



# 1 **Assessment of food trade impacts on water, food, and land security** 2 **in the MENA region** 3

4 Sang-Hyun Lee<sup>1</sup>, Rabi H. Mohtar<sup>2</sup>, Seung-Hwan Yoo<sup>3</sup>

5 <sup>1</sup> Research Institute for Humanity and Nature (RIHN), Motoyama 457-4, Kamigamo, Kita-ku, Kyoto 603-8047, Japan

6 <sup>2</sup> Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, USA and Faculty of  
7 Agricultural and Food Sciences, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon

8 <sup>3</sup> Department of Rural and Bio-systems Engineering, Chonnam National University, Gwangju, Republic of Korea

9 *Correspondence to:* Rabi H. Mohtar ([mohtar@tamu.edu](mailto:mohtar@tamu.edu) and [mohtar@aub.edu.lb](mailto:mohtar@aub.edu.lb))

## 10 **Abstract**

11 The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has the largest water deficit in the world. It also has the least food self-  
12 sufficiency. Increasing food imports and decreasing domestic food production can contribute to water savings and hence to  
13 increased water security. However, increased domestic food production is a better way to achieve food security, even if  
14 irrigation demands increase in accordance to projected climate changes. Accordingly, the trade-off between food security and  
15 the savings of water and land through food trade is considered as a significant factor for resource management, especially in  
16 the MENA. Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyze the impact of food trade on food security and water-land savings in  
17 the MENA region. We concluded that the MENA region saved significant amounts of national water and land based on the  
18 import of four major crops, namely, barley, maize, rice, and wheat, within the period from 2000 to 2012, even if the food self-  
19 sufficiency is still at a low level. For example, Egypt imported 8.3 million ton/year of wheat that led to 7.5 billion m<sup>3</sup> of  
20 irrigation water and 1.3 million ha of land savings. In addition, we estimated the virtual water trade (VWT) that refers to the  
21 trade of water embedded in food products and analyzed the structure of VWT in the MENA region using degree and  
22 eigenvector centralities. The study revealed that the MENA region focused more on increasing the volume of virtual water  
23 imported during the period 2006–2012, yet little attention was paid on the expansion of connections with country exporters  
24 based on the VWT network analysis.

25 **Keyword:** *Food security; Food self-sufficiency; Food trade; Virtual water; MEAN.*

## 26 **1 Introduction**

27 Primary resource gaps for the MENA region in terms of safe and affordable access to water, food, energy, and nutrition, are  
28 expected to grow owing to demographic, population, and climate changes. These primary resources are highly interlinked and  
29 create a high-degree of risks and vulnerability. The food portfolio in the MENA region has been complicated by an increased  
30 degree of risks owing to the geopolitical challenges and inability to satisfy needs with domestic production. This is in part due  
31 to lack of adequate arable land and water resources. As such, trade has been a major part of the food security portfolio, and  
32 has created another level of complexity that has been understudied.

33 The VWT refers to the trade of water embedded in food products (Allan, 1993; Aldaya et al., 2010; Antonelli and Tamea,  
34 2015). Therefore, food trade drives water conservation or loss in terms of VWT, and it is an important element of both food  
35 and water security in water-scarce regions (Konar et al., 2012; Hanjra and Qureshi, 2010; Hoekstra, 2003). The concept and  
36 quantitative estimates of virtual water can help to realistically assess water scarcity for each country, projecting future water  
37 demand for food supply, thus increasing public awareness on water and identifying water-wasting processes in production  
38 (Oki and Kanae, 2004). For water-scarce countries, achieving water security by importing water intensive products could be a  
39 more attractive option compared to producing all water-demanding products domestically (Hoekstra and Hung, 2005). The  
40 global volume of international crop-related virtual water flows averaged 695 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year over the period 1995–1999, which



41 means that 13% of the water used for crop production in the world was not used for domestic consumption but rather for export  
42 in virtual forms (Hoekstra and Hung, 2005). Falkenmark and Lannerstad (2010) estimated that it would be necessary to double  
43 the VWT by 2050 to compensate for agricultural water deficits because of climatic change, population increase, and the pattern  
44 of food supply per capita. For example, an average of 20% of the per capita food energy supply was assumed to originate from  
45 animal foods to ensure sufficient protein content, and additional water was required to produce animal foods compared to other  
46 food types (Falkenmark and Lannerstad, 2010).

47 The VWT could contribute to the relief of water stress through the use of global water in a more efficient manner in the event  
48 of an increase in the global food trade (Molden, 2007). Additionally, the VWT and the respective savings garnered through  
49 the trade of agricultural goods have been quantified in a number of studies. Oki and Kanae (2004) investigated that  
50 approximately 1140 km<sup>3</sup>/year of virtual water could be used for altering the import of food products to domestic products, e.g.,  
51 cereals, soybeans, and meat; however, 680 km<sup>3</sup>/year of water was used to produce these food types in exporting areas. Yang  
52 et al. (2006) revealed that the VWT could generate global water savings because virtual water has flown primarily from  
53 countries of increased crop water productivity to countries of low-crop water productivity. In their study, 336.8 km<sup>3</sup>/year of  
54 water were saved globally by the international trade of major food crops from 1997 to 2001, while 20.4% of the total global  
55 net virtual water import was imported by countries that have water availability below 1700 m<sup>3</sup> per capita, such as the Arab  
56 countries. Fader et al. (2011) calculated the VWT based on the trade of crop products, and compared it with the water  
57 requirements for producing crop products in each country for domestic consumption without international trade. Generally,  
58 exporters use less water for production of crop products than importers. Thus, the trade of crop products saves 263 km<sup>3</sup>/year  
59 of water globally, thereby representing 3.5% of the annual precipitation on cropland (Fader et al., 2011). In particular, water-  
60 scarce countries, such as China and Mexico, as well as Netherlands and Japan, saved large amounts of water by importing  
61 goods that require water in the range from 25 to 73 km<sup>3</sup>/year, because they would otherwise need relatively large amounts of  
62 water to produce the goods they import. According to the study by Biewald et al. (2014), blue water, which refers to the  
63 irrigation water supplied from artificial facilities, such as reservoirs, ground water pumping or desalination stations, was saved  
64 in importing countries by importing products in accordance to international trade. It is expected that this can elicit enormous  
65 benefits in water-scarce regions. For example, 17 billion m<sup>3</sup> of blue water per year were saved by the global food trade, and  
66 the value of blue water saving was estimated to 2.4 billion US\$.

67 Previous studies showed that the effective import of virtual water may reduce water use for domestic food production in  
68 importing countries and help alleviate water stress in the MENA region where the largest water deficit in the world exists  
69 (Gleick, 2000; World Bank, 2009). The critical condition of water scarcity in the MENA region will reach severe levels by  
70 2025 (Tolba, 2009). In addition, if population increases rapidly and urbanization continues fast, availability of water could be  
71 reduced in the Arab countries by approximately 50% by the year 2025 (Abahussain et al., 2002). Water shortages will certainly  
72 speed up the rate of desertification in the Arab countries with a larger deficit in freshwater (Abahussain et al., 2002).  
73 Agricultural water withdrawals account for over 85% of the total water withdrawn by the various countries of the MENA  
74 region (FAO, 2014). Irrigation systems in the MENA region are based on pumping groundwater resources, such as aquifers,  
75 and water security is being threatened by the declining aquifer levels and the extraction of nonrenewable groundwater  
76 (Antonelli and Tamea, 2015). In addition, Immerzeel et al. (2011) expected that the unfulfilled water demand in the entire  
77 MENA region would increase from the current level of 16% to 51% in 2040–2050 owing to climate changes. The zone of  
78 severely reduced rainfall extends throughout the Mediterranean region and the Northern Sahara (Hennessy et al., 2007). Milly  
79 et al. (2005) identified that climate change will cause a decrease in water run-off by 20% to 30% in most of the MENA region  
80 by 2050, mainly owing to the rising temperatures and lower precipitation. In addition, the regions that include Syria, Lebanon,  
81 Israel, and Jordan, will get drier, with significant rainfall decreases in the wet season.

82 However, the high dependency on food import can be a risk of food security, even if it can elicit domestic water, energy, and  
83 land savings, in water-scarce regions. Therefore, we should consider a trade-off between food security and resource savings,



84 using a holistic approach, such as water–energy–food nexus. Furthermore, the VWT can be suggested as relevant to the water  
 85 policy of a nation (Schyns and Hoekstra, 2014), thus establishing a new point-of-view from which both food security and  
 86 sustainable water management are considered (Novo et al., 2009).

87 This study addresses three questions that relate to the role and impact of the VWT in the MENA region, that are raised to draw  
 88 attention to the complexity of the issue and the need for a broader view in assessment. Specifically, 1) what are the effects of  
 89 the VWT on water savings and land tenure in the MENA region, 2) has the structure of the virtual water import in the MENA  
 90 region been vulnerable or robust? 3) Who are the influential importers and exporters in the VWT network in the MENA region?  
 91 The aim of this study is to evaluate the effects on water savings and land tenure from importing crops in the MENA region. In  
 92 addition, we quantified the amount of VWT from 2000 to 2012, and analyzed a structure of the VWT, such as the connectivity  
 93 and influence in the MENA region using degree and eigenvector centralities.

## 94 2 Materials and Methods

### 95 2.1 National water and land savings in importing countries using footprints

96 The import of crops in the MENA region could affect the domestic resource management in terms of resource saving. Water  
 97 saving indicates the amount of water needed to produce the same quantity of imported crops but as a domestic production.  
 98 Accordingly, the failure of trade could cause water and land shortages in the importing country. Although this assumption  
 99 about water and land savings considers an extreme trade situation, these results could be used to understand the importance of  
 100 the international crop trade in the MENA region.

101 In this study, the national water and land savings indicated the amount of water and land requirements for crops imported to  
 102 substitute domestic production. Therefore, we applied the water and land footprints to calculate water and land savings. The  
 103 water footprint of a crop indicates the total amount of water used for producing 1 ton of crop, and land footprint indicates the  
 104 land requirement for producing 1 ton of crop. The national water and land savings were calculated as follows,

$$105 \quad WFP [n_i, c] = \frac{CWR [n_i, c]}{P [n_i, c]} \quad (1)$$

$$106 \quad LFP [n_i, c] = \frac{Area [n_i, c]}{P [n_i, c]} \quad (2)$$

$$107 \quad WS [n_i, c] = CI [n_i, c] \times WFP [n_i, c], \quad (3)$$

$$108 \quad LS [n_i, c] = CI [n_i, c] \times LFP [n_i, c] \quad (4)$$

109 in which variable  $WFP [n_i, c]$  ( $m^3/ton$ ) is the water footprint of crop  $c$  in the importing country  $n_i$ ,  $CWR$  is the crop water  
 110 requirement ( $m^3$ ), and  $P$  is the production (ton). Equivalently,  $LFP [n_i, c]$  ( $ha/ton$ ) is the land footprint of crop  $c$  in the importing  
 111 country  $n_i$ , and  $Area$  is the cultivated area (ha). The symbol  $WS$  (or  $LS$ ) indicates the amount of water (or land) savings in the  
 112 importing country  $n_i$ .  $CI$  is the import of crop  $c$  in the importing country  $n_i$ .

113 The water footprint of crops is based on crop water requirements and irrigation. Therefore, various datasets are required for  
 114 calculating it, such as climate data, crop information, irrigation scheduling, and soil characteristics. In addition, each variable  
 115 is dependent on local characteristics. In addition, the water footprint for a crop is divided into green and blue water footprints  
 116 based on the water resources (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2008). The green water footprint indicates that water supplied by  
 117 precipitation is retained in the soil of the root zone (Falkenmark, 1995), and blue water footprint is the water stored at the  
 118 surface or in the ground. Therefore, the green water footprint is related to rain-fed agriculture and the blue water footprint is  
 119 related to irrigation water provided by aquifers or surface bodies of water. As the water footprint is divided into green and blue  
 120 water footprints, the water saving could be considered as green and blue water saving as well. Thus, the study for national  
 121 water footprint should be executed for each country, basin, or specific area; however, this was outside the scope of the current  
 122 study.



123 In this study, the estimation of the water footprint was not included but we applied national water footprint data of countries  
124 from the study executed by Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2010). They estimated the average value of green and blue water  
125 footprints of crops and crop products at the national level from 1996 to 2005, as shown in Table 1. However, the data of the  
126 water footprint in the MENA region was limited in terms of availability. For example, Table 1 shows that the water footprint  
127 of wheat was available in all countries except for Bahrain. Therefore, we applied the limited water footprint in this study. The  
128 land footprint was calculated based on the harvest area and crop production, which were collected from FAOSTAT, as shown  
129 in Table 2.

130 **Table 1.** Water and lands footprints of four major crops in the MENA region

131 **Table 2.** Cultivation area, production, and the quantity of crops imported in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012

## 132 2.2 VWT based on international trade

133 The VWT represents the water embedded in international trade, and it indicates the water used in the exporting country to  
134 produce crops for export. For example, Saudi Arabia imported wheat from various exporters, and the VWT was calculated by  
135 multiplying the quantity of traded wheat with the respective water footprint of exporters. In other words, the VWT is calculated  
136 based on the water footprint of exporters. Thus, the export of virtual water in the exporting country has the same meaning as  
137 the import of virtual water has in the importing country. Accordingly, the main factors for quantifying a VWT are the trade  
138 data and water footprint, and the VWT is calculated by multiplying the trade by its associated water footprint in the exporting  
139 country, as follows:

$$140 \text{VWT} [n_e, n_i, c, t] = \text{CT} [n_e, n_i, c, t] \times \text{WFP} [n_e, c], \quad (5)$$

141 where the variable VWT denotes the virtual water trade from the exporting country,  $n_e$ , to the importing country,  $n_i$ , in year  
142 t, as a result of trade in crop c, CT represents the crop trade from the exporting country,  $n_e$ , to the importing country,  $n_i$ , in  
143 year t as a result of trade in crop c, and WFP represents the water footprint of crop c in the exporting country,  $n_e$ .

144 The international trade data of the four major crops, namely, barley, maize, rice, and wheat from 2000 to 2012 was obtained  
145 from FAOSTAT (<http://www.fao.org/faostat/>), as shown in Table 2. The crop with the largest amount of import was wheat,  
146 with 27.6 million ton/year imported by the MENA region from 2000 to 2012, followed by maize (14.4 million ton/year), barley  
147 (9.0 million ton/year), and rice (3.7 million ton/year).

## 148 2.3 Degree and eigenvector centralities for analyzing the structure of VWT

### 149 2.3.1 Nonscaled and scaled in-degree centralities of VWT

150 Understanding the VWT structure is important for quantifying the amount of import and export because the VWT structure  
151 can represent whether it would be sustainable or vulnerable. For example, if a country imports considerable amounts of virtual  
152 water through the food trade from just a few exporters, the structure of VWT in this country might be impressionable by  
153 exporters. However, if a country is connected with many exporters in VWT, it can have a resilient structure for global changes.  
154 A few studies have been conducted on the analysis of the structure of the VWT using a network-based approach (Konar et al.,  
155 2012; Dalin et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2016).

156 In this study, we analyzed the links of the VWT network for identifying the VWT structure using degree centrality, that is the  
157 number of degree incidents on a given node (Freeman 1979). In addition, the degree centrality is divided into in- and out-  
158 degree centralities, depending on the direction. In-degree is based on the number of lines (or volume) directed to the node. and  
159 out-degree is based on the number of lines (or volume) that the node directs to. In this study, we focused on the in-degree  
160 centrality because the MENA region includes representative importing countries. An importer accompanying an increased in-  
161 degree centrality has expanded connectivity with exporters, meaning that this importer could cope with an accidental  
162 disconnection from a certain exporter. In addition, the in-degree centrality, based on the number and volume of links in the



163 VWT network, is expressed according to the nonscaled in-degree centrality (NSInDC), that is based on the number of links,  
 164 and the scaled in-degree centrality (SInDC), that is based on the volume of links.

$$165 \quad NSInDC_i = \sum_j^N Link_{ij} / (N - 1), \quad (6)$$

$$166 \quad SInDC_i = \sum_j^N Flow_{ij} / (N - 1), \quad (7)$$

167 where  $NSInDC_i$  is the nonscaled in-degree centrality of country  $i$ , and  $Link_{ij}$  is the number of links between the  $i$ th and  $j$ th  
 168 countries. The symbol  $SInDC_i$  is the scaled in-degree centrality of country  $i$ , and  $Flow_{ij}$  is the volume of virtual water traded  
 169 between the  $i$ th and  $j$ th countries. Moreover,  $N$  is the total number of countries.

170 Through NSInDC and SInDC, we analyzed the vulnerable expansion (or reduction) and robust expansion (or reduction) in the  
 171 VWT network in the MENA region. For example, the vulnerable expansion in the network indicates that the amount of flow  
 172 to a node increases but the number of connections to other nodes decrease. This is represented by high-levels of SInDC and  
 173 low-levels of NSInDC. The importer country that is associated with vulnerable expansion has an increased quantity of products  
 174 from only a few exporters.

### 175 2.3.2 Eigenvector centralities of VWT

176 The eigenvector centrality could be used for identifying influential countries who could affect the entire network. In other  
 177 words, the entire VWT can be affected by a few influential countries, and it is important to identify these countries for  
 178 understanding and estimating the change of the entire structure of the VWT. An eigenvector centrality can measure the  
 179 influence of each country in the entire VWT, and it is related not only to its own connection pattern but also to the connections  
 180 of other countries to it. Therefore, a country is more influential if it is considered in relation to the countries that are influential  
 181 themselves (Ruhnau, 2000). The eigenvector centrality assigns relative centrality to all of the countries in the VWT, based on  
 182 the principle that connections to high-level centrality countries contribute more to the centrality of the countries compared to  
 183 equal connections to low-level centrality countries (Ruhnau, 2000; Lee et al., 2016). Therefore, the eigenvector centrality of  
 184 the country is related to both the number of links to partners and their centralities (Ruhnau, 2000). Bonacich (1972) defined  
 185 the centrality  $c(v_i)$  of a node (country)  $v_i$  as the positive multiple of the sum of adjacent centralities, as follows,

$$186 \quad \lambda c(v_i) = \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_{ij} c(v_j) \quad \forall i. \quad (8)$$

187 In matrix notation, and assuming that  $c = (c(v_1), \dots, c(v_n))$ , the above equation yields

$$188 \quad Ac = \lambda c \quad (9)$$

189 This type of equation is solved using eigenvalues and eigenvectors, where  $A$  is a square matrix, and  $\lambda$  is a scalar, known as the  
 190 eigenvalue associated with the eigenvector  $c$  defined as a column vector. Eigenvector centrality is determined by calculating  
 191 the principal eigenvector that has the largest eigenvalue among all eigenvectors. A non-negative eigenvector with the maximal  
 192 eigenvalue exists. We refer to a non-negative eigenvector ( $c \geq 0$ ) of the maximal eigenvalue as the principal eigenvector, and  
 193 we call the entry  $c(v_i)$  the eigenvector-centrality of node (country)  $v_i$  (Ruhnau, 2000).

## 194 3 Results and Discussion

### 195 3.1 Trade-offs between national water-land savings and food security through food trade in the MENA region

196 Food import could cause a decrease of food security, which can be a particularly critical issue in the MENA region. This is  
 197 because the countries in the MENA region have very low food self-sufficiencies. For example, Egypt is one of the agricultural  
 198 countries in the MENA region, and produced 20.5 million ton/year of barley, maize, wheat, and rice, which was 47 % of total  
 199 production in the MENA region. However, 13.4 million ton of barley, maize, wheat, and rice was imported annually, and it  
 200 was 40 % of domestic supply in Egypt. To sum up, in the MENA region, food security is a significant issue and some countries  
 201 have tried to increase domestic production for food security.



202 However, we need to consider trade-offs between food security and national water-land management. In order to increase the  
203 food security, additional water and land should be required for increasing domestic production. Therefore, we estimated the  
204 national water and land savings by importing crops, that is a negative factor for food security. Table 3 shows that the green  
205 and blue water savings by barley, maize, and wheat imports in Saudi Arabia were 2.0 and 7.8 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year, respectively.  
206 This means that the contribution of import of barley, maize, and wheat on water security in Saudi Arabia was significant. In  
207 the case of Egypt, most of the water saving occurred based on the imports of wheat and maize. Approximately 7.5 billion  
208 m<sup>3</sup>/year of blue water was saved by importing wheat. Specifically, the internal water resources in Egypt are only 1.8 billion  
209 m<sup>3</sup>/year, therefore, if the exporting countries ban the export of wheat to Egypt, a significant water scarcity would occur.  
210 The crop import could result in a large amount of land savings. In Saudi Arabia, land savings based on the import of barley,  
211 maize, and wheat, amounted to 1.6 million ha/year, and Lebanon was also strongly influenced by the impact of crop import  
212 on land savings. For example, approximately 0.24 million ha could be saved by crop imports, comprising 36% of the  
213 agricultural area in Lebanon, that indicates that the crop trade in Lebanon has significant benefits in terms of land resources  
214 compared to water resources.  
215 These results can elicit useful information for analyzing the trade-off between food and water-land securities in the MENA  
216 region in terms of sustainable development. However, water saving indicates the virtual water saving, and sometimes it is  
217 larger than the total water resources in some countries. However, these results showed that the increase of food security is  
218 accompanied by numerous water requirements in the MENA region. Additionally, the saved land is not always suitable for  
219 agricultural areas. Some crops are required for the specific type of land, and the productivity is also different based on soil.  
220 Even if we can save land, there is the limitation for considering the land saving as an agricultural land saving in accordance to  
221 this study.

222 **Table 3.** The amount of water and land savings through importing crops in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012.

### 223 3.2 The VWT in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012

#### 224 3.2.1 Virtual water import in the MENA region

225 The total amount of green and blue water imported by each Arab country from 2000 to 2012 respectively reached 921.2 and  
226 80.5 billion m<sup>3</sup> in the MENA region, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 1. The largest volume of green water was imported  
227 annually by Egypt (19.1 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year), followed by Saudi Arabia (11.9 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year). In addition, the largest amount of  
228 blue water was imported annually by Saudi Arabia (1.2 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year), followed by the UAE (0.9 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year). Over 70%  
229 of the green water imported annually into the MENA region based on the trade of barley (approximately 8.5 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year)  
230 was occupied by Saudi Arabia. The amount of virtual water imported based on the trade of maize was 13.0 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year,  
231 with Egypt being the primary importer of 31% of the total imported amount into the MENA region.

232 Generally, rice is cultivated in paddy fields, and the blue water footprint of rice in these fields is larger than other cereal crops  
233 in various countries. For example, the global average of the blue water footprint of rice is 584 m<sup>3</sup>/ton but that for wheat is 343  
234 m<sup>3</sup>/ton (Chapagain and Hoekstra 2011; Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2010). Therefore, the importers of rice also import a lot of  
235 water. Approximately 3.0 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year of blue water were imported in the rice trade from 2000 to 2012, and Saudi Arabia,  
236 UAE, and Iraq, were the primary importers. The largest volume of virtual water imported by the MENA region was owing to  
237 the trade of wheat. The annual amount of virtual water imported based on the trade of wheat in the MENA region from 2000  
238 to 2012 was approximately 42.6 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year, but the amount of blue water was only 2.0 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year. Over 35% of the  
239 virtual water imported through the wheat trade was imported by Egypt (15.7 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year).

240 We also estimated the amount of virtual water imported per capita (VWlcap), as shown in Figure 2, which shows the differing  
241 viewpoints regarding food and water securities. If we consider only the total amount of imported virtual water, the UAE may  
242 not be considered to be a significant importer because the population and area of UAE is much smaller than those of the MENA  
243 other countries, such as Saudi Arabia. However, the virtual water import per capita in the UAE is larger than that of Saudi





244 Arabia, thus indicating that the dependency on virtual water imported from exporters in the UAE is much more significant  
245 than in Saudi Arabia. For example, the VWIcap was 1266.6 m<sup>3</sup>/cap/year in the UAE, which was the largest value in the MENA  
246 region. The UAE is strongly dependent on the import of virtual water, even though the UAE imports only 4.2 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year  
247 of virtual water. The VWIcap increased significantly in Saudi Arabia and Libya from 2000 to 2012. Saudi Arabia and Libya  
248 imported approximately 453.4 and 497.8 m<sup>3</sup>/cap/year, respectively, of virtual water more in 2012 than in 2000. Saudi Arabia  
249 was the second largest importer in the MENA region, and its VWIcap was also the fifth highest in the MENA region.

250 **Table 4.** The amount of green and blue water imported in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012.

251 **Figure 1.** The total amount of virtual water imported by each country in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012, separated into  
252 green (upper) and blue (lower) water. The pie graph shows the annual import and proportion of each crop, and the size of the  
253 pie indicates the amount of annual virtual water imported from 2000 to 2012.

254 **Figure 2.** Virtual water imported per capita in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012.

### 255 3.2.2 Virtual water export to the MENA region

256 We also focused on the volume of virtual water exported to the MENA region by each exporter from 2000 to 2012, as shown  
257 in Figure 3. Based on the trade of barley, Ukraine exported 41.1 billion m<sup>3</sup> of green water to the MENA region that amounted  
258 to 27% of the total green water imported in the MENA region based on barley. In terms of blue water traded through barley,  
259 five exporters (Germany, Australia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and India) provided 78% of the total blue water imported  
260 in the MENA region based on barley. Based on the trade of maize, Argentina contributed 40% of the total amount of green  
261 water imported by the MENA region based on maize, but the blue water imported by the MENA region was primarily from  
262 the USA. Based on the trade of rice, the major virtual water exporters to the MENA region were India, Thailand, and Pakistan.  
263 In particular, 30.4 billion m<sup>3</sup> of blue water were imported from these countries from 2000 to 2012, which comprised 78% of  
264 the blue water imported by the MENA region based on rice. Wheat was the most representative crop imported by the MENA  
265 region. The Russian Federation and the USA provided 25% (140.6 billion m<sup>3</sup>) and 21% (111.2 billion m<sup>3</sup>) of the total amount  
266 of green water imported in the MENA region based on the trade of wheat in 2000 to 2012, respectively, and the remaining 55%  
267 was divided among several exporters, including Australia, Canada, France, and Ukraine.

268 **Figure 3.** Quantities of green water export (GWE) and blue water export (BWE) from the primary exporters to the MENA  
269 region from 2000 to 2012

### 270 3.3 The change of VWT structure in the MENA region

271 We analyzed the degree centralities of NSInDC and SInDC from 2000 to 2012 in the MENA region, and identified the  
272 countries who had the vulnerable expansion or reduction in the VWT network.

273 Figure 4 shows the NSInDC and SInDC patterns in the VWT network in accordance to each country in the MENA region. If  
274 the specific country has both large NSInDC and small SInDC, this country constructs the connection with various exporters  
275 but imports a small amount of virtual water. Specifically, Egypt and Yemen showed that NSInDC was lower but SInDC was  
276 higher than other countries, thus indicating the intensive connectivity with a few exporters. In contrast, Saudi Arabia had larger  
277 SInDC than other countries expect for Egypt, while the NSInDC was also highest in the MENA region. Accordingly, Saudi  
278 Arabia had a more distributed structure regarding VWT. UAE and Iraq had similar SInDC in 2012 but NSInDC was quite  
279 different (UAE (0.46) and Iraq (0.27)). Furthermore, SInDC in Morocco (96.45) was larger than UAE (83.41) but NSInDC in  
280 Morocco (0.26) was smaller than UAE (0.46). In comparison to UAE, Morocco had intensive connections with fewer exporters  
281 compared to UAE.

282 Based on the temporal changes of NSInDC and the SInDC during two periods (2000–2006 and 2006–2012), the MENA region  
283 countries were divided into four types (I–IV), as shown in Figure 5. The listed numbers in Figure 5 represent each Arab country.  
284 For example, the number 1 is assigned to Algeria. The x-axis indicates the NSInDC and the y-axis indicates the SInDC.  
285 Therefore, if the specific country in the MENA region is located at a higher level in the x-axis and at a lower level in the y-



286 axis, this country has established connections with more exporters but has a decreased virtual water imports. Type I countries  
287 show a robust expansion in the virtual water import. Additionally, the countries in this type increased the connectivity and  
288 volume of virtual water imported, simultaneously. Type II countries increased the volume of virtual water imported without  
289 expansion of connectivity. Type III and type IV countries showed reductions in the virtual water import with and without  
290 reduction of connectivity, respectively.

291 In the early 2000s, most of countries in the MENA region tried to expand their trade structure by increasing both the  
292 connectivity to the exporters and the volume of the imported virtual water. In Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Yemen, Saudi Arabia,  
293 Lebanon, and UAE, the NSInDC of the VWT network increased significantly from 2000 to 2006, which means that the trade  
294 connectivity expanded. The expanded structure of the VWT indicates that the Arab countries were connected to various  
295 exporters, and that this structure can be a resilient structure for global changes. In particular, the import of food crops is an  
296 essential factor in food security in the MENA region, even if food self-sufficiency is increased by increasing domestic  
297 production. However, Egypt had the largest SInDC but NSInDC was ranked 6th among the MENA region countries. In 2006,  
298 Egypt and Saudi Arabia both expanded the connectivity in the VWT network, as shown by the increasing NSInDC.

299 However, the VWT has become a more vulnerable structure in the MENA region in recent years. Most of the Arab countries  
300 increased the volume of the imported virtual water, but the number of exporters that linked to the Arab countries decreased or  
301 increased insignificantly from 2006 to 2012. In particular, in 2012, most of countries kept their connectivities or reduced them,  
302 except for Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and UAE. For example, Figure 6 shows that the virtual water imported in Lebanon significantly  
303 increased from 2006 to 2012, but NSInDC decreased in 2012. In 2000 Lebanon imported most of the virtual water from the  
304 USA, Argentina, and Australia. Thus, VWT in Lebanon was strongly dependent on these exporters. However, Lebanon  
305 expended the VWT in 2006 and Russian Federation, Turkey, and Kazakhstan, contributed to virtual water imports in Lebanon.  
306 Accordingly, the structure of VWT in Lebanon approached a distributed network. However, the VWT in 2012 showed that it  
307 was dominated by Ukraine and Russian Federation, even if Lebanon imported more virtual water in 2012 than 2006. Therefore,  
308 Lebanon should consider not only the amount of virtual water but also the structure of VWT for sustainable food security  
309 subject to the condition of a strong dependency on crop import. These results indicate that the dependence of the MENA region  
310 on virtual water import increased rapidly recently with the large increase in the imported volume of virtual water. However,  
311 the connectivity of the VWT in the MENA region has not increased as much as the volume of virtual water imported increased.  
312 We analyzed the influence of each country on the entire VWT network of the MENA region using eigenvector centrality, as  
313 shown on Figure 7. In 2000, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were identified as the most influential importers in the MENA region,  
314 and the USA and Australia were the most influential exporters. Accordingly, the entire VWT in the MENA region could be  
315 affected by these importers and exporters. This means that the change of the trade policy or food management in these countries  
316 could change the structure of VWT in the MENA region. In 2006 and 2012, the influential countries in the MENA region were  
317 still Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but the influential exporters moved to the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Brazil.

318 **Figure 4.** Nonscaled and scaled in-degree centralities of each country in the MENA region in 2000, 2006, and 2012

319 **Figure 5.** Country types in the MENA region according to the changes of nonscaled and scaled in-degree centralities

320 **Figure 6.** Virtual water import from exporters to Lebanon in 2000, 2006, and 2012.

321 **Figure 7.** Eigenvector centrality of virtual water trade network in the MENA region at 2000, 2006, and 2012

### 322 3.4 Importance and limitations of water footprint and VWT in the MENA region from a policy perspective

323 Generally, the VWT is more related to resource management in exporting countries rather than importing countries because  
324 the embedded water in food trade indicates water resources that are consumed for producing food products in the exporting  
325 country. However, VWT is also considered as an important issue in importing countries in terms of water and food security.  
326 For example, the reduction of VWT might be related to water consumption by replacing imported food products by domestic  
327 food products.





328 However, the application of the concept of VWT is under critical discussion (Wichelns, 2010). First, water footprints formulate  
329 new concepts of water management, but it is difficult to link these to operating water resource systems. Water footprints are  
330 more related to the water consumption rather than water supply. We can quantify the water requirements for producing food  
331 products or water savings by importing them using the water footprint and VWT. However, the operations of the water facilities,  
332 for example reservoirs, desalination plants, and ground water pumping stations, are affected by monthly rainfall and ground  
333 water level, development of technologies, fertilizer usage, irrigation scheduling, and systems. Therefore, we need to realize  
334 that water footprint can be changed in accordance to various factors. Second, VWT could contribute to the connection of water  
335 management to food security. However, food trade is affected by the scarcity or affluence of other important resources, such  
336 as capital, labor, and land (Biewald et al., 2014). In particular, economic values, such as the price of food products, is the main  
337 driver in global food trade, but there is no global value established for virtual water. Therefore, it is difficult to apply virtual  
338 water to trade policy in terms of the economic efficiency. Therefore, policy makers or resource managers in the MENA region  
339 should not only consider the effects of VWT but also the difficulty in adapting virtual water to policies for resource  
340 management.

341 Despite these limitations, we believe that virtual water has a role in the achievement of sustainable water, land, and food  
342 security, even if there are limitations and difficulties in applying the virtual water concept. As mentioned above, the VWT can  
343 be a major resource in the MENA region. Accordingly, vulnerable VWT, for example, low connectivity, can be a risk element  
344 for future food security risk management. In particular, the MENA region is strongly dependent on food products from  
345 exporting countries that implies a strong dependency on water resource from exporting countries. Therefore, water shortages  
346 or low-food production in exporting countries might cause increasing food prices in the MENA region, but also increasing  
347 domestic water use for increasing domestic food production. The primary resources of water, energy and food are naturally  
348 interlinked. The degree of their interlinkages in the MENA is exceptionally high, thus creating a higher degree of risks and  
349 vulnerability. Therefore, understanding these interlinkages and quantifying them in an attempt to better understand this  
350 complex system of systems is crucial. This requires the synergistic effort of multiple disciplines, including contributions from  
351 various technologies, science, policies, health, communication, and economics, at local processes and system level scales. In  
352 this study, we believe that the VWT in the MENA region can be the key factor for bridging water and food, and it is important  
353 to quantify the influence of trade on water and food management. In addition, this study revealed vulnerability (or robust)  
354 expansion (or reduction) and influential traders in the VWT network in the MENA region, based on in-degree and eigenvector  
355 centrality indices. If a country in the MENA region has low connectivity but an increased import of virtual water, this country  
356 should re-evaluate their vulnerable trade structure and change the trade policy or water-food management.

#### 357 **4. Conclusions**

358 The import of water in virtual form based on VWT could develop into a major water portfolio that dominates water  
359 management in the water-scarce countries of the MENA region. Since the introduction of the virtual water concept, various  
360 studies have been conducted to quantify the volume of the VWT. In water-deficit areas, such as the MENA region, the VWT  
361 can offer new perspectives for understanding and solving water stress and scarcity. The amount of imported virtual water is  
362 regarded as the most important factor in determining water and food security, and the water and land savings based on crop  
363 imports in the MENA region could explain and underline the importance of international trade.

364 In particular, the interlinkages of key natural resource sectors and the improved production efficiency are considered a win-  
365 win strategy for environmental sustainability for current or future generations (Ringler et al., 2013). Nexus frameworks identify  
366 key issues in food, water, and energy securities through the lens of sustainability, seeking to predict and protect against future  
367 risks and resource insecurities (Biggs et al., 2015). The core of the Nexus concept is that the production, consumption, and  
368 distribution of water, energy, and food, are inextricably interlinked. Thus, decisions made in one sector typically impact the



369 other sectors (Mohtar and Daher, 2014). Therefore, we believe that virtual water can be a useful interlinking parameter among  
370 water, food, and land, within the Nexus system. In addition, VWT and water-land savings by trade in this study can be used  
371 for supporting decisions through the Nexus system.  
372 In summary, policy makers can benefit by considering both the quantitative impacts of VWT and the structural changes of  
373 VWT, such as vulnerable expansion (or reduction) in the MENA region. The intensity and connectivity of VWT, which were  
374 analyzed in this study, can be the major components needed for integrating food and water policies in the MENA region.  
375 Correspondingly, this study might provide important information to policy makers for evaluating future scenarios about  
376 resource management toward sustainability in the MENA region.

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
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


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(a) Green water imports




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(b) Blue water imports

449 **Figure 1.** Total amount of virtual water imported by each country in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012 classified into  
 450 green (upper) and blue (lower) water. The pie graphs show the annual imports and proportions of each crop, while the size of  
 451 the pie indicates the amount of annual virtual water imported from 2000 to 2012

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
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**Figure 2.** Virtual water imported per capita in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012


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(a) Total green water export (GWE) during 2000-2012




(b) Total blue water export (BWE) during 2000-2012

457 **Figure 3.** Quantities of green water exports (GWE) and blue water exports (BWE) from the primary exporters to the MENA  
 458 region from 2000 to 2012






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
(a) Nonscaled in-degree centrality




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(b) Scaled in-degree centrality

**Figure 4.** Nonscaled and scaled in-degree centralities of each country in the MENA region in 2000, 2006, and 2012



(a) Changes of in-degree centrality from 2000 to 2006




(b) Changes of in-degree centrality from 2006 to 2012

**Figure 5.** Country types in the MENA region according to the changes of nonscaled and scaled in-degree centralities


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



Figure 6. Virtual water imports from exporters to Lebanon in 2000, 2006, and 2012.  
 (bn indicates billion m³)

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**Figure 7.** Eigenvector centralities of the virtual water trade network in the MENA region in 2000, 2006, and 2012



495 **Table 1.** Water and land footprints of four major crops in the MENA region

Countries in the MENA region	Water footprint (m <sup>3</sup> /ton)								Land footprint (ha/ton)			
	Barley		Maize		Wheat		Rice		Barley	Maize	Wheat	Rice
	Green water footprint	Blue water footprint	Green water footprint	Blue water footprint	Green water footprint	Blue water footprint	Green water footprint	Blue water footprint				
ALGERIA	2859.0	-	964.1	-	3290.0	65.2	1080.8	-	0.72	0.27	0.72	-
EGYPT	619.2	1694.7	140.8	1078.2	214.8	903.5	59.0	1003.1	0.51	0.13	0.16	0.10
IRAQ	3459.7	4321.4	587.3	1812.2	3069.2	2818.3	256.2	6574.7	1.22	0.42	0.72	0.37
JORDAN	3167.8	320.3	126.6	-	2267.0	988.7	-	-	1.37	0.05	0.86	-
KUWAIT	929.3	2256.3	41.2	207.9	955.4	2287.7	-	-	0.48	0.05	0.50	-
LEBANON	1919.9	-	507.6	14.4	1556.0	97.0	-	-	0.54	0.27	0.36	-
LIBYA	6417.6	1808.2	1151.1	-	4360.2	1542.9	-	-	2.04	0.45	1.29	-
MOROCCO	3692.3	-	3541.0	3182.9	2758.0	244.6	293.0	1278.0	1.13	1.43	0.69	0.16
OMAN	322.9	2336.2	-	-	842.4	1938.5	-	-	0.33	-	0.30	-
QATAR	485.6	1714.3	78.5	502.9	678.6	1626.3	-	-	0.33	0.07	0.44	-
SAUDI ARABIA	193.6	799.8	366.6	1270.1	238.4	1093.2	-	-	0.18	0.19	0.19	-
SYRIA	5084.0	41.6	347.3	1573.4	1454.2	440.1	273.2	-	1.61	0.25	0.42	-
TUNISIA	3561.1	75.1	-	-	2375.0	71.8	-	-	0.94	-	0.55	-
UAE	-	-	-	-	1563.5	507.7	-	-	0.13	0.05	0.24	-
YEMEN	1904.6	3234.4	1726.2	2950.8	1804.4	2355.5	-	-	1.22	0.71	0.64	-

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500**Table 2.** Cultivation area, production, and the quantity of crops imported in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012

Countries in the MENA region	Annual cultivation area (ha/year)				Annual production (ton/year)				Annual import (ton/year)			
	Barley	Maize	Wheat	Rice	Barley	Maize	Wheat	Rice	Barley	Maize	Wheat	Rice
ALGERIA	760,545	308	1,658,197	-	1,049,710	1,128	2,313,464	-	233,887	2,112,527	5,363,580	47,080
EGYPT	68,103	876,153	1,180,644	625,626	134,034	6,812,845	7,549,253	6,023,684	24,805	5,073,779	8,295,988	46,292
IRAQ	914,074	128,842	1,451,219	85,182	751,099	307,682	2,009,972	232,040	35,378	18,960	2,545,919	742,394
JORDAN	31,158	947	20,116	-	22,757	17,514	23,379	-	487,593	385,936	792,508	137,442
KUWAIT	1,058	290	173	-	2,191	5,855	345	-	178,432	134,373	284,684	171,451
LEBANON	13,515	949	45,380	-	24,834	3,579	126,623	-	49,278	289,707	367,370	46,087
LIBYA	191,641	1,356	165,469	-	94,107	2,997	128,149	-	226,317	429,407	803,545	122,579
MOROCCO	2,118,032	226,903	2,910,977	5,876	1,867,670	159,127	4,200,596	36,936	392,639	1,446,836	2,994,446	13,307
OMAN	1,002	-	426	-	3,027	-	1,432	-	35,829	99,525	288,134	118,802
QATAR	947	94	15	-	2,841	1,329	34	-	33,286	3,914	47,798	87,312
SAUDI ARABIA	12,279	16,689	374,414	-	68,366	86,181	1,997,598	-	6,252,893	1,600,081	700,703	1,009,384
SYRIA	1,313,101	53,405	1,667,229	-	817,609	211,675	4,008,420	-	393,029	1,319,461	454,904	201,690
TUNISIA	385,189	-	722,038	-	411,431	-	1,302,438	-	407,455	737,754	1,525,848	17,453
UAE	14	144	18	-	111	2,931	74	-	215,321	399,987	1,063,996	683,336
YEMEN	39,276	40,774	110,138	-	32,248	57,329	173,437	-	2,845	343,919	2,096,970	279,136

Source: FAOSTAT (<http://www.fao.org/faostat/>)



501 **Table 3.** The amounts of water and land savings based on imported crops in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012  
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Countries in the MENA region	Water savings (million m <sup>3</sup> /year)						Land savings (thousand ha/year)		
	Barley		Maize		Wheat		Barley	Maize	Wheat
	Green water	Blue water	Green water	Blue water	Green water	Blue water			
ALGERIA	669.0	-	2,037.2	-	17,647.6	349.9	169.5	577.0	3,844.7
EGYPT	15.5	42.4	714.3	5,470.5	1,781.9	7,495.6	12.7	652.5	1,297.4
IRAQ	121.1	151.3	11.2	34.4	7,814.1	7,175.5	42.6	8.0	1,838.2
JORDAN	1,545.9	156.3	48.9	-	1,797.7	784.0	668.2	20.9	682.3
KUWAIT	165.4	401.6	5.5	27.9	272.3	652.0	86.0	6.6	142.9
LEBANON	94.1	0.0	147.2	4.2	571.0	35.6	26.7	76.9	131.5
LIBYA	1,450.4	408.6	493.8	-	3,505.6	1,240.5	460.2	194.1	1,038.1
MOROCCO	1,451.1	-	5,123.8	4,605.6	8,257.3	732.3	445.7	2,063.3	2,074.8
OMAN	11.6	84.1	0.0	-	242.6	558.3	11.9	-	85.7
QATAR	16.0	56.6	0.3	2.0	32.6	78.1	11.0	0.3	21.2
SAUDI ARABIA	1,210.5	5,001.5	586.5	2,032.1	167.1	766.3	1,123.1	309.8	131.4
SYRIA	1,998.0	16.3	458.1	2,075.3	661.6	200.3	631.2	332.8	189.2
TUNISIA	1,449.4	30.5	-	-	3,624.2	109.6	381.0	-	846.0
UAE	-	-	-	-	1,663.6	540.2	27.1	19.7	258.8
YEMEN	5.7	9.7	593.8	1,015.1	3,783.8	4,939.4	3.7	244.7	1,331.7

\* Water and land savings by rice import was not calculated because of the lack of the data of water and land footprints in the MENA region

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504 **Table 4.** The amounts of green and blue water imported in the MENA region from 2000 to 2012

Countries in the MENA region	Import of green water (million m <sup>3</sup> /year)					Import of blue water (million m <sup>3</sup> /year)				
	Barley	Maize	Wheat	Rice	Total	Barley	Maize	Wheat	Rice	Total
ALGERIA	242.0	1,883.6	5,104.8	57.8	7,288.2	7.8	76.6	371.1	33.5	489.0
BAHRAIN	0.4	7.5	62.7	44.4	115.0	0.2	0.3	7.1	78.2	85.8
EGYPT	37.3	3,798.4	15,254.1	58.4	19,148.2	1.1	295.6	418.6	32.5	747.8
IRAQ	33.2	16.7	4,645.8	1,027.8	5,723.5	2.2	1.3	153.9	404.8	562.2
JORDAN	656.8	364.2	1,483.9	81.2	2,586.1	20.8	20.8	84.5	115.0	241.1
KUWAIT	257.0	159.1	557.7	211.6	1,185.4	9.7	2.3	10.2	138.1	160.3
LEBANON	84.7	211.0	749.5	30.0	1,075.2	2.3	25.6	18.9	36.0	82.8
LIBYA	359.6	408.9	1,245.4	56.0	2,069.9	8.4	26.8	75.3	99.7	210.2
MOROCCO	318.6	1,383.2	3,345.0	8.9	5,055.7	12.1	46.1	118.8	20.4	197.4
OMAN	52.7	123.2	470.8	107.6	754.3	5.4	4.1	67.8	201.3	278.6
QATAR	50.9	6.4	76.4	77.6	211.3	2.4	0.3	19.1	146.9	168.7
SAUDI ARABIA	8,154.5	1,521.4	974.0	1,225.9	11,875.8	324.3	68.9	70.8	696.0	1,160.0
SYRIA	556.4	947.3	900.0	120.8	2,524.5	12.8	90.2	17.8	165.6	286.4
TUNISIA	409.8	611.7	2,507.7	27.8	3,557.0	16.0	40.7	73.9	11.6	142.2
UAE	315.7	465.8	1,671.8	859.5	3,312.8	28.5	14.3	249.3	612.5	904.6
YEMEN	3.1	406.1	3,597.3	392.7	4,399.2	1.6	8.2	247.3	220.8	477.9

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