on the hourly precipitation input, however, the user
298 must provide an input of mean monthly temperatures (C).

299 **2.5 Hydrology Module**

300 A model structure that is designed to simulate peak flows was chosen for the hydrology
301 module. Because the city agent in this model is impacted only by the maximum annual peak
302 flow, precisely simulating the full time series of hydrologic flows as well as hydrologic
303 components such as groundwater flow and evapotranspiration were not needed to meet the
304 objectives of the current study. The modeling structure was designed based on a version of the
305 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Hydrologic Engineering Center Hydrologic Modeling System
306 (HEC-HMS) (Scharffenberg, 2013) used by the City of Ames, Iowa for flood forecasting in the
307 Squaw Creek watershed in central Iowa. The Squaw Creek watershed represents the type of
308 rural-urban conditions of interest for this study and is a useful test-bed for this modeling
309 application (Section 3). Further, calibrated parameters were available for the Squaw Creek
310 watershed (Schmieg et al., 2011), providing a realistic baseline for the hydrology module.

311 Using the configuration and parameters previously defined by Schmieg et al. (2011) for
312 the Squaw Creek watershed, the model on average was within 12.7% of the observed peak
313 discharge for 12 major events simulated. Six of these events were simulated within 3-8% of the

314 observation, while the least satisfactory simulation overestimated the observed peak discharge by
315 33%. This error was most likely due to the high spatial variability of precipitation for that event.
316 For the two most recent record flooding events that have occurred, the model underestimated the
317 peak discharge by 6.2% (2008, observed: $356.7 \text{ m}^3\text{s}^{-1}$, simulated: $334.6 \text{ m}^3\text{s}^{-1}$) and 16.6% (2010,
318 observed: $634.3 \text{ m}^3\text{s}^{-1}$, simulated $528.3 \text{ m}^3\text{s}^{-1}$), showing that the model is able to simulate the
319 flooding events needed to run scenarios within the ABM with a fair degree of accuracy. The
320 HEC-HMS model has also been successfully used for simulation of short term rainfall-runoff
321 events and peak flow and flood analysis in other studies (Chu and Steinman, 2009; Cydzik and
322 Hogue, 2009; Gyawali and Watkins, 2013; Halwatura and Najim, 2013; Knebl et al., 2005;
323 Verma et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2013).

324 In the module, basin runoff is computed using the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) curve
325 number (CN) method, runoff is converted to basin outflow using the SCS unit hydrograph (SCS-
326 UH) method, and channel flow is routed through reaches in the river network using the
327 Muskingum method (Mays, 2011). A single area-weighted CN parameter is required for each
328 subbasin and is the only hydrology module parameter that changes during the simulation if land
329 cover changes. The SCS-UH method requires specification of subbasin area, time lag, and model
330 timestep. The Muskingum method is based on the continuity equation and a discharge-storage
331 relationship which characterizes the storage in a river reach through a combination of wedge and
332 prism storage (Mays, 2011). The Muskingum method requires specification of three parameters
333 for each reach within the river network: Muskingum X, Muskingum K, and the number of
334 segments over which the method will be applied within the reach (Mays, 2011). Muskingum X
335 describes the shape of the wedge storage within the reach whereas Muskingum K can be
336 approximated as the travel time through the reach.

337 For the agricultural areas, empirically-derived CN values (Dziubanski et al., 2017) are
338 used for native prairie strips; a CN = 82 is used for 100% row crop production; and a CN = 72
339 is used for the conservation option implemented by the farmer agents. Urban areas are set to a
340 CN = 90 which is derived from the standard lookup tables for residential areas with lot sizes
341 of 0.051 hectares or less, soil group C (USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service,
342 2004). Subbasin delineations and Muskingum parameters previously defined by Schmieg et al.
343 (2011) are used.

344 The model accepts point-scale rainfall data (e.g., rain gauge data) and calculates mean areal
345 precipitation using the Thiessen Polygon gauge weighting technique (Mays, 2011). The Thiessen
346 weights are entered as parameters to the module. For the initial testing presented in this paper,
347 uniform precipitation over the entire watershed was assumed.

348 Output from the hydrology module is discharge at the watershed outlet ($\text{m}^3 \text{s}^{-1}$). The
349 hydrology module is run continuously but is designed primarily for simulation of peak flows,
350 which generally occur during the summer in the study region; therefore, for simplicity, a constant
351 baseflow is assumed and snow is ignored. Runoff, river routing processes, and discharge are
352 computed on a timestep identical to the input rainfall data. The model is run at an hourly
353 timestep in this study, but is capable of running at a 30-minute timestep.

354 **2.6 Crop Yield Module**

355
356 Crop yields are modeled with a multiple regression equation that takes into account
357 monthly precipitation and temperature. The regression equation, which was developed using
358 historical crop yield and meteorological data for Iowa from 1960-2006, can be represented as
359 (Tannura et al., 2008):

$$\begin{aligned}
yield_t = & \beta_0 + \beta_1(year_t) + \beta_2(September\ through\ April\ precipitation) \\
& + \beta_3(May\ precipitation) + \beta_4(June\ precipitation) \\
& + \beta_5(June\ precipitation)^2 + \beta_6(July\ precipitation) \\
& + \beta_7(July\ precipitation)^2 + \beta_8(August\ precipitation) \\
& + \beta_9(August\ precipitation)^2 + \beta_{10}(May\ temperature) \\
& + \beta_{11}(June\ temperature) + \beta_{12}(July\ temperature) \\
& + \beta_{13}(August\ temperature) + \varepsilon_t
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

360 Mean error of the above regression for Iowa over the 1960-2016 period is -0.395 MT/ha,
361 and mean absolute error is +0.542 MT/ha. An error correction factor of +0.395 MT/ha was added
362 to the yield for each year to correct for this error. The above regression model is only appropriate
363 for reproducing mean historical crop yields. Since each farmer's land can be composed of
364 different soil types, adjustments are applied to the crop yield for each soil type to account for
365 differences in soil productivity (Supplement S2).

366 **2.7 Farmer Agent Module**

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368 **2.7.1 Conservation option**

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370 The conservation option implemented by farmer agents is native prairie strips, a practice
371 in which prairie vegetation is planted in multiple strips perpendicular to the primary flow
372 direction upland of and/or at the farm plot outlet (Dziubanski et al., 2017; Helmers et al.,
373 2012; Zhou et al., 2010). Either 10% or 20% of the total field size is converted into native
374 prairie vegetation under this practice. Prairie strips have been shown to reduce runoff by an
375 average of 37% (Hernandez-Santana et al., 2013), and have additional benefits of reducing
376 nutrients (Zhou et al., 2014) and sediments (Helmers et al., 2012) in runoff. The greatest
377 runoff reduction was realized under the 10% native prairie cover; therefore, the most
378 conservation-minded farmers ($Cons_{max} = 0.10$) in the model potentially convert up to 10% of
379 their total land into native prairie.

380 **2.7.2 Farmer agent land use decision process**

381
382 Agents within an ABM can be modeled using a variety of decision models with varying
383 degrees of complexity (An, 2012; Zenobia et al., 2009). An (2012) compiled a list of nine of the
384 most common decision models used in agent-based modeling studies. Examples of a few of these
385 include micro economic models, space theory based models, cognitive models, and heuristic
386 models. In micro-economic models, agents are typically designed to determine optimal resource
387 allocation or production plans such that profit is maximized and constraints are obeyed (Berger
388 and Troost, 2014). Example studies using optimization include Becu et al. (2003), Ng et al.
389 (2011), Schreinemachers and Berger (2011). In heuristic-based models, agents are set up to use
390 “rules” to determine their final decision (Pahl-wostl and Ebenhöh, 2004; Schreinemachers and
391 Berger, 2006). The “rules” are typically implemented using conditional statements (e.g. if-then).
392 Example studies using heuristics include Barreteau et al. (2004), Le et al. (2010), Matthews
393 (2006), van Oel et al. (2010).

394 We take a different approach from the aforementioned studies by modeling agent decision
395 making using a nudging concept originating in the field of data assimilation (Asch et al., 2017).
396 Agents nudge their decision based on outcomes (i.e. flood damage, farm profitability) from the
397 previous year. Information relevant to an individual agent is mapped into the decision space
398 through a weighting function that updates the previous year’s land use decision to create a new
399 decision for the current year. The approach used for both agents is different from optimization in
400 that the agents are not trying to determine the best decision for each year. These types of agents
401 behave based on the idea of “bounded rationality”. In this case, the rationality of the agents is
402 limited by the complexity of the decision problem and their cognitive ability to process
403 information about their environment (Simon, 1957). These agents try to find a satisfactory

404 solution for the current year, and are thus termed “satisficers” rather than optimizers (Kulik and
 405 Baker, 2008).

406 At the start of each calendar year, a farmer agent decides how to allocate his/her land
 407 between production and conservation based on five variables: risk-aversion, crop price
 408 projections, past profits, conservation goal, and neighbor land decisions. These factors were
 409 chosen based on numerous studies indicating profits, economic incentives, conservation beliefs,
 410 beliefs in traditional practices, neighbor connections, and observable benefits to be the key
 411 factors influencing on-farm decision making related to conservation adoption (Arbuckle, 2017;
 412 Arbuckle et al., 2013; Burton, 2014; Daloğlu et al., 2014; Davis and Gillespie, 2007; Hoag et al.,
 413 2012; Lambert et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 2015; Nowak, 1992; Pfrimmer et al., 2017; Prokopy
 414 et al., 2019; Ryan et al., 2003).

415 A farmer agent’s decision of the total amount of land to be allocated into conservation, D_t ,
 416 for the current year t is:

$$D_t = W_{risk-averse}[C_{t-1:t-X}] + W_{futures}[D_{t-1} + \delta C_{futures:Y}] + W_{profit}[D_{t-1} + \delta C_{profit:X}] + W_{cons}[D_{t-1} + \delta C_{cons}] + W_{neighbor}[C_{neighbor}] \quad (2)$$

417 where $C_{t-1:t-X}$ is the mean total amount of land allocated to conservation during the previous X
 418 years, D_{t-1} is the prior conservation decision (total amount of land the farmer would have liked
 419 to implement in conservation) in year $t - 1$, $\delta C_{futures:Y}$ is the decision based on crop price
 420 projections for Y years into the future, $\delta C_{profit:X}$ is the decision based on the mean past profit of
 421 the previous X years, δC_{cons} is the decision based on the conservation goal of the farmer, and
 422 $C_{neighbor}$ (Supplement S3) is the weighted mean conservation land of the farmer agent’s
 423 neighbors (Table 1). A given farmer can make a certain random number of neighboring
 424 connections with farmers that are located in the same subbasin (Supplement S3). The variable Y

425 indicates that one farmer agent might consider his/her history of conservation land implemented
426 over the last year, while another farmer agent might consider his/her conservation land
427 implemented over the last 5 years. Similarly, the variable X indicates that one farmer agent might
428 take into account future crop projections for the next 5 years, while another farmer agent might
429 take into account crop projections for the next 10 years.

430 Decision weights alter how each of the five components factor into the farmer agent's
431 decision: $W_{risk-averse}$ reflects the unwillingness to change past land use, $W_{futures}$ reflects the
432 consideration of future price projections, W_{profit} reflects the consideration of past profits, W_{cons} is
433 the agent's consideration of his/her conservation goal, and $W_{neighbor}$ reflects the importance that
434 the agent places on his neighbor's decision (Table 2). Upon initializing each farmer agent, values
435 are allocated for each decision weight such that:

$$W_{risk-averse} + W_{futures} + W_{profit} + W_{cons} + W_{neighbor} = 1 \quad (3)$$


436 The above decision scheme allows for varying decision weights, thus one farmer's
437 decision may be heavily weighted by future crop prices, whereas another farmer's decision may
438 be heavily weighted by past profits. If majority of a farmer's decision is based on $W_{risk-averse}$,
439 then that farmer is less inclined to change his/her previous land use.

440 The decision components for past profit and future crop prices are based on a partial
441 budgeting approach that compares land use alternatives. Under this budgeting approach, farmer
442 agents take into account added and reduced income, as well as added and reduced costs from
443 changing an acre of land from crop production to conservation (Tigner, 2006). The result from
444 performing this budget indicates the net gain or loss in income that a farmer agent may incur if
445 they make the land conversion.

446 The past profits decision is solely based on outcomes that have been fully realized for the
447 previous X years. In this decision, the land allocated to conservation is based on the net amount
448 of money that could have been earned per hectare of conservation land versus crop land and is
449 calculated as:

$$\delta C_{profit:X} = [A * Profit_{diff}^2 + B * Profit_{diff} + C] \cdot Cons_{max} \cdot Hectares_{tot} \quad (4)$$

450 where $Profit_{diff}$ is the difference in profit between a hectare of cropland and a hectare of
451 conservation land (Table 1), $Cons_{max}$ is the farmer agent's maximum conservation parameter,
452 $Hectares_{tot}$ is the area of the agent's land. $Profit_{diff}$ integrates costs and revenue of crop
453 production as well as costs and revenue of conservation land, which are computed based on
454 model input data (Section 2.4, Supplement S4). In the case of $\delta C_{profit:X}$, $Profit_{diff}$ is
455 calculated using realized crop prices from previous years (Supplement S4). The future price
456 decision variable, $\delta C_{futures:Y}$, is also calculated using the same form of Eq. (4). However,
457 $Profit_{diff}$ is calculated using projected crop prices for the Y upcoming growing seasons. These
458 price projections are based on historical crop prices with an added adjustment calculated from
459 historical errors in crop price forecasts produced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
460 (Supplement S5).



461

Figure 4. Example of percent conservation change for δC_{profit} and $\delta C_{futures}$. Gray curves indicate negative percent change (decrease conservation land), black curves indicate positive percent change (increase conservation land).

462

463 The first term in Eq. (4), the second-degree polynomial of form $Ax^2 + Bx + C = y$, is
 464 displayed in Fig. 4. At the start of each year, farmers may decide to alter their land use based on
 465 observed $Profit_{diff}$ from harvests in previous years ($\delta C_{profit:X}$) or calculated $Profit_{diff}$ based
 466 on projected crop prices ($\delta C_{futures:Y}$). If $Profit_{diff}$ is positive (i.e. greater profit is earned from
 467 crop production than conservation land), the farmer agent will potentially decrease the amount of
 468 land in conservation (gray curve). Likewise, under negative $Profit_{diff}$, conservation land is
 469 potentially increased because revenue is lower from crop production (black curve). Half of the
 470 maximum allowable percent increase in conservation land is assumed to correspond to the
 471 median historical negative $Profit_{diff}$, whereas half of the maximum allowable percent decrease
 472 in conservation land corresponds to the median historical positive $Profit_{diff}$ (Figure 4). We
 473 assume that farmer agents will not change land use when a very small profit difference between

474 the two possible options is observed because changing land use requires extra upfront time and
 475 resources (Duffy, 2015). Similarly, we assume that farmer agents will fully implement the
 476 maximum land conversion possible prior to reaching the most extreme $Profit_{diff}$ values. Three
 477 equations need to be simultaneously solved to determine coefficients A, B, C (Supplement S4).
 478 The three equations are based on the 25th, median, and 75th percentiles of historical $Profit_{diff}$
 479 information. Thus, farmers are continually utilizing historical observations of $Profit_{diff}$ to
 480 formulate their decision space through time.

481 The use of a profit function (i.e. Eq. (4)) is meant to capture to effects of changes in crop
 482 prices on conservation land. In 2008 and 2011, corn prices rose to a record high values, and
 483 farmers in the Midwest U.S. (e.g., Iowa, Minnesota) were converting significant portions of CRP
 484 land back into crop production (Marcotty, 2011; Secchi and Babcock, 2007). It is estimated that
 485 when corn prices rise by \$1.00, 10-15% of CRP land in Iowa is converted back to production
 486 (Secchi and Babcock, 2007). Eq. (4) captures this transition between adding and removing
 487 conservation land based on crop price change, and it allows for variation in the decision-making
 488 between farmer agents since variables such as crop production costs vary from farm to farm.

489 The total amount of agricultural land that a farmer converts to conservation in any given
 490 year based on his/her conservation goal (δC_{cons}) is defined by the Bernoulli distribution:

$$P(n) = p^n(1 - p)^{1-n} \quad n \in \{0,1\} \quad (5)$$

491 Here, p indicates the probability of fully implementing conservation land and $1 - p$ indicates the
 492 probability of not implementing any conservation land. The variable n is simply the support of
 493 the distribution that labels a success of full implementation as 1 and a failure of full

494 implementation as 0. The probability p of fully implementing conservation land is a function of
 495 the agent's $Cons_{max}$ parameter and is computed by:

$$p = 10 \cdot Cons_{max} \quad (6)$$

496 The probability p scales from 0 at a $Cons_{max}$ of 0, to 1 at a $Cons_{max}$ of 0.1. Therefore, farmer
 497 agents with a $Cons_{max}$ of 0.05 and 0.1 will have a 50% and 100% probability of fully
 498 implementing (10% of total agricultural land) conservation land in any given year based on their
 499 conservation decision variable.

500 **2.8 City Agent Module**

501
 502 At the end of each year, the city agent collects discharge data and calculates the damage
 503 (Supplement S7) associated with the peak annual discharge at the watershed outlet for that year.
 504 In February of the next year, the flood damage for the previous year $t - 1$ is used to compute the
 505 conservation goal of the city agent for the current year t .

506 The conservation goal of the city agent is calculated as:

$$G_t = G_{t-1} + (A_{tot} - C_{tot}) \cdot P \quad (7)$$

$$P = P_{new} \cdot FDam \quad (8)$$

507

$$P_{new} = \frac{ConsGoal_{max}}{FDmax} \quad (9)$$

508 where G_t is the conservation goal for the new year t (Table 1), G_{t-1} is the unfulfilled hectares in
 509 conservation from the previous conservation goal for year $t - 1$, A_{tot} is the total land area
 510 owned by the farmer agents, C_{tot} is the total number of hectares currently in conservation, P is
 511 the percentage of new production land added into conservation, P_{new} indicates how much land to
 512 add into conservation based on the flood damage $FDam$ for year $t - 1$, and $ConsGoal_{max}$ is a
 513 parameter that indicates the new percentage of conservation land to be added if maximum flood

514 damage occurs (Table 2). Currently, $ConsGoal_{max}$ is set to 5% of total land area in the
515 watershed when maximum damage occurs.

516 **3. Scenario Analysis**

517
518 The study watershed is modeled after the Squaw Creek basin (~56200 Ha) located in
519 central Iowa, USA (Figure 5). This basin is characterized by relatively flat hummocky
520 topography and poorly drained soils with a high silt and clay content (~30-40% silt and clay)
521 (Prior, 1991; USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA-NRCS), 2015). The
522 predominant land use is row crop agriculture (~70% of the total watershed area) with one major
523 urban center at the outlet (Ames, Iowa), and several small communities upstream. Average
524 annual precipitation is 32 inches (812 mm), with the heaviest precipitation falling during the
525 months of May and June. The watershed is divided into 14 subbasins.




Figure 5. Squaw Creek watershed and subbasin division used in the hydrology module. Land cover data shown is from the National Land Cover Database (NLCD), 2016.

526

527 In this model application, 100 farmer agents are implemented (~7 farmers per subbasin)
 528 with 121 hectares total for each farmer. The total acreage per farmer compares reasonably well
 529 with average farm size for the state of Iowa in 2017, which was 140 hectares (USDA National
 530 Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018). Soil types and the area of land associated with each soil
 531 type are randomly assigned to each farmer agent upon model initialization. Assigning different

532 soil types creates heterogeneous conditions under which farmer agents must operate (Supplement
533 S2) and affects the profitability of each farmer agent differently.

534 Six scenarios are run: high and low yield ($\pm 11\%$ from historical yield), high and low
535 corn prices ($\pm 19\%$ from historical prices) and high and low conservation subsidies ($\pm 27\%$ from
536 historical cash rent). The watershed was also simulated under historical conditions, in which no
537 economic variables were changed, for comparison purposes. The 90th percentile discharge in
538 analyzed, which represents the 0.1 exceedance probability level, to examine changes in large
539 discharge events. The above percentages were computed using trends and mean absolute
540 deviations of historical economic data. For instance, based on the crop regression model (Section
541 2.6), crop yields display a relatively linear increase with time. The mean absolute deviation of
542 crop yield was then computed using the linear time trend as a central tendency. The mean
543 absolute deviation was determined to be 11%, thus the yield scenarios are $\pm 11\%$ from the
544 historical yield. The same approach was used for the crop price and conservation subsidy
545 scenarios. A linear and cubic function were found to provide a good estimate of the central
546 tendency of historical cash rent and crop prices, respectively, for those calculations. In addition,
547 four different farmer decision schemes are created in which an 80% weight was assigned to one
548 decision variable, with all other variable weights set to 5% (Table 3). Each scenario is tested with
549 each decision scheme and system outcomes under different farmer behaviors are assessed.

550 To test the sensitivity of the hydrologic system to farmer types, the conservation
551 parameter ($Cons_{max}$) of the farmer agents is varied using a stratified sampling approach. Each
552 farmer agent is randomly assigned a $Cons_{max}$ value from a predefined normal distribution:
553 ($\overline{Cons_{max}}, \sigma_{Cons_{max}}$). The lowest distribution is defined as $\mathcal{N}(0.01, 0.01)$ and the highest
554 distribution is defined as $\mathcal{N}(0.09, 0.01)$. Any farmer agent that is assigned a parameter value

555 less than 0 or greater than 0.1 is modified to have a value of 0 or 0.1, respectively. Twelve
556 simulations are performed for each conservation parameter distribution, with a total of 17
557 conservation parameter distributions. Thus, the first 12 simulations consist of farmer agents with
558 $Cons_{max}$ chosen from $\mathcal{N}(0.01, 0.01)$. For the next 12 simulations, the mean $Cons_{max}$ is shifted
559 up by 0.05, with $Cons_{max}$ chosen from $\mathcal{N}(0.015, 0.01)$. A total of 204 simulations are
560 conducted for each decision scheme under each scenario (Table 3).

561 Each simulation is run using 47 years of historical climate and market data, with the
562 exception of federal crop subsidies, which are based on 16 years of historical estimates produced
563 by Iowa State University Agricultural Extension (Hofstrand, 2018; Table 4). It is assumed that
564 federal crop subsidy payments from 1970-2000 are similar to levels seen from year 2000-2005
565 due to relative stability in long-term crop prices and production costs. The hourly 47 year
566 precipitation time series data was obtained from the Des Moines, Iowa airport Automated
567 Surface Observing System. Historical 47 year time series of corn prices, crop production costs,
568 and land rental values are used as economic inputs into the model and were obtained from Iowa
569 State University Agricultural Extension and Illinois FarmDoc (Table 4).

570 **4. Model Calibration and Validation**

571 Calibrating and validating the social part of social-hydrologic models is difficult due to
572 reasons that include lack of sufficiently detailed empirical data or system complexity at various
573 scales (An, 2012; Ormerod and Rosewell, 2009; Troy et al., 2015). Validation of agent-based
574 models is usually performed on what are termed the micro and macro levels. The micro level
575 involves comparing individual agent behaviors to real world empirical data whereas the macro
576 level involves comparing the model's aggregate response to system-wide empirical data (An et
577 al., 2005; Berger, 2001; Troy et al., 2015; Xiang et al., 2005). Troy et al., (2015) suggests that

578 one or a few model simulations out of an ensemble of simulations should match the real-world
579 observed data.

580 We conduct an indirect macro-level model calibration for determining an appropriate
581 range of farmer agent decision weights (Windrum et al., 2007). Since the subsidy program
582 offered by the city agent is similar to the federal Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the
583 model was developed and calibrated to attempt to reproduce the range and variability of
584 conservation land seen in the CRP program. CRP data from 1986-2016 for the Central Iowa
585 Agricultural District was used in the calibration process and two main objectives functions were
586 used:

$$MAE = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |y_i - x_i|}{n} \quad (10)$$


$$Pearson's\ r = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2} \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \bar{y})^2}} \quad (11)$$

588
589 In the first step of calibration, the focus was to determine an appropriate range of mean
590 *ConsMax* of the farmer agent population to match the magnitude of CRP land seen for central
591 Iowa. The model was simulated 360 times using 20 random sets of farmer agent decision
592 weights. Output from the first calibration step was filtered using a criteria of $r > 0.6$ and
593 $MAE < 25\%$, and the optimal *ConsMax* range was reduced to 0.05-0.07. In the second step of
594 calibration, the focus was to determine a singular optimal mean *ConsMax* value and narrow the
595 range for each decision weight. *ConsMax* was incremented by 0.001 within the range derived
596 from step 1, and 20 simulations were performed for each increment using decision weights
597 stochastically drawn from the uniform distribution $\mathcal{U}(0.05, 0.95)$ for a total of 400 simulations.
598 Output was filtered using a stricter criteria of $r > 0.7$ and $MAE < 25\%$. The final calibration

599 step involved 400 simulations with the optimal mean *ConsMax* value and stochastic sampling
600 from the reduced range of decision weights derived in step 2. Filtering with a criteria of $r > 0.75$
601 and $MAE < 12.5\%$ was performed to determine the final optimal decision weight ranges.

602 The optimal mean *ConsMax* value was determined to be 0.06 and the final optimal
603 decision weight ranges were determined to be: $W_{risk-averse} = (0.1, 0.43)$, $W_{futures} =$
604 $(0.07, 0.24)$, $W_{profit} = (0.07, 0.34)$, $W_{cons} = (0.18, 0.37)$, $W_{neighbor} = (0.05, 0.35)$. The
605 median r and MAE values of the simulations after filtering with the criteria in step three ($r >$
606 0.75 , $MAE < 12.5\%$) were 0.79 and 11% respectively. Sixty-six out of 400 simulations matched
607 this criteria in step three, whereas only seven matched this criteria in step one and 26 matched
608 this criteria in step two.

609 The model simulated conservation land generally aligns with trends in the observed
610 conservation land (Figure 6). Simulated conservation land is not maintained following a rise in
611 crop prices in the mid-1990s and from 2006-2013, which is similar to the observed data (red).
612 The drop in conservation land during these time periods occurs because the subsidy rate is not
613 modified rapidly enough in comparison to market forces to incentivize the farmer (Newton,
614 2017). The model does capture the smaller decrease in conservation land between 2007 and
615 2014, even though crop prices rose more dramatically than in the mid-1990s.



616

617 Figure 6. Simulated conservation land from four model simulations with Pearson's $r > 0.8$ and
 618 MAE < 12.5% in comparison to observed conservation land.
 619

620 The onset of significant land conversion in the model is offset from the observations.
 621 Conservation land is implemented in the mid-1970s, while conservation land in the observation
 622 is implemented in the late-1980s. The CRP program did not come into existence until 1985,
 623 which partly explains this difference. A large rise in conservation land to roughly 4% occurs
 624 from 1975-1978, most likely due to a combination of decreasing crop prices from 1974-1977 and
 625 model spin up. This is similar to the rate of rise in conservation land that occurred under the CRP
 626 programs from 1985-1987 under a comparable period of decreasing crop prices.

627 Overall calibration does provide evidence that the model captures changes in CRP land
 628 during the appropriate time periods. However, the calibration technique does have limitations.

629 The technique followed here was an indirect calibration approach, whereby the parameters are
630 determined based on the simulations that replicate the empirical data best (Fagiolo et al., 2006).
631 This technique can lead to equifinality since difference parameter sets may reproduce the
632 historical observations with similar degrees of accuracy. Further, this calibration approach does
633 not provide evidence that any individual agent's decisions are valid. The stochastic nature of
634 human behavior coupled with path dependencies makes it difficult to predict individual agent
635 outcomes accurately (Berglund, 2015). A dominating problem with calibrating ABMs is that it
636 may be difficult to find sufficient data sets to support a robust validation at the micro-level. For
637 modeling land use decisions, data is typically available at a larger scale such as county or state
638 level rather than at the individual agent-level (e.g. single farm) (An, 2012; Parker et al., 2008).
639 This introduces difficulty in trying to validate farm-level decisions with respect to farm-level
640 finances (Section 2.7.2). Adding in additional factors, such as Federal Market Loss Assistance
641 and Loan Deficiency Payments, as well as trying to characterize some of the other model
642 parameters that were not a focus of this calibration, may further improve results.

643 In light of the paper by Windrum et al. (2007), there has been much debate as to the
644 proper methodology and techniques to follow for ABM validation (Bharathy and Silverman,
645 2013; Hahn, 2013). To fully validate the current model, a more extensive process may be
646 necessary. Macal et al., (2007) introduced a framework for ABM validation that may provide for
647 a more comprehensive evaluation. This framework includes subject matter expert evaluation,
648 participatory simulation, model-to-model comparison, comparison against critical test cases,
649 invalidation tests, and comprehensive testing of the entire agent strategy and parameter space.
650 However, following this framework is very time costly, and thus most recent studies have
651 focused on empirical validation against real world macro level data, with some studies validating


652 at the individual agent level if data is available (Fagiolo et al., 2019; Guerini and Moneta, 2017;
653 Langevin et al., 2015; Schwarz and Ernst, 2009).

654 5. Results

655 5.1 Crop Price Scenarios

656 The 90th percentile peak discharge is 296.4 m³/s when no conservation is occurring in the
657 watershed (Figure 7). The 90th percentile peak discharge decreases for all four decision schemes
658 and under all scenarios as the average conservation-mindedness ($Cons_{max}$) of the population
659 increases (Figure 7). The low crop price scenario produces a larger decline in peak discharge
660 compared to the high crop price scenario, with the exception of the conservation decision scheme
661 (80% weight on conservation) in which both low and high crop price scenarios produce a similar
662 ensemble pattern (Figure 7a).

663




664

Figure 7. Mean 90th percentile discharge for high and low crop price scenarios under (a) 80% weight on conservation goal, (b) 80% weight on future price, (c) 80% weight on past profit, and (d) 80% weight on risk aversion. Bars indicate the median (circle) and the 5th and 95th percentiles of discharge for all simulations at a specific $Cons_{max}$.

665 Under low crop prices, peak discharge reaches an average reduction of 8.18% (24.27 m³/s)
666 when the average $Cons_{max}$ is 0.08-0.09 (conservation-minded population) and 4.67% (13.85
667 m³/s) when the average $Cons_{max}$ is 0.04-0.06 (mixed population). The decrease in peak
668 discharge corresponds with the 800-1000 hectares and 400-600 hectares converted to
669 conservation by the conservation-minded and mixed farmer populations, respectively (Figure 8a,
670 c, e, g). The production-minded populations ($Cons_{max}$ ~0.01-0.02) implement less than 200
671 hectares during the entire simulation period. These acreage values represent 6.5-8.2%, 3.3-5.0%,
672 and less than 2.0% of the entire watershed for the conservation-minded, mixed, and production-
673 minded groups, respectively. Given that 10% of the watershed would be in conservation if native
674 prairie strips were fully implemented, about 65-80% of a conservation-minded population fully
675 implements the practice over the simulation period under low crop prices.

676 Under the high crop prices, mean peak discharge decreases by 5.6 % (16.6 m³/s) under the
677 future price weighting scheme and 2.9% (8.6 m³/s) under the past profit weighting schemes for
678 the highly conservation-minded population (Figure 7b and c, respectively), with an even smaller
679 reduction seen for the risk-averse scenario. This represents approximately a 61% smaller
680 decrease in the peak discharge when crop prices are high and the population is conservation-
681 minded as compared to the low crop price scenario. Discharge remains largely unchanged for
682 these decision schemes because generally less than 300 hectares of land is allocated for
683 conservation when corn prices are high (Figure 8d, f, and h). The small amount of conservation
684 land implemented is due to farmer agents receiving significantly more revenue from crops than

685 conservation subsidies. However, in the case of low crop prices, conservation subsidies allow the
 686 farmer agents to approach break even because they are guaranteed a subsidy that covers the cash
 687 rent for that land, whereas crop production leads to potential losses due to corn prices being low
 688 relative to production costs. Even in these scenarios where farmer agents are heavily considering
 689 profit related variables, populations dominated by production-minded farmer agents are still
 690 inclined to leave land in production (Figure 8c and e).




691
 Figure 8. Range of simulated conservation land within the watershed under low (left column) and high (right column) crop prices for conservation-minded populations (green), mixed populations (blue) and production-minded populations (red). Crop prices are plotted as bars for each crop price scenario. Results are for decision schemes of 80% weight on conservation behavior (a, b), 80% weight on future price (c, d), 80% weight on past profit (e, f), and 80% weight on risk aversion (g, h).

692 **5.2 Crop Yield Scenarios**

693 Under high and low crop yield scenarios, the 90th percentile peak discharge decreases by
 694 an average of 5.9% (17.4 m³/s) and 7.6% (22.7 m³/s), respectively, for the conservation-minded
 695 populations (Figure 9). Thus, a smaller decrease in peak discharge occurs with low crop yields

696 relative to low crop prices (Figure 7). In the low crop yield scenario, conservation land was
 697 approximately 200 Ha less than in the low crop price scenario, particularly for the past profit and
 698 future price decision schemes (Figure 8a, c, e, g and 10a, c, e, g). Conversely, more conservation
 699 land is established under the high yield scenario compared to the high crop price scenario (Figure
 700 8b, d, f, h and 10b, d, f, h). As a result, mean peak discharge decreases in the high yield scenario
 701 by 15.6% more compared to the high crop price scenario for the conservation-minded
 702 population.



703 Figure 9. Mean 90th percentile discharge for high and low crop yield scenarios under (a) 80% weight on conservation goal, (b) 80% weight on future price, (c) 80% weight on past profit, and (d) 80% weight on risk aversion. Bars indicate the median (circle) and the 5th and 95th percentiles of discharge for all simulations at a specific $Cons_{max}$.




Figure 10. Range of simulated conservation land within the watershed under low (left column) and high (right column) crop yields for conservation-minded populations (green), mixed populations (blue) and production-minded populations (red). Yearly crop yields are plotted as bars for crop yield scenario. Results are for decision schemes of 80% weight on conservation behavior (a, b), 80% weight on future price (c, d), 80% weight on past profit (e, f), and 80% weight on risk aversion (g,h).

5.3 Conservation Subsidy Scenarios

704 Under the low and high subsidies scenarios (not shown), the 90th percentile peak
 705 discharge decreases by an average of 5.8% (17.3 m³/s) and 7.6% (22.5 m³/s), respectively, for
 706 conservation-minded populations. Similar to the low crop yield scenario, high subsidies do not
 707 produce as large of a decrease in mean peak discharge as low crop prices (Figure 7). In the high
 708 subsidies scenario, conservation land was approximately 200-300 Ha less than in the low crop
 709 price scenario, specifically for the future price and past profit decision scheme. In comparison,
 710 low subsidies generate more conservation land than under high crop prices (Figure 8b, d, f, h). As
 711 a result, mean peak discharge decreases in the low subsidy scenario by 14.8% more compared to

712 the high crop price scenario for the conservation-minded population. Differences in peak
713 discharge reduction between the high subsidy and low yield scenarios were insignificant, with
714 less than 1% difference between these two scenarios.

715 **5.4 Decision Schemes**

716 The future price and past profit decision schemes display the largest spread in discharge
717 outcomes between scenarios (Figure 7, 9). Mean peak discharge decreases on average by 9%
718 (~27.2 m³/s) relative to when no conservation occurs for both decision schemes under all
719 scenarios that encourage more conservation land (i.e. low crop prices, low yields, high subsidies)
720 (Figure 7b, c and 9b, c). Under scenarios that encourage less conservation land, mean peak
721 discharge decreases by 5% (~15.4 m³/s). This spread in peak discharge results is not present
722 under the risk-averse and conservation decision schemes.

723 The spread between the mean peak discharge under the different scenarios is smaller for
724 the future price decision scheme (Figure 7b and 9b) compared to the past profit decision schemes
725 (Figure 7c and 9c). This smaller spread may be due to uncertainty in future crop price
726 projections. For instance, future crop price projections may underestimate high crop prices, but
727 overestimate low crop prices, as is observed in previous USDA crop price forecasts (Supplement
728 S5). Thus, the farmer agents may be making decisions based on a smaller range of crop prices
729 when under the future price decisions compared to the past profit decision scheme where they
730 use realized crop prices. In addition, the future crop price decision scheme results in greater
731 variability in conservation land over short periods of time under all scenarios (Figure 8c,d and
732 10c,d). This result is evident under the low crop price scenario, with several short periods
733 showing changes in conservation land of 200-400 ha as compared to the past profit scenario

734 where conservation land remains relatively steady. However, this result does not lead to a larger
735 spread (i.e. red and blue bars) within the mean peak discharge results.

736 The risk averse decision scheme produces the smallest changes in peak discharge under
737 all scenarios, with an average decrease of less than 2% ($6 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$) and 3% ($9 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$) for mixed and
738 conservation-minded populations, respectively (Figure 7d, 9d). Because the farmer's past
739 practices are the primary factor in determining land conversion in this scheme, the farmer agents
740 implement a limited number of conservation acres ($\leq 200 \text{ ha}$), regardless of the scenario.
741 Therefore, changes in the economic variables are not having as large of an impact on the farmer
742 agents when they are strongly risk-averse.


743 Overall, the current city agent conservation goal of 5% new conservation land at
744 maximum flood damage did not have a significant impact on the total amount of land
745 implemented. Following two major flooding events, the conservation goal of the city agent
746 increases from less than 20 ha in 1975 to 620 ha in 1976. A similar event in 1977 increases the
747 conservation goal by another 500 ha for a total goal of approximately 1100 ha. These increases
748 correspond to the large and rapid onset of conservation land seen during those years (Figure 8a,
749 c, e; 10a, c, e). After the 1977 flood event, several smaller flood events do occur that are
750 generally less than 15-30% of maximum, which further increases the conservation goal by ~200-
751 300 Ha. When the population has a high average $Cons_{max}$, the conservation goal of the city
752 agent is nearly fulfilled during this period, particularly in the low crop price scenario. In these
753 cases, 900 ha of the conservation goal is implemented, and 200 ha remains unimplemented. This
754 results in the largest reduction in 90th percentile discharge under all scenarios and decision
755 schemes (Figure 7a, 9a). When the population has a low average $Cons_{max}$, the majority of the
756 city agent's conservation goal remains unimplemented. Thus, the goal remains at a constant

757 1000-1400 ha and discharge remains unchanged. The only case where the city agent
758 conservation goal limits the amount of land implemented is under the conservation weighting
759 scenario since conservation-minded farmers are inclined to add conservation land on a yearly
760 basis.

761 **5.5 Historical Comparison**

762 To gain an understanding of how each of the scenarios differs from the historical 1970-
763 2016 period, the mean peak discharge is compared against the historical scenario (Figure 11).
764 Recall that under the historical scenario, farmer agents make annual land use decisions as in the
765 other scenarios, but corn prices, conservation subsidies, and crop prices are unchanged from
766 historical observed values. Overall, crop prices had the largest impact on mean peak discharge
767 while changes in subsidies had the smallest overall impact. When crop prices were low, mean
768 peak discharge decreased by 1-2% for mixed populations and 2-3% for conservation-minded
769 populations under the future price and past profit schemes compared to the historical scenario
770 (Figure 11a). High crop prices result in an increase in peak discharge from the historical
771 scenario, with an increase of 1-3% for mixed populations, and 3-5% for conservation-minded
772 populations. This indicates that the farmer agents are more likely to convert land back to crop
773 production under high crop prices than convert land to conservation under low crop prices,
774 which is a similar conclusion to Claassen and Tegene, 1999.

775 The subsidy scenarios produced a similar pattern to the crop price scenarios, where a
776 larger change (increase) in mean peak discharge occurs under low subsidies than under high
777 subsidies (Figure 11b). This pattern was not as clearly evident under the yield scenarios, with
778 similar changes resulting from high and low yields (Figure 11c).



779

Figure 11. Percent Change in median 90th percentile discharge from the historical scenario for (a) high and low crop prices, (b) high and low subsidies, (c) high and low yields for the conservation, risk, future price, and past profit weighting schemes.

780

781 **6. Conclusions**

782

Scenarios of historical and low crop yields, as well as high and low corn prices and

783

conservation subsidies, were simulated for an agricultural watershed in the Midwest US corn-

784 belt using an agent-based model of farmer decision making and a simple rainfall-runoff model.
785 The influence of different farmer agent decision components on model outcomes was also
786 explored. Model results demonstrate causations and correlations between human systems and
787 hydrologic outcomes, uncertainties, and sensitivities (specifically focused on high flows).

788 The primary findings from this study are:

- 789 • Crop prices had the largest impact on mean peak discharge, with a 61% larger reduction in
790 mean peak discharge under low crop prices in comparison to high crop prices.
- 791 • Changes in subsidy rates and crop yields produced a smaller impact on mean peak
792 discharge. Only a 25-30% difference in mean peak discharge was realized between high and
793 low subsidies, and high and low yields.
- 794 • Farmer agents more often made decisions to eliminate conservation land than to enter into
795 conservation contracts: a 3-5% increase in mean peak discharge occurred under high crop
796 prices, while only a 2-3% decrease in mean peak discharge occurred under low crop prices
797 compared to the historical simulation. Thus, even under low crop prices, the effectiveness of
798 the conservation program is limited either due to economic or behavioral factors.
- 799 • Hydrologic outcomes were most sensitive when farmer agents placed more weight on their
800 future price or past profit decision variables and least sensitive when farmer agents were
801 highly risk averse. For instance, under future price and past profit weighting scenarios, a 4%
802 and 7% difference in mean peak discharge is seen between high and low crop prices as
803 opposed to a 0-1% difference under the risk averse weighting scenario.

804
805 The ABM modeling approach demonstrated here can be used to advance fundamental
806 understanding of the interactions of water resources systems and human societies, particularly

807 focusing on human adaptation under future climate change. Our model indicates that external
808 factors can influence local streamflow, albeit in a complex and unpredictable way as the
809 information gets filtered through the complex decision making of local farmers. Social factors,
810 both local and external, introduce significant uncertainty in local hydrology outcomes, and by
811 ignoring them, water management plans will be inherently incomplete. Thus, multi-scale human
812 factors need to be explicitly considered when assessing the sustainability of long-term
813 management plans.

814
815 This study additionally demonstrates some of the advantages of the ABM approach. One
816 of the primary advantages of ABMs is the ability to capture emergent phenomenon (Bonabeau,
817 2002). For instance, in the model, the change in conservation area seen in the mid-1990s is larger
818 than during the period after 2007, despite the much larger volatility in crop prices after 2007.
819 While the primary reason behind this phenomenon may not be clear, the ABM captures this
820 change. The ABM also allows for specifying small scale differences between farmer agents such
821 as variations in conservation-mindedness, production costs, yields, cash rents, etc. Thus, using
822 ABMs allows for a very flexible modelling approach.

823 The current model design contains limitations in both the hydrologic and agent-based
824 models that should be addressed in future model development. The curve number values that
825 were used to represent the conservation option were derived for small agricultural plots of
826 approximately 0.5-3 Ha in size. The question remains whether these CN values can be scaled up
827 to the size of a several hundred hectare farm plot and still produce reasonable discharge results.
828 In addition, there is no explicit spatial representation of farmer agents within each subbasin.
829 Coupling the agent-based model to a more robust hydrologic model may reduce some of these
830 hydrologic limitations. The Agro-IBIS model, which includes dynamic crop growth and a crop

831 management module, would be particularly well suited to further investigating various farm-
832 level decisions within an ABM on hydrologic outcomes (Kucharik, 2003).

833 From the agent-based modeling standpoint, the decision-making of the farmer and city
834 agent could be made more sophisticated by introducing certain state variables, further decision
835 components and longer planning horizons. Studies have identified variables such as farm size,
836 type of farm, age of farmer, off farm income, land tenure agreement, education from local
837 experts, among others, to be significant in determining adoption of conservation practices
838 (Arbuckle, 2017; Daloğlu et al., 2014; Davis and Gillespie, 2007; Lambert et al., 2007; Mcguire
839 et al., 2015; Ryan et al., 2003; Salatiel et al., 1994; Schaible et al., 2015). The functionality of the
840 city agent could be expanded by introducing cost-benefit analysis capabilities. Cost-benefit
841 capabilities would allow the city agent to make more advanced decisions such as choosing
842 among a variety of flood reducing investments (Shreve and Kelman, 2014; Tesfatsion et al.,
843 2017). The model is capable of replicating historical trends in observed conservation land in
844 Iowa with a Pearson's $r > 0.75$ and a $MAE < 12.5\%$ for a select number of simulations;
845 however, more work is needed to try to validate the model on a micro-level (farm-level) scale.
846 Finally, future work should more fully explore the feedbacks from the hydrologic system to the
847 human system, which is one of the strengths of the agent-based modeling approach (An, 2012).

848 **Code Availability**

849 Model code can be obtained from the corresponding author.

850

851

852

853

854 **Author Contribution**

855 David Dziubanski and Kristie Franz were the primary model developers and prepared the
856 manuscript. William Gutowski aided with manuscript preparation and editing.

857 **Competing Interests**

858 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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Variable	Description	Unit
$C_{t-1:t-X}$	Mean total amount of land allocated to conservation during the previous X years	Hectares
D_{t-1}	Previous year's conservation land decision	Hectares
$\delta C_{\text{futures}:Y}$	Conservation decision based on crop price projections for Y years into the future	Hectares
$\delta C_{\text{profit}:X}$	Conservation decision based on mean past profit of previous X years	Hectares
δC_{cons}	Conservation decision based on conservation goal	Hectares
C_{neighbor}	Weighted mean conservation land of the farmer agent's neighbors	Hectares
$\text{Profit}_{\text{diff}}$	Differences in profit between an acre of crop and an acre of conservation land	(\$/Hectare)
$\text{Hectares}_{\text{tot}}$	Total land owned by farmer agent	Hectares
G_t	Government agent conservation goal for the current year t	Hectares
G_{t-1}	Unfulfilled conservation land from the previous year's t-1 conservation goal	Hectares
A_{tot}	Total agricultural land in watershed	Hectares
C_{tot}	Total land currently in conservation	Hectares
P	Total conservation land to be added to the goal as a percentage of production land	Dimensionless
P_{new}	Variable describing change in conservation goal with flood damage	(1/\$)

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Table 1. Variables in farmer and city agent equations.

Agent Model Parameters	Description	Range
$W_{\text{risk-averse}}$	Weight placed on farmer agent's previous land use	0.0 - 1.0
W_{futures}	Weight placed on farmer agent's decision based on future crop price	0.0 - 1.0
W_{profit}	Weight placed on farmer agent's decision based on past profit	0.0 - 1.0
W_{cons}	Weight place on farmer agent's decision based on his/her conservation goal	0.0 - 1.0
W_{neighbor}	Weight placed on farmer agent's decision based on his/her neighbor's decisions	0.0 - 1.0
Cons_{max}	Farmer's conservation goal - used to describe the farmer's conservation-mindedness	0.0 - 0.1
X	Number of previous years a farmer agent takes into account for his/her land decision	1 - 5
Y	Number of future years a farmer agent takes into account for his/her land decision	5 - 10
$\text{ConsGoal}_{\text{max}}$	Conservation goal at maximum flood damage	0.0 - 0.1

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Table 2. Primary agent model parameters in decision-making equations.

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Decision Scheme	Decision Weight				
	Conservation Goal	Futures	Past Profit	Risk Aversion	Neighbor
Conservation	0.8	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Future price	0.05	0.8	0.05	0.05	0.05
Past profit	0.05	0.05	0.8	0.05	0.05
Risk averse	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.8	0.05

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Table 3. Decision weighting scheme tested with each scenario.

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Model Inputs	Years	Unit
Historical Cash Rent	1970-2016	(\$/Hectare)
Federal Subsidies	2000-2016	(\$/Hectare)
Historical Production Costs	1970-2016	(\$/Hectare)
Historical Corn Prices	1970-2016	(\$/MT)
Precipitation	1970-2016	(mm/hr)

Table 4. Model Inputs.

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