

## 1 **Response to Reviewer 1**

2 We are indebted to the reviewer for this insightful review of our discussion paper.  
3 As detailed below, we have made substantial improvements to analysis and  
4 presentation in response to reviewer comments.

### 6 **General Comment 1**

8 *The first major shortcoming of the paper is to ignore the role of changes in*  
9 *infrastructure and agricultural practices that could be independent of, or resulting*  
10 *from, changes in climate and upstream infrastructure development. As the authors*  
11 *likely know, there are several proposals on the table in Sudan for new infrastructure*  
12 *projects, and agricultural expansion (particularly in sugar production) is a major*  
13 *objective of current irrigation development strategy in Sudan. In addition, reservoir*  
14 *operating rules and irrigators are not likely to take climate change “fully on the chin”;*  
15 *i.e., they will adapt by changing management.*

### 17 **Response:**

18 The reviewer makes an excellent point. Indeed, we developed SHOM largely to  
19 provide a modeling tool for addressing these kinds of questions. We had initially  
20 withheld modifications in practice and infrastructure from the current paper  
21 because we wanted to present SHOM using present-day infrastructure, with the  
22 potential to apply the model to management and construction analysis in future  
23 studies. Upon reflection, however, we realize that we should include at least an  
24 indicative analysis of how the model responds to changes in management or  
25 infrastructure.

27 To do this we have considered the impact of agricultural intensification through the  
28 addition of a second cropping season. This pattern has already been observed in  
29 other parts of Sudan in which large upstream dams have been introduced (Professor  
30 Belay Simane, Addis Ababa University personal communication), so we consider it  
31 to be a realistic and likely management change in the presence of upstream control  
32 on the Blue Nile. Our analysis of this change in management proceeds as follows.  
33 Beginning with our upstream control scenario (i.e., the 3-month smoother; see  
34 response to General Comment 3 for more on this point) we add the option to divert  
35 water for irrigation in a second season in addition to the primary growing season  
36 included in the baseline model. This allows us to add four scenarios to our analysis:

- 37 1. A hydrology only analysis that includes upstream control and two cropping  
38 seasons but does not change the price of power or the treaty constraint  
39 (smooth2crop). This simulation can be compared to the original Smooth flow  
40 to isolate the impact of changing agricultural practices in the absence of  
41 other changes.
- 42 2. An analysis that includes double cropping and an estimate of less expensive  
43 power due to upstream production sold to Sudan (smoothPower2crop). This  
44 simulation can be compared to the original SmoothPower simulation to see

- 45 how double cropping might evolve under conditions of a lower electricity  
 46 price.
- 47 3. A policy analysis that includes multiple cropping and the removal of the 1959  
 48 treaty constraint (Smooth2cropNA). This simulation is important because we  
 49 found that the 1959 Nile Waters agreement placed a significant limitation on  
 50 Sudan's ability to take advantage of multiple cropping seasons. Please see our  
 51 response to Specific Comment 4 for more information on the treaty  
 52 constraint.
  - 53 4. A full analysis that includes multiple cropping, lower electricity price, and  
 54 removal of the 1959 treaty constraint (SmoothPower2cropNA).


55  
 56 For each scenario we performed simulations for a range of marginal water values to  
 57 test sensitivity across a range of agricultural returns (see General Comment 5 for  
 58 more on this topic). These values are presented in Table 1. As the marginal value of  
 59 water for each crop increases the model tends towards larger irrigation  
 60 withdrawals.

61  
 62 Table 1: Marginal Value of water calculated for each crop

	Marginal value of water (\$/m3)					
	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6
Cotton	0.287	0.118	0.036	0.008	0.001	0.00001
Wheat	0.062	0.025	0.008	0.002	0.000	0.000
Groundnut	0.083	0.034	0.011	0.002	0.000	0.000
Sorghum	0.017	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000

63  
 64 The results of these simulations are presented in Figure 1, which has also been  
 65 added to the paper (new paper Figure 9).

66  
 67 Figure 1: Hydropower vs. irrigation benefits in simulations that include double  
 68 cropping. Simulation names are described in the text. The "Observed" flow  
 69 simulation is included for comparison.  
 70



71  
72

73 In this figure we see that the Smooth and Smooth2crop scenarios both lie above the  
74 Observed scenario for all sets of marginal water values. This indicates that an  
75 upstream control that smoothes Blue Nile flows results in increased hydropower  
76 production in Sudan even when an additional cropping season is allowed in the  
77 model. Somewhat surprisingly, there is very little increase in irrigation benefits in  
78 Smooth2crop relative to Smooth, even for high agricultural marginal water values  
79 (e.g. P1-P3). This suggests that the value of hydropower and/or hydrological or  
80 treaty constraints limit the attractiveness of an irrigation driven pathway in this  
81 scenario.

82

83 One might also expect that a reduction in electricity price (any of the Power  
84 scenarios) would push Sudan strongly towards irrigation. Some tendency in this  
85 direction can be seen in Figure 1, but the effect is modest and only applies for  
86 specific marginal values of water (P5, P4), and not every case. In fact, the  
87 "SmoothPower2crop" scenario actually produces more KWH power than

88 “Observed,” albeit with lower total benefit on account of the lower price of power in  
89 this scenario. This is true even for high marginal values of irrigation (P5 and P6).

90  
91 The “NA” simulations shown in Figure 1 suggest that these counterintuitive results  
92 are in large part a product of the treaty constraint. As Figure 1 shows the nature of  
93 the 1959 agreement constraint within The 1959 Agreement constraint in the  
94 equation below guarantees at least three times more water passing through Merowe  
95 (the largest dam in the model) than to be used in irrigation and for losses due to  
96 evaporation. Hence Sudan’s irrigation potential is limited by the 1959 agreement.

$$\sum_{l,m} (i_{l,m,y}) + \sum_{l,m} (e_{l,m,y}) \leq 0.28 * \sum_m (r_{3,m,y})$$

98

99

100

101 “Smooth2cropNA” and “SmoothPower2cropNAPower” removes this constraint, and  
102 for larger marginal values there is a substantial increase in irrigation benefits.

103

104 Additional changes in infrastructure and management—for example, additional  
105 dams in Sudan or development of new irrigation initiatives—are left for future  
106 analysis. The matter of adaptive reservoir management is an interesting problem.  
107 We acknowledge that, we would need a more realistic and data-informed  
108 representation of reservoir operation to provide a fully meaningful analysis of  
109 adaptive reservoir management under climate change.

110

#### 111 **General Comment 2**

112 *The second major shortcoming of the paper is the fact that it ignores the White Nile*  
113 *and the Atbara rivers completely. The problem with these omissions is that the water*  
114 *management situation in those rivers is dynamic and not insignificant (contrary to*  
115 *what the authors assert). In the White Nile, there are a range of changes underway*  
116 *between Gebel el Aulia and Khartoum, as well as long-standing plans related to the*  
117 *Sudd, a discussion that includes South Sudan. And changes in the Atbara and White*  
118 *Nile could both affect the negotiation of allocations under climate change. The paper*  
119 *must either be given a new title or the model expanded; at the moment it does not*  
120 *apply to the entire “Sudanese Nile.”*

#### 121 **Response:**

122 Agreed. Rather than attempt a drastic expansion of the model for the current paper  
123 we have changed our title to:

124 The Question of Sudan: a hydroeconomic optimization model for the Sudanese Blue  
125 Nile.

126

127

#### 128 **Reviewer 1 General Comment 3**

129 *The third issue is the treatment of the effect of upstream infrastructure. The authors*

130 *do not provide sufficient justification for their temporal smoothing assumption, which*  
131 *is surprisingly ad-hoc given that they would appear to be able to model a new large*  
132 *dam in Ethiopia. Why not simply include such a project, optimized from Ethiopia's*  
133 *perspective? The other advantage of this is that it would allow for more realistic*  
134 *representation of the energy system, since a likely target for Ethiopian hydropower*  
135 *would be the Sudanese market. Because of the way the analysis has been structured,*  
136 *the model may overstate the tradeoff between hydropower and irrigation because it*  
137 *assumes no hydropower from Ethiopia will go to Sudan (this is acknowledged on*  
138 *p.11585 but the solution is again ad-hoc). I would urge a rethinking of the analysis*  
139 *along these lines.*

140 **Response:**

141 We agree with the reviewer that expanding the model across the border to model  
142 the GERD would lead to a more realistic simulation. However, we are not sure that  
143 adding a GERD optimized from Ethiopia's perspective in the context of a connected  
144 grid is really a simple addition to the current model. Just as an example, it is highly  
145 likely that the GERD and Roseires will be managed in some kind of reregulating  
146 fashion in order to supply peaking power to Khartoum. We've begun to work  
147 through this problem, but we are not ready to formalize it within the model.

148  
149 For this reason, we have used the observed monthly flows averaged across 3  
150 months purely as an illustrative example of how upstream flow regulation impacts  
151 Sudan. This is, indeed, a simplified approach. But it is not a trivial adjustment, given  
152 the fact that the high variability of Blue Nile flows has been identified as a key  
153 development limitation for Sudan for many years. Our simplified "GERD" (i.e.,  
154 smoothing) allows us to examine this issue in an idealized manner. In the future we  
155 do intend to expand the model in a number of ways, including the addition of an  
156 optimally managed GERD.

157

158

159 **General Comment 4**

160 *The description of previous work in the Nile basin covers the existing hydro-economic*  
161 *optimization models well, but says little about important simulation work that has*  
162 *been used specifically to consider climate change implications, which seems very*  
163 *relevant. See Jeuland (2010) in Water Resources Research and Jeuland & Whittington*  
164 *(2014). Note that the supplementary materials for the latter also include updated*  
165 *water demands for Sudan, compared to those used in the paper.*

166 **Response:**

167 We thank the reviewer for noting these studies. A description of related  
168 hydroeconomic tradeoff simulations within the Nile basin as detailed in Jeuland  
169 (2010), Jeuland and Whittington (2014) were all added to the section 1.2 of the  
170 updated version of the manuscript.

171

172

173 **General Comment 5**

174 *Model: I question the choice of valuing the irrigation benefits using agricultural profit*  
175 *margins (in the objective function). The problem is that this assumes that all profits*  
176 *are attributable to irrigation, which may not be the case. What the authors need*  
177 *instead is a marginal product of water in irrigation. Given this approach, I find it hard*  
178 *to interpret the tradeoff curves, which do not reflect the marginal contribution of*  
179 *water to agriculture profits.*

180 **Response:**

181 We acknowledge that our application of AGM was poorly framed. To address this  
182 shortcoming we have replaced AGM with a marginal value of agricultural water, an  
183 approach that has been used in previous studies (e.g., Whittington 2005, Arjoon  
184 2014). Noting that agricultural data from the region is extremely limited, these  
185 authors used a flat demand curve with a constant marginal value of water at  
186 0.05\$/m<sup>3</sup> for all agricultural areas.

187  
188 For this paper we have followed the approach of using a flat demand curve, but we  
189 have applied crop-specific marginal water values and performed a sensitivity  
190 analysis on the parameter. Six different combinations of marginal water value were  
191 tested, as listed in the table below. The ratio of the marginal values for each crop  
192 was calculated based on the producer price (P, \$/ton), yield (Y, ton/m<sup>2</sup>) and water  
193 content (W, m<sup>3</sup>/m<sup>2</sup>).

194  
195 PY/W will give the \$/m<sup>3</sup> for each crop, thus a ratio of marginal value of water for  
196 each crop. Varying the values based on this ratio gives the table below. Sources: P  
197 (FAOSTAT website), Y (Ghezze, 1998 taken from a Rahad Research Station for  
198 potential yield values), W (Plasquelle 1990, takes into account initial irrigation and  
199 penman evap from Wad Medina)

200

	Marginal value of water (\$/m <sup>3</sup> )					
	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6
Cotton	0.287	0.118	0.036	0.008	0.001	0.00001
Wheat	0.062	0.025	0.008	0.002	0.000	0.000
Groundnut	0.083	0.034	0.011	0.002	0.000	0.000
Sorghum	0.017	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000

201

202 Additionally, we would like to clarify that the marginal values presented here as  
203 well as the power pricing of 8 cents/KWh are chosen for illustrative purposes only.  
204 They are intended to assess the sensitivities of the model and are **not** meant to  
205 reflect an optimal estimate of current agricultural or energy market prices. This will  
206 be added in section 2.2.1 of the manuscript.

207

208 **General Comment 6**

209 *A final (and difficult) issue I would raise is that the valuation must clearly be presented*  
210 *as a country-specific one. Despite the legal regime, Egypt has been releasing more than*  
211 *55.5 bcm per year from the High Aswan Dam, because Sudan has not used her full*

212 *allocation. This means that the true economic benefits of Sudan consuming more*  
213 *water thus must include the reduced water available in Egypt, where it is being used*  
214 *productively. If the paper is really about optimal economic use of water, it must*  
215 *explain and handle this issue clearly.*

216 **Response:**

217 Agreed. The larger benefits accrued by increased consumption of water in the  
218 analysis of this paper is restricted to the Sudan only. This analysis does not factor  
219 the effect of the decrease in upstream water supplied to Egypt, thus an increase in  
220 benefits to Sudan does not necessarily equate to a basin-wide increase in net  
221 benefits. This is now noted in the paper in Section 4. Our model does not address  
222 the question of what an increase in Sudan's consumption would do to basin wide  
223 benefits. Past studies (Whittington and Blackmore) have shown that decreases in  
224 inflows to Aswan Dam would lower water levels in the dam and decrease the total  
225 amount of water lost to evaporation, thus increasing basin-wide benefits.

226

227

228 **Specific Comment 1**

229 *In the introduction p. 11567, the relevance of changing silt loads is not properly*  
230 *explained (lines 25-26).*

231 **Response:**

232 Development upstream of Sudan will decrease silt loads thereby having multiple  
233 effects. Silt deposited accumulate over time in the reservoir and reduce the volume  
234 of reservoir. This affects hydropower production, reduces the available water for  
235 irrigation, incurs dredging costs, as well as reduces flood control capabilities. We  
236 have added text explaining this to the relevant passage of the introduction.

237

238 **Specific Comment 2**

239 *I would advise the authors to update somewhat their data sources. In the introduction,*  
240 *based on a now dated study by Blackmore and Whittington, it is said that Sudan*  
241 *consumes 13.5 bcm/yr of water, which is likely on the low side, and does not include*  
242 *evaporation losses from the reservoirs behind the heightened Roseires Dam and the*  
243 *Merowe Dam, the latter of which should be included in Sudan's 18.5 bcm/yr allocation*  
244 *(e.g., the 10 bcm in the 1959 agreement is evaporation from behind Lake Nasser). Also,*  
245 *how evaporation from Roseires should be handled is ambiguous since the heightening*  
246 *was not written into the treaty.*

247 **Response:**

248 Agreed. Jeuland (2010) uses a baseline demand target for Sudan of 16.1 Billion cubic  
249 meters (Bcm). This is corrected in the revised version of the manuscript.

250

251 **Specific Comment 3**

252 *Please review the equations section. Some terms (e.g. "Water") are not defined, and it*  
253 *is unclear how little "i" relates to big "I". I think the problem is that the water*  
254 *requirements of different crops have not been clearly explained.*

255 **Response:**

256 Water in the irrigation equation is defined as the crop water requirement, the total  
257 amount of water (m<sup>3</sup>) required by 1 m<sup>2</sup> area of the crop. We apologize for the  
258 confusion and restated the irrigation constraint as:

259 Total water withdrawn for irrigation location (l) at month (m) in year (y):

$$i_{l,m,y} = \sum_c (effi * Water_{c,l,m,y} * Area_{c,l,m,y})$$

260

261 The total water used for irrigation is calculated by multiplying the area cultivated,  
262 the crop water requirement and the irrigation efficiency. The total benefits are  
263 derived by multiplying the total water used and the marginal value of the water.  
264 Therefore the total irrigation benefits for each month (m) at year (y):

$$bi_{m,y} = \sum_{c,t} (effi * v_c * Water_{c,l,m,y} * Area_{c,l,m,y})$$

265 where v<sub>c</sub> is the marginal value of water for each crop. With these changes, big “I” has  
266 been removed from the irrigation constraint. This updated constraint has now been  
267 included in section 2.1.3.

268

269 **Specific Comment 4**

270 *Looking at constraint in equation 5, is it correct that the model allows Sudan to*  
271 *withdraw more or less than 18.5 in a given year so long as the total balances out? That*  
272 *seems problematic since Sudan would likely be tempted to take more water in drought*  
273 *years and Egypt would clearly not allow this. The other reason that this formulation is*  
274 *problematic is because the discounting will necessarily front-load demands.*

275 We thank the reviewer for noting these important concerns. We have attempted to  
276 address the drought problem as follows. In order to ensure Egypt’s water allocation,  
277 Sudan’s total use of water for the year should be less than or equal to 0.28 of the  
278 total release downstream of Merowe (i.e Egypt’s share). This prevents Sudan’s large  
279 intake during drought years by guaranteeing Egypt’s fractional share during those  
280 years.

281

$$\sum_{l,m} (i_{l,m,y}) + \sum_{l,m} (e_{l,m,y}) \leq 0.28 * \sum_m (r_{3,m,y})$$

282

283 0.28 = 18.5 / (55.5 +10) = Sudan’s share / (Egypt’s share + evaporation at Aswan).

284

285 With this additional constraint incorporated, we tested our model for front-loading.  
286 Results displayed below show the difference between two identical models, the first  
287 “Dis” includes a discount rate of 5%, the second model “No Dis” removes the  
288 discount rate.

289

$$Objective\ function = \sum_{m,y} (D_y * bi_{m,y}) + \sum_{m,y} (D_y * bh_{m,y})$$



290  
291  
292  
293  
294  
295

As the table indicates, front loading is not a significant phenomenon in the model once the drought year constraint is included. The largest change in any year is an increase of approximately 4% in benefits for the first year for both irrigation and hydropower.

Year	Bi			bh		
	Irrigation Benefits			Hydropower Benefits		
	Dis	No Dis	%Diff	Dis	No Dis	%Diff
1	41.420	39.830	3.992	549.241	526.077	4.403
2	47.985	47.985	0.000	951.687	975.899	-2.481
3	47.985	47.985	0.000	992.416	993.895	-0.149
4	45.323	45.323	0.000	963.910	959.026	0.509
5	47.985	47.985	0.000	990.561	995.715	-0.518
6	47.985	47.985	0.000	963.039	963.039	0.000
7	18.312	18.312	0.000	956.764	951.440	0.560
8	47.985	47.985	0.000	899.781	900.426	-0.072
9	40.527	40.527	0.000	880.719	885.905	-0.585
10	1.053	1.053	0.000	885.186	883.670	0.172
11	47.985	47.985	0.000	900.973	900.541	0.048
12	47.985	47.985	0.000	975.185	975.899	-0.073
13	47.985	47.985	0.000	992.416	993.895	-0.149
14	45.323	45.323	0.000	959.026	959.026	0.000
15	47.985	47.985	0.000	995.715	995.715	0.000
16	47.985	47.985	0.000	963.039	963.039	0.000
17	18.312	18.312	0.000	954.264	951.440	0.297
18	47.985	47.985	0.000	899.346	900.426	-0.120
19	40.527	40.527	0.000	884.726	885.905	-0.133
20	1.090	1.090	0.000	975.216	976.027	-0.083

296  
297  
298  
299

Both the updated constraint and a statement on front loading are now included in the text, in sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.2, respectively.

**300 Specific Comment 5**

301 *Model II: Random bootstrapping of flows will not maintain the autocorrelation in the*  
302 *hydrological time series. The authors should comment on the implications of this and*  
303 *whether it is likely to be an important shortcoming.*

**304 Response:**

305 The reviewer makes a good point: our bootstrapping method does retain the  
306 seasonal structure of flows, but any autocorrelation between hydrologic years is  
307 lost. To check whether interannual autocorrelation is significant in the available 70  
308 year discharge record we calculated autocorrelation for total and average annual  
309 flows lagged for 1 to 50 years. The lag-1 autocorrelation was 0.165, which is not

310 statistically significant. For other time lags the largest correlation value was 0.175  
311 and the lowest -0.215. These low values show minimal autocorrelation on annual  
312 scales thus minimizing the distortive effects of bootstrapping. We now note this in  
313 the text in section 2.2.4.

314

315

316 *P.11567, line 27: "analytical tools" not "analysis tools".*

317

318 **Response:** Changed

319

320 *P.11568, line 5: "For the purposes of..."*

321 **Response:** Changed

322 *Gezira – as in the irrigation scheme, is misspelled in different ways in different places*  
323 *(as Gezeira, Gezeria, etc.)*

324 **Response:**

325 *P.11575. line 16: The model does not maximize I. The objective function includes both*  
326 *agricultural profits and hydropower.*

327 **Response:** Irrigation constraints and the objective function have been updated

328

### 329 **Response to Reviewer 1 Rebuttal:**

330

331 **Comment 1:**

332 Reviewer 2 raises an important point about the need to correctly account for the marginal  
333 value of water in agriculture, and I am not sure I follow the approach taken by the authors to  
334 specify this. It appears that they have based this value on a multiplicative function of yield and  
335 water content, but this would seem to me to still be an average value (not a marginal one),  
336 since what would be needed is the contribution of an additional unit of water to an additional  
337 unit of yield, to isolate the correct parameter.

338

339 **Response:**

340

341 Thank you for your response. We indeed assume that the marginal value (MV) of  
342 water is equal to the average value of water dependent on crop yield and water  
343 content and remains unchanged for any incremental changes in water allocation,  
344 implying a flat demand curve. Therefore an incremental increase in water ( $i_{\text{increase}}$ )  
345 would increase the total agricultural benefits value by  $i_{\text{increase}} * MV$ . While this a  
346 assumption might not be ideal, we believe that under the current application it is as  
347 close as we will get to the actual marginal value of water given data limitations.

348

349 **Action:**

350 We have stated the use of a flat demand curve and that the average value of water  
351 equals the marginal value in the Manuscript

352

353 Comment 2:

354 Though it is true that the treaty constraints do limit irrigation expansion (as shown in the new  
355 "NA" scenarios of Figure 1), my interpretation of the results differs somewhat from that of the  
356 authors (or at least their statements of it are somewhat confusing and contradictory).  
357 Specifically, they say that "the value of hydropower and/or hydrological or treaty constraints  
358 limit the attractiveness of an irrigation driven pathway in this scenario." In fact, I don't think it  
359 has anything to do with the value of hydropower, i.e., there is very little real tradeoff between  
360 hydropower production and agriculture. This can be seen by the results across high and low  
361 value hydropower scenario. The reason for this is fairly simple, regardless of irrigation  
362 withdrawals, there is sufficient flow continuing to Egypt such that power production at Merowe  
363 (the main dam affected negatively by more water use in irrigation in Sudan) is not affected in  
364 a major way, until irrigation expansion beyond the treaty constraints is allowed.

365

366 Response:

367 Agreed.

368

369 Action:

370 We have corrected this in the findings of the Manuscript:

371 "Smooth2crop in Figure 9 introduces a second crop season to the smoothed flow,  
372 and SmoothPower2crop includes this double cropping and an estimate of less  
373 expensive power due to upstream production sold to Sudan. The modest increases  
374 in irrigation benefits for these flows, particularly in scenarios of high irrigation  
375 profitability, illustrate Sudan's limitation due to the constraints in the model  
376 representative of the 1959 agreement. The second constraint guarantees at least  
377 three times more water passing Merowe downstream into Egypt that it does allow  
378 for irrigation at upstream schemes, thereby forcing Sudan toward a hydropower  
379 path and limiting its irrigation potential"

380

381 Comment 3:

382 While I appreciate the change in title and agree that it better reflects the nature of the paper,  
383 some qualitative discussion of the dynamics of other rivers (White Nile and Atbara), and how  
384 they could enrich or alter the Blue Nile optimization performed here, is warranted.

385

386 Response:

387

388 We acknowledge the importance of discussing the dynamics and effects of the White  
389 Nile and Atbara on our analysis.

390

391 Action:

392 The introduction section of the manuscript briefly discusses the dynamics of the  
393 White Nile and other eastern Nile tributaries.

394

395 "The Eastern Nile tributaries collectively contribute over 80% of flow in the main  
396 stem Nile. The Eastern Nile basin also exhibits strong hydrological connectivity, in  
397 that upstream climate variability and development directly impact downstream  
398 resources in a manner that is not observed in the White Nile system, where lakes

399 and wetlands serve as a buffer between the Equatorial Lakes headwaters region and  
400 downstream water deficit areas in Sudan and Egypt”

401  
402 The conclusion section of the paper has been updated to address the effects of  
403 including these tributaries on Blue Nile optimization.

404  
405 “In addition, we would add that our analysis was performed for a portion of the Blue  
406 Nile as well as the downstream main Nile stem within Sudan. Future development of  
407 the model should incorporate other major tributaries such as the White Nile and the  
408 Atbara. Inclusion of other Nile tributaries and their infrastructure in the model will  
409 present a more holistic approach to analyzing Sudan’s water resources decision  
410 making.”

411  
412 Comment 4:

413 In response to my comment about effects of increased withdrawals on Egypt and basin  
414 benefits, the authors state that: “Past studies (Whittington and Blackmore) have shown that  
415 decreases in inflows to Aswan Dam would lower water levels in the dam and decrease the total  
416 amount of water lost to evaporation, thus increasing basin-wide benefits.” My recollection of  
417 Whittington & Blackmore is that they said reduced evaporation at Aswan would increase the  
418 amount of water that can be used by Nile riparians, but it does not follow that this would  
419 increase basin- wide benefits, which depends on the distribution of the changes and whether  
420 they occur in high or low-value sectors.

421  
422 Response:

423 Agreed

424  
425 Comment 5:

426 It would be more straightforward to report the sensitivity of front-loading demands to  
427 discounting by showing what the annual withdrawals are over time in the scenarios used to  
428 test for this. Showing the benefits each year is unnecessarily opaque.

429  
430 Response:

431 Agreed.

432  
433 Action:

434  
435 Table below shows the water withdrawals for Sudan for the whole 20 year period  
436 for the same model with and without a discount rate. No discount column presents  
437 withdrawal values for the model when the discount rate is removed from the  
438 objective function. Discount column shows withdrawals with a discount rate.

439  
440

Year	No Discount rate mcm	Discount rate mcm	Comparison mcm
1	7556	7650	95
2	8600	8600	0

zaitchik 3/7/15 1:47 PM

**Comment [1]:** What unit are you using here? It can't be billion cubic meters, because the values are way too big. But if it's million cubic meters then I'm surprised at how low it is.

Saleh Satti 3/9/15 2:26 PM

**Comment [2]:**

3	8600	8600	0
4	8600	8600	0
5	8600	8600	0
6	8600	8600	0
7	8549	8549	0
8	8600	8600	0
9	8600	8600	0
10	5205	5205	0
11	8600	8600	0
12	8600	8600	0
13	8600	8600	0
14	8600	8600	0
15	8600	8600	0
16	8600	8600	0
17	8549	8549	0
18	8600	8600	0
19	8600	8600	0
20	8588	8588	0

441  
442  
443

## 444 **Responses to Reviewer 2**

445 We thank the reviewer for their thoughtful comments on our paper. A detailed  
446 response to reviews is offered below.

447

### 448 **Major Comment 1**

449 *My main concern is with the hydro-economic model and, more specifically, with the*  
450 *method used to assess the contribution of irrigated agriculture to the system-wide*  
451 *benefits. Due to data limitations, the authors assume that the net benefits correspond*  
452 *to (crop price \* production\*AGM). This formulation overestimates the value of water*  
453 *as the contribution of the other inputs (fertilizer, land, etc) to the production of the*  
454 *agricultural goods is ignored. For the energy sector, the net benefits are given by*  
455 *price\*hydropower where hydropower is a function of the head and the turbined*  
456 *outflow, which properly reflects the contribution of water. For a study emphasizing the*  
457 *economically efficient allocation of water, it is key that the marginal value of water in*  
458 *both sectors be treated on the same footing*

459 We acknowledge that our application of AGM was poorly framed. To address this  
460 shortcoming we have replaced AGM with a marginal value of agricultural water, an  
461 approach that has been used in previous studies (e.g., Whittington 2004,  
462 Whittington et al. 2005, Arjoon et al. 2014). Noting that agricultural data from the  
463 region is extremely limited, these authors used a flat demand curve with a constant  
464 marginal value of water at 0.05\$/m<sup>3</sup> for all agricultural areas.

465

466 For this paper we have followed the approach of using a flat demand curve, but we  
 467 have applied crop-specific marginal water values and performed a sensitivity  
 468 analysis on the parameter. Six different combinations of marginal water value were  
 469 tested, as listed in the table below. The ratio of the marginal values for each crop  
 470 was calculated based on the producer price (P, \$/ton), yield (Y, ton/m<sup>2</sup>) and water  
 471 content (W, m<sup>3</sup>/m<sup>2</sup>).  
 472 PY/W will give the \$/m<sup>3</sup> for each crop, thus a ratio of marginal value of water for  
 473 each crop. Varying the values based on this ratio gives the table below. Sources: P  
 474 (FAOSTAT website), Y (Ghezze, 1998 taken from a Rahad Research Station for  
 475 potential yield values), W (Plasquelle 1990, takes into account initial irrigation and  
 476 penman evap from Wad Medina)  
 477

	Marginal value of water (\$/m3)					
	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6
Cotton	0.287	0.118	0.036	0.008	0.001	0.00001
Wheat	0.062	0.025	0.008	0.002	0.000	0.000
Groundnut	0.083	0.034	0.011	0.002	0.000	0.000
Sorghum	0.017	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000

478  
 479 Additionally, we would like to clarify that the marginal values presented here as  
 480 well as the power pricing of 8 cents/KWh are chosen for illustrative purposes only.  
 481 They are intended to assess the sensitivities of the model and are **not** meant to  
 482 reflect an optimal estimate of current agricultural or energy market prices. This will  
 483 be added in section 2.2 of the manuscript.  
 484

485

486 **Major Comment 2**

487 *This study considers that all irrigation schemes in Sudan are supplied by the Blue Nile,*  
 488 *which is not correct. There are schemes on the White Nile and the Atbara. So, the*  
 489 *upper bound on maximum irrigation withdrawals must be corrected (eq 5).*

490

491 **Major Comment 3**

492 *In the '59 agreement, Sudan is entitled with 18,5 BCM/year, which includes both*  
 493 *irrigation withdrawals and evaporation losses from reservoirs. So, eq. 5 must be*  
 494 *changed accordingly.*

495

496 **Response to Reviewer 2 Major comments 2 and 3:**

497 These comments both address important details of the 1959 treaty constraint. As  
 498 the reviewer correctly points out, our constraint in equation 5 should be adjusted  
 499 downward to account for other rivers and for reservoir loss. To account for both of  
 500 these factors we have reduced the bound on maximum irrigation from 18.5 to  
 501 14.5—i.e., that approximately 80% of Sudan's total allocation will be used for  
 502 irrigation in the Blue Nile plus the main stem Nile. This approximation is based on

503 the relative contribution of Blue Nile flows to the Nile system and the recognition  
504 that the largest irrigation schemes in the country are located in the Blue Nile basin.

505

506 Thus we re-wrote the allocation constraint to:

507

$$\sum_{l,m,y} (i_{l,m,y}) + \sum_{l,m,y} (e_{l,m,y}) \leq Y * 14.5 \text{ bcm}$$

508

509

510 The 14.5 approximation is generous, considering estimated reservoir evaporation  
511 losses and the potential for new irrigation schemes on other rivers, but we consider  
512 it to be a reasonable value that allows us to explore the full potential development  
513 space for the Blue Nile under the constraint of the 1959 treaty.

514

515 Please also see our response to Reviewer 1, specific comment 4, which also  
516 addresses the issue of the 1959 treaty.

517

518

#### 519 **Major Comment 4**

520 *The optimization model (1)-(8) is deterministic. The authors therefore assume per-*  
521 *fect foresight over a period of 20 years. They should discuss the impact of this assump-*  
522 *tion on the results.*

#### 523 **Response:**

524 The deterministic nature of SHOM does not represent the uncertainties in some of  
525 the input parameters. Furthermore, a deterministic model allows for perfect  
526 foresight within the 20-year run period. Thus the results of the various models show  
527 the potential of benefits due to changing sensitivities under current Sudanese  
528 infrastructure. These decisions made in the presented scenarios are highly idealized  
529 and would produce results that are more efficient than any real world scenario.

530

531 For example, perfect foresight allows for pre-regulation of reservoirs to account for  
532 upcoming droughts well beyond the time horizon of existing forecast systems. The  
533 relevance of this kind of foresight to economic optimization is the subject of our  
534 ongoing research, which aims to understand the value of predictions to  
535 hydroeconomic outcomes in the Nile. We now note the perfect prediction issue and  
536 discuss its impacts on results in Section 4.

537

538

539

#### 540 **Major Comment 5**

541

#### 542 **5-1:**

543 *Equation 2. This is supposed to be the hydropower production function. A close*  
544 *examination reveals that the units on the right-hand side do not correspond to energy*

545 (KWh). As a matter of fact, with  $rhe = (m^3)$  ("amount of water passing..."page 11574,  
546 line 25),  $h = (m)$  and  $effh = (-)$ , the product gives  $(m^4)$  not  $(kWh)$ . In the appendix,  
547 "rhe" has become a flow (eq. A4) not a volume. Please clarify. Also, what is the  
548 "efficiency of the dam" ( $effh$ )? I hope that this is not the efficiency of the power plant  
549 because the value of 0.5 would then be extremely low (and would favor the irrigation  
550 sector). Typical efficiencies for a hydropower station range between 0.8-0.9. it is  
551 suggested that the authors use the classic hydropower production function which  
552 depends on the head, the flow, the density of water, the efficiencies of the turbines and  
553 the alternators, the acceleration of gravity, etc. It can be found in any good textbook in  
554 water resources engineering.

555 **Response**

556 Agreed. The equation presented in the paper excludes a conversion parameter. This  
557 parameter was present in the model.

558

559 Equation for hydropower:

560 Changed from

$$\forall_{l,m,y}, KWH_{l,m,y} = \frac{effh * rhe_{l,m,y} * h_{l,m,y} (seconds \text{ per month})}{3600}$$

561

562 to:  $\forall_{l,m,y}, KWH_{l,m,y} = 2.61e - 3 * n * effh * rhe_{l,m,y} * h_{l,m,y}$

563

564  $rhe$  is the average hydropower release during month  $m$ ,  $h$  is average height during  
565 month  $m$ ,  $n$  is the number of seconds in month  $m$ ,  $effh$  is efficiency and  $2.61e-3$  is a  
566 conversion factor. The equation above is derived from the hydropower equation  
567 (Cohon, 2003). This conversion factor is approximately the product of the  
568 acceleration due to gravity and the density of water, divided by  $3600s * 1000$  to give  
569 power generated in KWh..

570 **5-2:**

571 *Crop yield (table 1). 1 ton/ha for wheat in an irrigated scheme seems very low. See*  
572 *recent Msc Thesis "Land and water productivity of cash and food crops in Gezira*  
573 *scheme" by Mohamed Osman, University of Gezira (2009) for more realistic yields in*  
574 *the region.*

575 **Response:**

576 Thank you for bringing "Land and water productivity of cash and food crops in  
577 Gezira scheme" by Mohamed Osman, University of Gezira (2009), to my attention.  
578 Unfortunately, I have not been able to find Osman's thesis. I was able to find a  
579 published paper by Elmulthum of Gezira University "Food and water security in the  
580 Arab world and Sudan: Status and Threats" Resources and Environment 2012, 2(6):  
581 265-270. This paper utilizes Osman's data and concludes:

582 NB: [16] is referencing Osman's thesis.

583



584 "Applying data from [16] results obtained indicated that water productivity of food  
 585 crops is very low in Sudan. Figure (7) shows that average water productivity of  
 586 Sorghum, Wheat and Groundnut was estimated at 0.21 kg/m<sup>3</sup>, 0.12kg/m<sup>3</sup> and  
 587 0.17kg/m<sup>3</sup>, respectively. These figures are very low compared to the average  
 588 international water productivity of these crops which was estimated at 1.35 kg/m<sup>3</sup>"  
 589

590 This is not the only paper that makes the case for low actual yields. All the raw data  
 591 presented in alternative documents provides exceptionally low actual yield values.  
 592 By my calculations 0.12kg/m<sup>3</sup> with a water content for wheat at 0.589 m<sup>3</sup>/m<sup>2</sup> gives  
 593 a yield of 0.7 tons/ha, so an estimate of 1 ton/ha for actual yield is not unreasonable.

594 That said, there is a case to be made that an optimization analysis like this should  
 595 use potential yield rather than actual yield. For this reason we have replaced the  
 596 actual yield number with a potential yield value of 3.74 ton/ha, following values  
 597 in [Ghezae N. (1998). Irrigation Water Management. A Performance Study of the  
 598 Rahad Scheme in Sudan, 1977-1996. Thesis (PhD). Uppsala University Library.  
 599 Uppsala, Sweden], which presents higher potential yield values derived from the  
 600 Rahad research station. All results presented in the paper now use this formulation.

601 **5-3:**  
 602 *An irrigation efficiency of 0.8 is way too high. This might be the official figure from the*  
 603 *Sudanese government but studies have shown that this is grossly overestimated. See*  
 604 *Msc Thesis "Irrigation performance of Gezira scheme in Sudan..." by Thiruvarud-*  
 605 *chelvan, UNESCO-IHE (2010)*

606 **Response:**  
 607 Thank you for noting the discrepancy between official and actual efficiency  
 608 estimates. I was unable to find "Irrigation performance of Gezira scheme in Sudan..."  
 609 by Thiruvarudchelvan, UNESCO-IHE (2010) MSc. However, I was able to derive the  
 610 values of Technical efficiency (ratio of yields to total water used) from Elamin et al.  
 611 "Water Use Efficiencies of Gezira, Rahad and New Halfa Irrigated Schemes under  
 612 Sudan Dryland Condition" Sudan J. Des. Res. 3(1):62-72, 2011.

613 Technical Efficiency values for each crop in each scheme.

	Cotton	Sorghum	Groundnut	Wheat
Geziera	0.065	0.335	0.295	0.123
Rahad	0.065	0.345	0.25	0.475
New Halfa	0.065	0.32	0.39	0.1
Average	<b>0.065</b>	<b>0.333</b>	<b>0.312</b>	<b>0.233</b>

614  
 615 These values are now noted in Table 1 in the manuscript  
 616

617 **5-4:**  
 618 *Crop price (Table 1). Are those the farmgate prices? What are the sources?*  
 619

620 **Response:**  
621 Crop Prices are the producer prices provided for each country for each crop in the  
622 FAO database. Source: <http://faostat.fao.org/site/703/default.aspx#ancor>.  
623 We now cite this source in the text.

624 **5-5:**  
625 *Electricity price (Table 1). The authors should explain how the price of electricity is*  
626 *determined (and to what it corresponds). Please provide a reference.*

627 **Response:**  
628 Electricity price have been changed to 8 cents/KWh, this value was used in past  
629 studies by Whittington (2004, 2005), Block(2010) and Arjoon (2014).

630  
631  
632 **Other Comments**

633  
634 *P11567L22 change "though external influences..." to "through external influences..."*  
635

636 **Response: Corrected**  
637  
638 *P11570L23 mentions "human infrastructure". Human infrastructure relates to things*  
639 *such as health, education, nutrition etc. This should read "infrastructure" only.*

640 **Response: Corrected**  
641  
642 *Some sentences are awkward and difficult to read. For example P11572L9-17 which*  
643 *reads "The model produces distribution functions for dam geometry, evaporation loss*  
644 *and irrigation intended to inform dam management policies." is awkward. In Goor et*  
645 *al., the hydo-economic model does not produce distribution functions for dam*  
646 *geometry. Allocation decisions can be presented in the form of distribution functions.*  
647 *P11582L24-26 reads "Egypt might view movement to the right on the chart increasing*  
648 *irrigation withdrawals – as a potential threat to water resources in the ab- sence*  
649 *increased Nile river flow or counterbalancing shared benefits." This is difficult to*  
650 *understand and should read "Egypt might view movement to the right on the chart –*  
651 *increasing irrigation withdrawals – as a potential threat to water resources in the*  
652 *absence of increased Nile river flow or the counterbalancing of shared benefits."*

653 **Response: Corrected**  
654  
655 *P11572L9 change "...economic benefits for all players more than double..." to*  
656 *"...economic benefits for all players more than doubled..."*

657 **Response: Corrected**  
658  
659 *P11573L16 change "whilst" to "while"*

660  
661 **Response: Corrected**

662  
663 P11576L14 reads "The storage at each dam location must be equal to a simple water  
664 balance". This should be "The storage at each dam location can be calculated using a  
665 simple water balance."

666 **Response: Corrected**  
667

668 You have used the words dam and reservoir interchangeably. They are not  
669 interchangeable. The dam is the barrier that creates the reservoir. For example,  
670 P11576L14-16 reads "The storage at a particular time step is the total water  
671 contained in the dam in the previous time step plus the water entering each dam  
672 minus what comes out of the dam through upstream flow." In this sentence the word  
673 dam should be replaced by the word reservoir.

674 **Response: Corrected**  
675

676 P11570L5-6 reads "The dams also supply various schemes in Rahad Suki as well as  
677 upstream and downstream of Sennar...". This should be "The dams also supply various  
678 schemes in Rahad and Suki as well as..."

679 **Response: Corrected**  
680

681 P11570L24-28 reads "They are particularly valued in complex water management  
682 problems because they can inform a dynamic analysis of water resources and needs  
683 that guides basin managers...". The use of the word inform is incorrect in this sentence.  
684 This should read "They are particularly valued in complex water management  
685 problems because they provide a dynamic analysis..."

686 **Response: Corrected**  
687

688 P11572L19-20 reads "...calculates the economic benefit of development and changes to  
689 the climate to upstream portions of the Blue Nile." This should read "calculates the  
690 economic benefit of proposed development under changing climatic conditions."

691 **Response: Corrected**  
692

693 When referring to another section of the paper use "See section N.NN" format. For  
694 example, P11570L21 reads "(see irrigation constraints)". This should be changed to  
695 "(See section 2.1.3 on irrigation constraints)". There are other instances like this.  
696 Please validate and change all instances.

697 **Response: Corrected**  
698

699 *In tables 1 and 2, please validate the units. Area = Area irrigated = m<sup>2</sup>/month ? Since,*  
700 *in the equations, the variables are all dependent on location (l), month (m) and year*  
701 *(y) it is then confusing, and unnecessary, in table 2 to define units as something per*  
702 *month.*

703 **Response: m<sup>2</sup>/month changed to m<sup>2</sup>**

704

705 A comparison of presented results with those from other/similar studies should be  
706 included:

707 *a) McCartney et al., Evaluating the downstream implications of planned water*  
708 *resoruce development in the Ethiopian portion of the Blue Nile River, Water*  
709 *International, 2012*

710 *b) Arjoon et al, Hydro-economic risk assessment in the eastern Nile River basin, Water*  
711 *Resources and Economics, 2014*

712 **Response:** A comparison between Arjoon results and the findings of this paper are  
713 presented in Section 4 of the manuscript.

714 McCartney et al. (2012) is an intriguing paper that performs similar analysis  
715 but within a different region of the Nile. While we agree with McCarthy that issues of  
716 climate change adaptation, water resources management and development are  
717 inextricably connected, we feel that due to the lack of overlap in the study area a  
718 direct comparison with the actual results of the analysis cannot be made.

719

720 *Please ensure that all statements that need to be referenced are referenced. For*  
721 *example: P11585L9-11 reads "The GERD, for example, is expected to generate*  
722 *electricity that can be sold at about half the price of existing Sudanese facilities, and*  
723 *the dam will be connected to the Sudanese grid." This should be referenced.*

724 **Response:** An article issued on 7<sup>th</sup> December 2013 in Sudan Vision Daily reports  
725 "purchasing electricity from Ethiopia at 4 cents".

726 <http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=229800>

727 This article will be referenced in updated manuscript.

728

729 *On P11570 in the paragraph in which the various dams in Sudan are described, the*  
730 *size and capacity of the dams are mentioned, except for Merowe (last 3 sentences in*  
731 *the paragraph). This information should be added*

732 **Response:** A brief description of Merowe was added to section 1.1

733

734 *On P11579-11580 it states "There is a significant connection between dry periods and*  
735 *hydropower release at Roseires. This is illustrated by a reduction in Hydropower*  
736 *release during the periods of dry annual flows (months 70-120 and months 190-240),*  
737 *and higher hydropower release during wet periods (Fig. 3c)." First, hydropower should*  
738 *not be capitalized. More importantly, in figure 3c we see a range of hydropower re-*

739 leases for the 3 dams. For Roseries, the high release is maximized at around 2500  
740 million m<sup>3</sup>. There is a variation in the low release. I suspect that it is this variation in  
741 low release that is discussed in the sentence. In other words, "This is illustrated by  
742 lower hydropower releases during the periods of dry annual flows than during the wet  
743 flow periods."

744 **Response: Corrected**

745 On P11575L19 it states "...dependent on the water content for each crop type, at a  
746 specific month in a particular year." Water content should be changed to water  
747 requirement.

748 **Response: Corrected**

749

### 750 **Response to Reviewer 2 Rebuttal:**

751

752 Comment 1:

753 That the authors clearly indicate that 14.5 bcm is an ASSUMPTION they make because they do  
754 not include the irrigation schemes in the other river basins in Sudan

755

756 Response:

757

758 Agreed

759

760 Action:

761 We have stated in the manuscript that the 14.5 bcm is an assumption (Section 2.1.3).

762

763 Comment 2:

764 It would be nice if they mention the alternatives to their deterministic model. For example,  
765 could the hydro-eco model be implemented in an on-line mode (receding horizon) with  
766 updated flow forecasts? Would properly capture the uncertainty without major changes to the  
767 code

768

769 Response:

770 Agreed.

771

772 Action:

773 The conclusion section of the paper has been updated to address comment 2.

774 The following passage appears in the conclusion section:

775

776 "Future operation of SHOM may be within a value of information framework that  
777 aims to assess operational seasonal forecasts. The current deterministic model can  
778 be coupled to seasonal forecasting realizations with the aim of understanding the  
779 usefulness of seasonal prediction to the decision makers in Sudan. A more in-depth  
780 study of the value of information of seasonal forecasts will require the conversion of

781 SHOM from a deterministic model to a stochastic model in order to adjust to the  
782 stochastic nature of forecasts.”  
783

## 784 The Question of Sudan: A Hydroeconomic Optimization

### 785 Model for the Sudanese Blue Nile

786 Saleh Satti<sup>1\*</sup>, Benjamin Zaitchik<sup>1</sup>, Sauleh Siddiqui<sup>2</sup>.  
787 <sup>1</sup>Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.  
788 <sup>2</sup>Departments of Civil Engineering and Applied Mathematics & Statistics, Johns Hopkins  
789 Systems Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.

790  
791 \* Corresponding author: 301 Olin Hall  
792 3400 N. Charles St. Baltimore, MD, 21218  
793 USA  
794 [ssatti1@jhu.edu](mailto:ssatti1@jhu.edu)  
795

796 **Key points:** [Multi-objective](#) optimization; Hydroeconomic modeling; Climate Change  
797 effects on hydrology; Nile [River](#)

#### 798 **Abstract:**

799 The effects of development and the uncertainty of a changing climate in East Africa pose  
800 myriad challenges for water managers along the Blue Nile. Sudan’s large irrigation  
801 potential, hydroelectric dams, and prime location within the basin mean that Sudan’s  
802 water management decisions will have great social, economic and political implications  
803 [for](#) the region. At the same time, Sudan’s water use options are constrained by tradeoffs  
804 between upstream irrigation developments and downstream hydropower facilities as well  
805 as by the country’s commitments under existing or future transboundary water sharing  
806 agreements. Here, we present a model that can be applied to evaluate optimal allocation  
807 of surface water resources to irrigation and hydropower in the Sudanese portion of the  
808 Blue Nile. Hydrologic inputs are combined with agronomic and economic inputs to

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Multiobjective

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** within

811 formulate an optimization model within the General Algebraic Modeling System  
812 (GAMS). A sensitivity analysis is performed by testing model response to a range of  
813 economic conditions and to changes in the volume and timing of hydrologic flows.  
814 Results indicate that changing hydroclimate inputs have the capacity to greatly influence  
815 the productivity of Sudan's water resources infrastructure. Results also show that the  
816 economically optimal volume of water consumption, and thus the importance of existing  
817 treaty constraints, is sensitive to the perceived value of agriculture relative to electricity  
818 as well as to changing hydrological conditions.

819 **1. Introduction:**

820 The Nile Basin spans parts of 11 different countries in one of the most  
821 underdeveloped regions in the world. The transboundary nature of the Nile presents  
822 water-sharing challenges between upstream and downstream riparian nations (Waterbury  
823 et al. 1998). This is particularly true in the Eastern Nile basin, which is typically defined  
824 as the tributaries that arise in the Ethiopian Highlands—primarily the Blue Nile, Tekeze-  
825 Atbara, and Baro-Akobo-Sobat—together with the main stem Nile north of Khartoum  
826 (Figure 1). The Eastern Nile tributaries collectively contribute over 80% of flow in the  
827 main stem Nile. The Eastern Nile basin also exhibits strong hydrological connectivity, in  
828 that upstream climate variability and development directly impact downstream resources  
829 in a manner that is not observed in the White Nile system, where lakes and wetlands  
830 serve as a buffer between the Equatorial Lakes headwaters region and downstream water  
831 deficit areas in Sudan and Egypt (Blackmore & Whittington 2008). For this reason the  
832 utilization of Eastern Nile waters has long been a source of transboundary tension, most  
833 notably between Egypt, which claims historical rights to the majority of Nile River water,  
834 and Ethiopia, which has a strong interest in developing the Eastern Nile tributaries for  
835 hydropower and other uses.

836 While the diplomatic tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia have dominated the  
837 political and media discourse on Eastern Nile basin development (Cascao 2008, Igunza  
838 2014, Hussein 2014, Gebreluel 2014), Sudan has the greatest potential to influence



839 transboundary distribution of water resources. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement grants  
840 Sudan the right to use 18.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Nile water per year. At present,  
841 however, Sudan uses less than this allocation; its actual water demand has been estimated  
842 to be approximately 16.1 bcm per year (Jeuland 2010). This value could change in the  
843 future, both through internal development decisions and through external influences such  
844 as climate change and upstream infrastructure in Ethiopia. Where climate change has the  
845 potential to alter the magnitude of Blue Nile inflow and local evaporative demand,  
846 upstream infrastructure would be expected to regularize the timing of flows and to reduce  
847 silt load entering Sudan. Silt accumulates over time in the reservoir and reduces the  
848 volume of reservoir. This affects hydropower production, reduces the available water for  
849 irrigation, imposes dredging costs, and reduces flood control capabilities.

850 In this context, there is a need for analytical tools focused on Sudan's hydro-  
851 development options. In particular, it is important to understand how impending changes  
852 affecting the Sudanese portion of the Eastern Nile basin, including climate change and  
853 upstream development in Ethiopia, are likely to affect Sudan's use of its Nile River  
854 resources for hydropower and irrigation. The objective of this paper is to present an  
855 optimization model that illustrates the sensitivities of Sudan's Blue Nile and main stem  
856 Nile water resources infrastructure to changes in climate and upstream development.

### 857 1.1 The Blue Nile in Sudan

858 Approximately 60 bcm of water flows annually from the Blue Nile basin in  
859 Ethiopia to Sudan. Inter-seasonal variability is large, with flows peaking in August and

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** far

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** use

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** 13.5

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Blackmore and Whittington 2008).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** fact is surprising, given Sudan's vast areas of irrigable land and prevailing aridity, and has been attributed to policy and management issues combined with the difficulty of establishing infrastructure and practices that make efficient use of the highly variable and silt-laden flows of the Blue Nile. All of these factors

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** though

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** analysis

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** For purposes of this sensitivity analysis we assume no change in prevailing agricultural practices or in Sudanese infrastructure, so the simulations can be interpreted as evaluations of the influence that external changes would have on Sudan given current conditions and in the absence of large-scale adaptive action.

882 September, and inter-annual variability is also considerable—gauged flow at Roseries  
883 (Figure 1) has an inter-annual variability equal to 25% of the mean flow. The basin is  
884 also undergoing climate change that has had a significant impact on temperature but, as  
885 of yet, no clear directional impact on total annual precipitation or river discharge. In  
886 coming decades, climate change impacts on basin hydrology are expected to become  
887 more significant.

888 The magnitude, seasonality, and even directionality of this change, however, are  
889 highly uncertain. Global Climate Models (GCM's) participating in the 5<sup>th</sup> Coupled Model  
890 Intercomparison Project (CMIP5; Taylor 2012) exhibit no consensus on projected  
891 change. A recent study of 10 CMIP5 models revealed projected precipitation change in  
892 the Blue Nile headwaters ranged from an increase of almost 40% by the mid 21st century  
893 relative to late 20th century to a decrease of approximately 40% at the same time period  
894 (Bhattacharjee and Zaitchik, 2015). Interestingly, some of the models with the most  
895 widely diverging projections demonstrate reasonably good representation of current  
896 climate patterns and variability for commonly used model evaluation metrics  
897 (Bhattacharjee and Zaitchik, 2015). This range of uncertainty is evident in previous  
898 multimodel comparison studies as well, as past analysis have found 21<sup>st</sup> century change  
899 in Upper Blue Nile basin flows ranging from 133% to -35% and precipitation ranging  
900 from 55% to -9% (Yates and Strzepek 1998). Other studies of selected GCM's have  
901 found a smaller range of uncertainty, but no consensus on direction of change: Elshamy  
902 et al. (2008) examined 17 selected GCM's for the period 2081-2098 and found flow  
903 changes ranging from -15% to 14%, while Nawaz et al. (2010), analyzed the output of  
904 three GCM's and deduced that the mean annual Blue Nile runoff would change by +15%,

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: 2014

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: 2014

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: GCMs

908 1% or -9% by the year 2025. Analysis conducted by Taye et al. (2010) projected future  
909 climate scenarios and ran them through two hydrologic models for two catchments  
910 representing source regions of the Blue and White Nile. Results illustrated a large range  
911 in the projected flows from the baseline for both basins. Changes in projected mean  
912 annual flows from the Blue Nile catchment range from approximately -80% to 70%.

913 In addition to climate change, proposed infrastructure projects will drastically  
914 alter the nature of downstream flows. There are currently no large structures along the  
915 main stem of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, but the western portion of Ethiopia holds  
916 tremendous hydro-electric potential (Guariso et al 1987). The Ethiopian government has  
917 had plans to increase utilization of this energy source since at least 50 years ago, when  
918 the concept of a cascade of hydroelectric dams on the Blue Nile was first proposed  
919 (Bureau of Reclamation 1964, and Guariso et al 1987). The concept of a cascade of dams  
920 is still of interest to Ethiopia, but at present the country's development energies are  
921 focused on construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam (GERD), located at the  
922 border with Sudan (Figure 1). The GERD will be the Largest dam in Africa, holding back  
923 more than 60 billion cubic meters of water, and is expected to generate more than 5000  
924 MW of electricity (Hammond 2013). The construction of this dam will affect many  
925 aspects of water sharing in the region and raises numerous questions about its effects on  
926 downstream riparian nations.

927 [Sudan has one large dam on the main stem Nile—the 1250 MW capacity, 67](#)  
928 [meter high Merowe dam, located 800 kilometers north of Khartoum near the fourth](#)  
929 [cataracts \(Teodoru, 2006\). In addition to Merowe,](#) Sudan has two large dams along the  
930 Blue Nile reach, at Roseires and Sennar. Roseires was constructed in 1966 (Chesworth et

931 al, 1990) with a capacity to generate 280 MW of electricity. Recent construction  
932 heightened the dam and increased the reservoir volume from 3.3 bcm to more than 7 bcm  
933 (McCartney et al. 2009). The Sennar dam was constructed in 1925 and holds back 900  
934 million cubic meters of water (McCartney et al. 2009). Both dams were constructed to  
935 regulate flows that feed into multiple irrigation schemes, among them is the 800,000  
936 hectare (ha) Geziera scheme. The Geziera was constructed by the governing British  
937 magistrate in 1925 as the largest single irrigation scheme in the world at the time (Bernal  
938 1997). The dams also supply various schemes in Rahad, and Suki as well as upstream and  
939 downstream of Sennar (McCartney et al. 2009). The Merowe dam (Figure 1) is located  
940 further downstream, in the cataracts of the main stem Nile in northern Sudan. This is a  
941 highly arid area and the dam's primary purpose is hydropower rather than irrigation. It  
942 was constructed in 2009 and now supplies the majority of Sudan's hydroelectric power.

943 All discussions of Nile flow and water resource development take place on the  
944 background of a complex and lengthy history of colonial and post-colonial era  
945 negotiations (Swain 1997). The most recent legally binding treaty involving Sudan is the  
946 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, under which Sudan and Egypt agreed to divide the average  
947 flow of 84 bcm at the old Aswan dam between the two countries: 55.5 bcm to Egypt, 10  
948 bcm to evaporation losses, and 18.5 bcm to Sudan. The treaty also granted Sudan  
949 permission to build a dam at Roseries. The agreement was limited to the two downstream  
950 nations and does not include any upstream riparian countries, and for this reason it is  
951 generally not recognized by the other countries on the Nile.

## 952 1.2 Hydroeconomic Modeling in the Nile basin

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** 7bcm

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Gezzeria

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Governing

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** ,

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Water

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 1:32 PM

**Deleted:** . Nevertheless, as it is the most recent existing treaty and as Sudan has never disputed it, we take 18.5 bcm to be the maximum allowed water withdrawal for Sudan (see 2.1.3 on irrigation constraints)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Hydro-Economic

964 Hydro-economic models integrate natural hydrologic dynamics, infrastructure,  
965 and management options in a framework of economic costs and benefits. They are  
966 particularly valued in complex water management problems because they provide a  
967 dynamic analysis of water resources and needs that guides basin managers and  
968 stakeholders towards an economically optimal management strategy in place of  
969 traditional, static systems based on water rights and fixed allocations (Harou et al., 2009).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: human

970 The core structure of most river basin hydroeconomic models is roughly similar: flows  
971 pass through a network of rivers and canals (or aquifers) and encounter nodes that  
972 represent resource infrastructure, such as reservoirs, abstraction sites, hydroelectric  
973 facilities, etc. But there is considerable diversity in the conceptual approach (simulation  
974 vs. optimization), representation of time (deterministic, stochastic, or dynamic), manner  
975 in which submodels are integrated to the hydroeconomic solution (modular vs. holistic),  
976 and, for optimization models, in the optimization objective function and algorithm  
977 (Harou et al., 2009).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: hydro-economic

978 Not surprisingly, the Nile River basin has been a common and important target for  
979 hydroeconomic analyses. One relatively early effort was reported in Guariso et al. (1987),  
980 in which a linear optimization model was implemented to evaluate the effect of the long-  
981 discussed cascade of hydroelectric dams on the Ethiopian Blue Nile on overall benefit  
982 and on water economics in Sudan and Egypt. The optimization objectives of this model  
983 were to maximize hydropower production in Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as  
984 downstream agricultural water supply. Simulations indicated that there was minimal  
985 tradeoff between the two competing objectives. Thus, Ethiopia's increased hydropower  
986 output would have a minor adverse effect on downstream riparian nations, but upstream

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: hydro-economic

991 flow regulation also had benefits for downstream riparian nations, including the fact that  
992 an increase in upstream flow regulation would decrease water levels in the highly  
993 evaporative downstream reservoirs, thus increasing total water availability for  
994 downstream riparian nations. This finding has been confirmed by subsequent modeling  
995 studies (e.g., Blackmore and Whittington 2008) and plays a role in studies that investigate  
996 the benefits of cooperation in the basin (Whittington 2004).

997 Another influential and relatively early optimization model for the Nile is the Nile  
998 Decision Support Tool (DST) which was developed by the Georgia Water Resources  
999 Institute. This model performs a basin wide hydrological and hydraulic simulation along  
1000 with reservoir optimization capabilities and scenario assessment (Yao and Georgakakos,  
1001 Georgakakos 2007). The optimization model in DST utilizes the extended linear  
1002 quadratic Gaussian (ELQG) control method in order to perform a stochastic multi-criteria  
1003 optimization that aims to find the optimal reservoir operation (Georgakakos 1987, 1989).

1004 A more recent basin-wide hydroeconomic optimization model, the Nile Economic  
1005 Optimization Model (NEOM), was presented by Whittington et al. (2005) using GAMS  
1006 software. This model was used to assess the economic implications of various  
1007 infrastructural developments within the basin and aims to maximize for basin wide  
1008 economic benefits due to irrigation and hydropower production. The authors quantify the  
1009 economic benefit of cooperation by comparing the total benefits calculated from current  
1010 allocation, with the total benefits derived from full communication and cooperation  
1011 between various riparian nation states. They found that cumulative economic benefits for  
1012 all players more than doubled the realized total benefit from \$4.1 billion in the status quo  
1013 scenario to more than \$9 billion when all nations are fully cooperating.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: hydro-economic

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: double

1016 Other recent modeling efforts have focused on a subset of the basin and  
1017 investigated problems of dynamic and transient system management. In the Eastern Nile,  
1018 Goor et al. (2010) present a dynamic reservoir optimization model that employs a  
1019 Stochastic Dual [Dynamic](#) Optimization Program (SDDP). The model [identifies the most](#)  
1020 [economically efficient](#) policies [for large scale reservoirs](#) (Goor et al. 2010). Block and  
1021 Strzepek (2010) focus on the Ethiopian Blue Nile, implementing an Investment Model  
1022 for Planning Ethiopian Nile Development (IMPEND) that calculates the economic  
1023 benefit of [proposed](#) development [under changing climatic conditions](#). IMPEND has the  
1024 ability to model the transient filling stages of the dams, as well as the stochastic nature of  
1025 the climate variables, allowing for a focus on the transient nature of the development  
1026 process, an aspect of water management that is absent from most other hydroeconomic  
1027 models of the basin. Block and Strzepek (2010, 2012) apply the model to [climate change](#)  
1028 analysis and find that the omission of this transient period in models result in the  
1029 overestimation of total net benefits by more than \$6 billion, as well as a significant  
1030 change in the benefit to cost ratio of the project. Block and Strzepek (2010) also highlight  
1031 changes in the hydrology that are neglected in models with no filling process: reservoir  
1032 filling scenarios require that up to 170% more water be retained in Ethiopia over 30 years  
1033 compared to scenarios where the reservoirs are assumed to already be filled.

1034 [More recently Jeuland \(2010\) and Jeuland and Whittington \(2014\) present](#)  
1035 [hydroeconomic simulations that analyze decision making within the Nile basin under a](#)  
1036 [changing climate. Jeuland \(2010\) presents a basin-wide hydroeconomic framework that](#)  
1037 [integrates a stochastic flow generator, a hydrological simulation model and an economic](#)  
1038 [model for the Nile. His analysis shows that varying specific economic and physical](#)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** produces distribution functions for dam geometry, evaporation loss and irrigation intended to inform dam management

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** and changes to the climate to upstream portions of the Blue Nile

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:**

1045 [parameters combine to have a substantial impact on net present value. Jeuland and](#)  
1046 [Whittington \(2014\) present long term planning hydropower investment options within](#)  
1047 [Ethiopia under varying hydrological conditions. By using simulations, the authors are](#)  
1048 [able to develop performance metrics for the different options, and show that results are](#)  
1049 [dependent on the decision makers' risk preference.](#)

1050 The Sudan Hydro-economic Optimization Model (SHOM) presented in this paper  
1051 is intended to provide a complementary perspective on optimal water resource decision-  
1052 making in the Eastern Nile. In contrast to earlier modeling efforts, we focus specifically  
1053 on the Sudanese portion of the Blue Nile and the main stem Nile north of Khartoum. We  
1054 do this because Sudan is a relatively understudied and a pivotal player in Nile water  
1055 resource management. In addition, we use a non-linear optimization [model](#) (see section 2)  
1056 that maximizes economic benefits and assesses trade-offs between hydropower  
1057 production and irrigation within Sudan.

## 1058 2. Methods:

### 1059 2.1 The SHOM Optimization Model

1060 The General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) is front-end software that can  
1061 be used to solve non-linear multi-objective optimization problems by calling various  
1062 solvers. By using the reduced gradient method in the CONOPT [solver](#), the model seeks a  
1063 stationary point [while](#) reducing the number of variables by conducting a variable  
1064 selection processes. By curtailing the number of variables and linearizing the non-linear  
1065 constraints via a Taylor series approximation, the algorithm simplifies the problem and  
1066 solves for the non-linear objective (Drud, 1992).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** algorithm

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** algorithm

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** whilst

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** A.S.



1071 SHOM runs on monthly time steps. In this implementation the simulation network  
 1072 includes 2 dams located on the Blue Nile reach (Roseires and Sennar), 1 dam on the main  
 1073 stem Nile (Merowe), and agriculture is represented by 5 irrigation schemes corresponding  
 1074 to existing developments along the Blue Nile (Figure 2). The combined storage volume  
 1075 of all dams is approximately 20 bcm, and the total irrigable area is 1.4 million ha. Tables  
 1076 1 and 2 define all the parameters and variables in SHOM.

1077 2.1.1 Objective Function:

1078 The objective function of SHOM consists of two objectives which it seeks to  
 1079 maximize: agricultural and hydropower net benefits. Benefits refer to the total economic  
 1080 value attributed to each respective year summed over the twenty year run period. As  
 1081 noted by Whittington et al. (2005), the meaning of “value” takes more than one form. In  
 1082 this paper, the total net benefit attributed to the economic value of water is defined by the  
 1083 objective function and incorporates the benefits at each site location. Thus the total value  
 1084 of water is seen from the perspective of the producer (the State) and not from the  
 1085 perspective of the consumer. The objective function, illustrated below (Equation 1),  
 1086 represents the economic benefits from the agricultural and hydropower sectors. The total  
 1087 benefit attributed to hydropower production assumes infinite demand and is calculated as  
 1088 the total hydropower produced times the price per kilowatt hour. Initial dam  
 1089 infrastructural cost, cost of energy transmission and cost of dredging are not included in  
 1090 the objective function. Furthermore it is assumed in the sensitivity analysis presented in  
 1091 this paper that the price of electricity is fixed. Thus:

1092 
$$Objective = \max \sum_{m,y} (D^y * bi_{m,y} + D^y * bh_{m,y}) \quad (1)$$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted:  $\sum_{l,m,y} (D^y * AGM * I_{l,m,y} + D^y * P_{l,m,y} KWH_{l,m,y})$

1095 where  $D^y$  = discount rate,  $bi_{m,y}$  is the total benefits from Irrigation,  $bh_{m,y}$  is the total  
 1096 benefits from hydropower, and all variables are dependent on month( $m$ ) and year( $y$ ).

1097 2.1.2 Hydropower Constraints:

1098 Total hydropower generation ( $KWH_{l,m,y}$ ) is dependent on two variables (Equation  
 1099 2), the amount of water passing through the turbines at any given time step ( $rhe_{l,m,y}$ ), and  
 1100 the total height of water in the dam that forces water through the turbines ( $h_{l,m,y}$ ). (Cohon  
 1101 2003, Loucks et. al 1981).

1102 
$$\forall_{l,m,y}, KWH_{l,m,y} = c * effh * n * rhe_{l,m,y} h_{l,m,y} \quad (2)$$

1103 Production of hydropower is constrained by the dam's generation capacity, thus any  
 1104 additional release is categorized by the model as non-hydropower release.  $effh$  is the  
 1105 efficiency of the dams, which was assumed to be 0.85 in the model. There is also a  
 1106 conversion factor (c),  $c = 2.61 \times 10^{-3}$ .

1107 As shown in Equation 3, total hydropower benefits for each month in each year is  
 1108 dependent on the price of hydropower (P) and the sum of hydropower produced at all  
 1109 dam locations (I).

1110 
$$bh_{m,y} = \sum_l (P * KWH_{l,m,y}) \quad (3)$$

1111 2.1.3 Irrigation Constraints:

1112 The water used for irrigation ( $i_{l,m,y}$ ) is dependent on the crop water requirement  
 1113 (i.e. the volume of water needed per unit area of crop cultivated), and the area irrigated  
 1114 during cropping season. Values of crop water requirement (Water) were drawn from a  
 1115 World Bank report (Plusquellec 1990). The area irrigated ( $Area_{c,l,m,y}$ ) fluctuates

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: AGM = AGricultural profit Margin (See sensitivity parameter section),

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted:  $I_{l,m}$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted:  $P_{l,m}$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: fixed price of energy per KWH

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: location( $l$ ),

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted:  $\frac{effh * rhe_{l,m,y} h_{l,m,y} (seconds\ per\ month)}{3600}$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 5

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Irrigation production in

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: model is defined by a

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: price and a crop yield value that is held constant throughout

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: length

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: model run (Cohon 2003).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: price and yield

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) database

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: , Ghezae 1998, FAO 2013). The crop yield ( $Y_c$ ) and crop price ( $P_c$ ) are assumed to be fixed while the

1136 annually but remains constant during the cropping season (Equation 4). Therefore, the  
 1137 volume of water allocated for irrigation:

$$1138 \quad i_{l,m,y} = \sum_c (effi_c * Water_{c,l,m,y} * Area_{c,l,m,y}) \quad (4)$$

1139 Efficiency of irrigation was assumed to be dependent on the crop type (Table 1) Elamin  
 1140 et al. (2011). (NB: The agricultural output in the objective function is irrigation fed; rain-  
 1141 fed agriculture was not considered). Therefore, the total benefits due to irrigation for each  
 1142 m, at each y, is:

$$1143 \quad bi_{m,y} = \sum_c (effi_c * v_c * Water_{c,l,m,y} * Area_{c,l,m,y}) \quad (5)$$

1144 where  $v_c$  is the marginal value of water for each crop (see section 2.2.1 for more details.)

1145 Finally, per the 1959 Nile agreement Sudan's portion of withdrawals is limited to 18.5

1146 bcm of water annually. Since our model is restricted to portions of the Blue Nile, we  
 1147 assume the maximum bounds to be 14.5 bcm (Equation 6). This approximation is based  
 1148 on the relative contribution of Blue Nile flows to the Nile system, and the recognition that  
 1149 the largest irrigation schemes in Sudan are located along the Blue Nile. Thus for a  
 1150 simulation of  $Y$  years the total water consumed by Sudan should be:

$$1151 \quad \sum_{l,m,y} (i_{l,m,y}) + \sum_{l,m,y} (e_{l,m,y}) \leq Y * 14.5 \text{ bcm} \quad (6)$$

1152 A second constraint is included in the model to ensure Egypt's share and to prevent a  
 1153 large intake during drought years by ensuring Egypt's fractional share during those years  
 1154 (Equation 7):

$$1155 \quad \sum_{l,m} (i_{l,m,y}) + \sum_{l,m} (e_{l,m,y}) \leq 0.28 * \sum_m (R_y) \quad (7)$$

1157 where  $R$  is the release at Merowe dam.

1158 2.1.4 Continuity Constraints:

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 3

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted:  $\forall_{l,m,y}, i_{l,m,y} = \sum_c (P_c Y_c Area_{c,l,m,y}) \dots (3) \dots$  [1]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: . Also,  $effi = 1.25$ , and is

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted: Font color: Auto

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: inverse of the

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted: Font color: Auto

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: efficiency. A larger efficiency requires less water and a lower  $i_i$ .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted: Font:Not Italic, Font color: Auto, Not Superscript/ Subscript

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted: Font:Not Italic, Font color: Auto, Not Superscript/ Subscript

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: .)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted:  $i_{l,m,y}$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted:  $\sum_c (effi * Water_{c,l,m,y} *$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: .(4

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: (5).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: )  $\leq$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 18

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: . .(5

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: This constraint should, formally, be applied to the entire Nile network within Sudan rather than just to the Blue Nile and main stem Nile, and there is certainly some water consumed in reservoirs and irrigation on the White Nile south of Khartoum and in the other Eastern Nile tributaries. However, the Blue Nile represents the majority of water flow and usable water resource, and all of the largest irrigation schemes in Sudan lie within the Blue Nile basin (Knott and Hewitt, 1994). So we allow the model to use up to the ... [2]

1201 Storage at each dam location can be calculated using simple water balance. The  
 1202 storage at a particular time step is the total water contained in the reservoir in the  
 1203 previous time step plus the water entering each dam minus what comes out of the  
 1204 reservoir through upstream flow (Equation 8). The water entering is the upstream  
 1205 boundary flow or upstream total dam release ( $q_{l,m,y}$  or  $r_{l,m,y}$  respectively), the water leaving  
 1206 each dam node is the current dam release, the irrigated water and water loss due to  
 1207 evaporation.

1208  $\forall_{l,m,y}, s_{l,m,y} = q_{l,m,y} + r_{(l-1),m,y} + s_{l,(m-1),y} - r_{l,m,y} - i_{l,m,y} - e_{l,m,y}$  (8)  
 1209 NB:  $s_{l,(m-1),y}$  is the storage from the previous time step. When  $m = 1$ , the model uses the  
 1210 storage from  $s_{l,12,(y-1)}$ . Evaporation in  $m^3 / m^2$  (Ev) is estimated using the Thornthwaite  
 1211 equation (Thornthwaite, 1948), thus the total evaporated volume:  $e = Ev * \text{Dam Surface}$   
 1212 Area. The storage at each time step must also be less than each dam's respective  
 1213 maximum volume ( $V_{max}$ ) (Equation 9).

1214  $s_{l,m,y} \leq V_{max}$  (9)  
 1215 Lastly, all the decision variables calculated by the optimization model must satisfy non-  
 1216 negativity constraints (Equation 10):

1217  $s_{l,m,y}, r_{h,l,m,y}, i_{l,m,y} \geq 0.$  (10)

1218 *2.2 Model Parameters:*  
 1219 *2.2.1 Marginal Value of Water for Irrigation*

1220 Deriving the net benefits due to agriculture requires an intimate knowledge of  
 1221 both foreign and domestic agricultural economic markets. Calculating prices of output  
 1222 commodities relative to input production costs for future scenarios would require  
 1223 accurate price prediction of a non-linear, volatile market. Rather than attempt to analyze

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: The storage  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: must  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: equal to a  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: dam  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: dam  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 6

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 6

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 7  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 7

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 8)  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: i.e.:  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: 8  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Agricultural Profit Margin (AGM)

1237 and project costs of agricultural inputs (e.g., water rates, fertilizer, land and labor) or to  
1238 simplify tax rules and subsidies currently affecting agricultural prices in Sudan, we assign  
1239 marginal water values for agriculture by assuming a horizontal demand curve for the  
1240 marginal water values for each crop and that the average value of water equals the  
1241 marginal value. The ratio of marginal water values for the crops was calculated using the  
1242 producer price of the crop ( $P_c$ , FAO 2009), the yield ( $Y_c$ , Ghezze, 1998), and the crop  
1243 water requirement (*water*, Plasquelle 1990). To explore the sensitivities of the model we  
1244 perform simulations using 6 different sets of marginal water values, with each crop  
1245 assigned its own value (P1 – P6; Table 3). These values chosen are illustrative and are  
1246 intended to assess the sensitivity of the model and are not meant to reflect the optimal  
1247 estimate of current agricultural prices. Therefore the marginal crop values act as weights  
1248 within the objective function to develop a tradeoff between the various objectives, as  
1249 described in Section 3. For comparison, previous studies within the region have assumed  
1250 a horizontal demand curve with an assigned marginal water value of 0.05\$/m<sup>3</sup> for  
1251 agriculture (Whittington et al. 2005, Arjoon et al. 2014).

## 1252 2.2.2 Discount Rate ( $D^y$ )

1253 Economic analyses of large-scale development projects need to discount  
1254 anticipated future benefits relative to near-term costs and benefits forgone. Since the  
1255 objective function and decision making in our model is solely based on economics, the  
1256 discount rate can greatly influence the final value of the objective function of the model.  
1257 To quantify this influence we performed simulations in which discount rate was varied  
1258 from 3% to 7%, a range that has a considerable impact on the total value of the objective  
1259 function, but not on the overall results. Discount rates may also affect the analysis of our

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** have simply defined an “agricultural profit margin” (*AGM*) that represents the nation state’s fractional social benefit of agricultural production. The net benefit of agriculture is calculated by multiplying the total benefits (crop price \* total production in irrigated lands) by the *AGM* factor. To explore the sensitivities of the model to agricultural production this *AGM* functions as an objective weight and is varied

Sauleh 3/7/15 7:37 PM

**Deleted:** and

Sauleh 3/7/15 7:37 PM

**Deleted:** e

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Moved (insertion) [1]**

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** to assign a discount rate

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** .

1274 [deterministic hydroeconomic model by front-loading demands. In this model, this](#)  
1275 [phenomenon is minimized by treaty constraints that limit water allocation for irrigation](#)  
1276 [\(Equations 6 and 7\).](#) The same discount rate was applied to both objectives within the  
1277 objective function. The results presented in Section 3 used a discount rate of 5% for all  
1278 analyses.

### 1279 2.2.3 [Simulations](#)

1280 [We apply SHOM to a set of hydrological and development scenarios to test](#)  
1281 [sensitivities to changes in flow volume and timing in the Blue Nile as well as to](#)  
1282 [investigate the influence that changing agricultural practices, electricity markets, and](#)  
1283 [international agreements might have on optimal water allocations. A list of these](#)  
1284 [scenarios is provided in Table 4.](#)

1285 [First, we examine sensitivity to changes in Blue Nile hydrology.](#) As noted above,  
1286 there is significant uncertainty in projections of future precipitation patterns—and hence  
1287 future river flows—in the Blue Nile basin. For this reason we consider it important to test  
1288 model sensitivity to substantial increases (+20%) [“High flows”](#) and decreases (-20%)  
1289 [“Low flows”](#) in river flow, which is within the range of predictions of state of the art  
1290 global climate models for the first half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. [These simulations are](#)  
1291 [compared to an “Observed Flow” simulation based on historic flow rates.](#)

1292 In addition, we are interested in how the model responds to temporal smoothing  
1293 of inflow from Ethiopia, [which](#) might result from the construction of one or more  
1294 upstream dams. For this reason we include a third flow scenario, [“Smoothed Flows,”](#) in  
1295 which the annual total flow is unchanged from present conditions but monthly flow

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Flows

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Formatted:** Indent: First line: 0.5"

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** as

1298 values are averaged across three months, producing a smoothed hydrograph with less  
1299 extreme wet season peaks and dry season troughs.

1300 Changes in flows were restricted to the Blue Nile flows only; White Nile flows  
1301 remained unchanged. This approach was adopted for multiple reasons. First, the White  
1302 Nile originates in the Equatorial Lakes region, which is in a different climate zone. Thus  
1303 it is unclear that an increase in Blue Nile flows would translate into an increase in White  
1304 Nile flows. Second, the White Nile passes through the Equatorial lakes and Sudd  
1305 wetland, so that its annual flow is more buffered than the Blue Nile. Lastly, majority of  
1306 the water in Egypt originates from the Blue Nile region, so changes in White Nile flow  
1307 under climate change would not impact the main stem Nile as significantly as changes in  
1308 the Blue Nile.

1309 Next, we consider how changing agricultural management practices due to  
1310 upstream development might alter optimal allocations under a smoothed flow regime.  
1311 Expected upstream development will increase water availability during the dry months,  
1312 which will incentivize farmers to change their agricultural practices. This has already  
1313 been observed on the Atbara River, just north of the Blue Nile, where construction of a  
1314 dam in Ethiopia has led Sudanese farmers to transition from a one cropping season to a  
1315 multiple cropping season and to diversify crop types (Personal Communication, Professor  
1316 Belay Simane, Addis Ababa University). For this reason we have included simulations to  
1317 the smooth flows that add a second cropping season (Table 4 simulation “Smooth2crop”).

1318 Third, we examine sensitivity to electricity prices. The construction of a large  
1319 upstream structure like the GERD would produce a large amount of hydropower itself,  
1320 and in a connected electricity market this would drive down the price of electricity. The

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Increases and decreases

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** 2.2.4 Bootstrapped Flows .

1323 [GERD, for example, is expected to generate electricity that can be sold to Sudan at a](#)  
1324 [reduced price, about 4 cents a KWh \(Hai 2013\). To account for this dynamic in general](#)  
1325 [terms, we include a model simulation “SmoothPower” in which flow is smoothed and the](#)  
1326 [price of electricity is cut by half from 8 cents per KWh to 4 cents per KWh \(see Table 4\).](#)  
1327 [We also consider how this change in power price might interact with a change in](#)  
1328 [cropping practices in simulation “SmoothPower2Crop.”](#)

1329 [Finally, we introduce simulations in which there is upstream flow control, the](#)  
1330 [opportunity for double cropping, and a relaxation of the downstream constraint. This](#)  
1331 [relaxation, which we call “No Agreement” \(NA\), removes the requirement that Sudan](#)  
1332 [provide adequate flow to Egypt in dry years—i.e., our second “treaty” constraint from](#)  
1333 [section 2.1.3 \(Equation 7\). These simulations were performed for both high and low](#)  
1334 [electricity prices: “Smooth2CropNA” and “SmoothPower2CropNA.” Removing the](#)  
1335 [second constraint allows us to examine the impact that downstream delivery requirements](#)  
1336 [have on Sudan’s optimal water allocations while keeping the total water use relatively](#)  
1337 [similar to the baseline simulations, which facilitates comparisons between simulations.](#)

1338 All simulations in the sensitivity analysis were run for 20 years. To generate  
1339 hydrological inputs for these simulations a 70 year record of monthly observed Blue Nile  
1340 flows at Roseires was obtained from the Global Runoff Data Center ([www.grdc.org](http://www.grdc.org)).  
1341 This record was randomly resampled to generate 1000 20-year timeseries of  
1342 representative flow patterns. [Interannual autocorrelation is insignificant \(lag -1](#)  
1343 [autocorrelation is 0.165\) for this hydrological timeseries dataset, thus the distortive effect](#)  
1344 [of resampling is minimal. The mean flow for all 1000 bootstrapped timeseries were](#)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** The mean flow for all 1000



1346 assembled and ranked, thus defining the 5% and 95% confidence levels of flows for the  
1347 20 year observed period. The model output was assessed using these confidence intervals.

### 1348 **3. Results and Discussion:**

#### 1349 *3.1 Model Behavior*

1350 To demonstrate general model behavior we first examine a 20-year demonstration  
1351 simulation that uses bootstrapped historical flows and [the P5 set of marginal water values](#)  
1352 [\(see Table 3\)](#). Hydrologic fluxes and storages at the three dams in the simulation  
1353 (Roseires, Sennar, and Merowe) and for major irrigation areas are shown in Figures 3 and  
1354 4.

1355 Figure 3A shows the observed 20 year flows for the Blue Nile at the Sudan-  
1356 Ethiopia border. Fluctuations of flows are illustrative of the wet and dry seasonal pattern,  
1357 [and annual flows also vary significantly, from -26% to 26% of the mean](#). This record  
1358 shows two distinct periods of below average annual flows (months 70-120 and months  
1359 190-240). The dam storage and release values reflect a response by the model to these  
1360 periods of interseasonal dryness and wetness. The smaller dams (Roseires and Sennar)  
1361 are emptied and filled annually (Figures 3B) with Merowe remaining relatively full year  
1362 round in all years, with minor drops in its storage level during the dry months. Therefore  
1363 there is no significant connection between the hydropower releases at Merowe and inter-

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Discussions

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** a moderate *AGM* of 0.12.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Formatted:** Indent: First line: 0.5"

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** showing significant intraseasonal variability. Annual

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** for this record

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** , indicative of a substantial inter-annual variability

1371 annual variability. There is a significant connection between dry periods and hydropower  
1372 release at Roseries. This is illustrated by lower hydropower releases during the periods of  
1373 dry annual flows than during the wet periods (Figure 3C).

1374 Figure 4 also shows results for the base case simulation, but as 20-year average  
1375 seasonal cycles of storage, release, and withdrawals at each major dam and irrigation  
1376 zone across the 1000 bootstrapped simulations. It is clear from Figure 4A that the large  
1377 reservoir at Merowe is relatively insensitive to seasonal variability and to climatic  
1378 variability represented by bootstrapping. This offers a more robust view of the sensitivity  
1379 of optimal reservoir operation and water withdrawals to season and to potential patterns  
1380 of variability given historical conditions.

1381 Figure 4A shows that the dams along the Blue Nile (Sennar and Roseires), in  
1382 contrast, are significantly sensitive to seasonal and interannual variability: in the months  
1383 preceding the wet season both Sennar and Roseires are emptied and then refilled during  
1384 the rainy season, while Merowe is able to remain relatively full year round maximizing  
1385 hydropower generation. This is in small part a product of the fact that Blue Nile flows are  
1386 more strongly seasonal than main stem flows, which are slightly moderated by inflow  
1387 from the White Nile. But the primary reason for the difference is the model's objective to  
1388 maximize total benefit through the system. Maximizing hydropower output requires large  
1389 hydropower release (Figure 4B), and adequate head through the turbines (see hydropower  
1390 constraints section). Since Merowe is the largest hydroelectric facility, it is critical to  
1391 hydropower optimization that it is active and that its reservoir is relatively full for as  
1392 much of the year as possible. The model maximizes hydropower by maintaining Merowe  
1393 at full capacity for most of the dry months at the expense of storage at Roseries and

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** a reduction in Hydropower release

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** (months 70-120 and months 190-240), and higher hydropower release

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** maintain

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** the

1399 Sennar. Thus Roseries is emptied between January to May and a relatively full dam is  
1400 maintained at Merowe for most of the dry season, maximizing total hydropower  
1401 production. Since the Blue Nile has highly seasonal flows and Roseires and Sennar are  
1402 relatively small dams, this comes at the cost of seasonally reduced reservoir storage and  
1403 hydropower potential at those dams. In Figures 4A and B, the largest variability between  
1404 simulations (biggest +/- bars) is observed during the months of emptying and filling (Feb-  
1405 Aug), reflecting sensitivity to inter-annual climate variability.

1406 Figure 4C shows total water withdrawal amounts during the cropping season  
1407 upstream of Sennar dam, which would include the Rahad, Suki and Upstream Sennar  
1408 irrigation schemes, and upstream of Merowe dam, which includes the Geziera and  
1409 Downstream Sennar irrigation schemes. Since the larger schemes are situated upstream of  
1410 Merowe and downstream of Sennar, the largest withdrawals are downstream of Sennar.  
1411 There were four crops modeled with different cropping cycles that overlapped during the  
1412 season (Table 1), so the total agricultural water requirement varied on a monthly basis.

1413 Withdrawals, however, were maintained at between 1-2.5 bcm on average from July to  
1414 October and drop to zero during the non-cropping period.

1415 Currently, the influence of agriculture on dam management is limited due to two factors.  
1416 First, though the crop calendar is somewhat different for each of the four crops, there is  
1417 only one cropping season, which approximately coincides with the wet months, so  
1418 agricultural productivity peaks when the water supply via Blue Nile peak flows is  
1419 plentiful (Figure 4C) and the total annual withdrawals are limited by prevailing  
1420 agricultural practices. Second, as shown in the tradeoff analysis below (Section 3.2), the

Saleh Satti 3/9/15 12:30 PM

**Deleted:** 2

Saleh Satti 3/9/15 12:31 PM

**Deleted:** 3

Saleh Satti 3/9/15 12:31 PM

**Deleted:** January

Saleh Satti 3/9/15 12:32 PM

**Deleted:** February to June

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** 18.5 bcm per year maximum withdrawal stipulated in the

1427 | 1959 Nile Waters Agreement constraints serves as a cap on water demands for scenarios  
1428 | with high marginal values of water for agriculture.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** withdrawals in high *AGM* scenarios that would otherwise favor larger agricultural production.

### 1429 | 3.2 Tradeoff Analysis

1430 | Understanding the tradeoff between hydropower and irrigation is central to  
1431 | understanding how the model allocates water to the different objectives. Figure 5 shows

1432 | results of simulations for three of the marginal values (P2, P4 and P5) represented in  
1433 | Table 3. The agricultural benefit is removed from the objective function and phrased as a

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** in which the *AGM* factor is maintained at a constant value while the unit benefit of hydropower is varied, for historical flow conditions.

1434 | constraint, and thus a tradeoff curve can be constructed that illustrates the hydropower-  
1435 | agriculture relationship for each set of agricultural marginal water values. For the case

1436 | with higher marginal value of water for agriculture (P2), the gradient of the tradeoff

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** that specific *AGM*. For high *AGM* (e.g.,  $AGM = 0.4$ )

1437 | curve is low. Thus the loss of one unit benefit of hydropower would result in a gain of

1438 | more than one unit benefit of irrigation. In order to maximize total benefits, then, the

1439 | model would allocate more and more water to agricultural production until it hits a

1440 | constraint. For the case with a low marginal value of water for agriculture (P5) the

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** For low *AGM* (e.g.,  $AGM = 0.1$ )

1441 | opposite is true: the model prioritizes moving water through the turbines at the expense of

1442 | agriculture. For intermediate marginal water values (P4) there is an inflection point at

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** *AGM* (e.g.,  $AGM = 0.16$ )

1443 | which the gradient is equal to 1.0 (circled point in Figure 5). To the left of the point the

1444 | gradient is less than 1.0, which would cause the model to shift towards agriculture, and to

1445 | the right it is greater than 1.0, pushing the model back towards hydropower. Thus the

1457 inflection point is the optimum balance between agriculture and hydropower for that  
1458 [marginal value of water](#) under given simulation conditions.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** *AGM*

1459 The implications of the optimal inflection point for total benefits are illustrated  
1460 schematically in Figure 6. The blue line in Figure 6 represents a base case scenario with  
1461 an optimum division between irrigation and hydropower indicated by the inflection point  
1462 at gradient equal to one. The other lines are representative of scenarios in which changing  
1463 conditions—altered flow regime, market modifications, policy decisions, or other  
1464 external factors—shift the optimum in a manner that can change both the total value  
1465 realized from the system and the division between irrigation and hydropower. A  
1466 movement up and to the right on the chart is a win-win condition for Sudan in which both  
1467 irrigation and hydropower benefits increase, while a move down and to the left is a lose-  
1468 lose scenario. Movement up and to the left and down and to the right are trade-off  
1469 scenarios in which hydropower benefit increases to the detriment of irrigation and vice  
1470 versa. The interpretation of these “wins” and “losses” would, of course, differ for other  
1471 stakeholders. Egypt might view movement to the right on the chart—increasing irrigation  
1472 withdrawals—as a potential threat to water resources in the absence [of](#) increased Nile  
1473 river flow or [the](#) counterbalancing shared benefits.

1474 With this framework in mind, we next consider simulations [for one set of](#)  
1475 [marginal water values \(P4\)](#). These simulations allow us to ascertain the changing nature  
1476 of the tradeoff curves for changes in mean flow consistent with the range of predicted  
1477 climate change and for changes in flow timing representative of flow regulation from  
1478 upstream development. [P4](#) is used because it represents an intermediate [set of](#)  
1479 profitability [values; P3-P1 have high irrigation profitability and are limited by the](#) [1959](#)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** in which flow scenarios are added to the analysis while maintaining a constant *AGM* value.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** A value of *AGM* = 0.12

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** value; *AGM* greater than 0.14 was found to push some scenarios up to

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** 18.5 bcm

1488 constraints, while P5 and P6 push simulations strongly towards hydropower. Figure 7  
1489 shows the results of these simulations, with inflection points indicated as circles around  
1490 the point at which the gradient crosses through 1.0. These circled data points are the  
1491 optimal values for each scenario at which the model would converge for the given  
1492 hydrologic inputs and parameter values.

1493 The relative position of these inflection points lies at the core of optimization-  
1494 based hydro-economic analysis. When a change in hydrology (e.g., “high flow” versus  
1495 “observed flow”) causes the inflection point to move to the right on the chart it suggests  
1496 that this hydrologic change will push Sudan towards more irrigation. Similarly, if the  
1497 inflection point moves up on the chart it suggests that the hydrologic change is pushing  
1498 Sudan towards hydropower. These dynamics matter enormously for studies of how  
1499 climate change or upstream development is likely to impact Sudan’s water resource  
1500 decision-making. Movement that is up and to the left or down and to the right is  
1501 particularly interesting, as it suggests that Sudan’s optimal development strategy involves  
1502 a shift between hydropower and irrigation. In more general terms, a hydrologic shift that  
1503 moves the optimal point up and to the left on Figure 6 could be thought of as a change  
1504 that pushes Sudan towards a hydropower development pathway, while a shift that moves  
1505 the point down and to the right pushes Sudan towards an irrigation development pathway  
1506 relative to baseline simulation conditions.

1507 Model sensitivity to reduced flow (-20%) is consistent with expectation. For the  
1508 P4 water value set this low flow scenario results in a decrease in benefits from both  
1509 irrigation and hydropower production (triangles and dashed line in Figure 7). Conversely,  
1510 an increased flow (+20%) increases both agricultural production and hydropower

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** AGM less than 0.1 pushed

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** scenarios

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** smooth

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** For this fixed AGM analysis, model

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** A

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** at AGM = 0.12

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** dramatic

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** a slight decrease in

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** Interestingly, sensitivity to

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** is not as intuitive: increased flow concentrated over the wet months would significantly increase

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** at the expense of downstream

1524 production (squares and dotted line in Figure 7). Lastly, the smoothed flows show an  
1525 increase in hydropower and almost no change in irrigation benefits. Stabilized flows  
1526 increase water availability during the dry season and at the tail ends of the wet season,  
1527 and thus there is more water available throughout the year for hydropower, increasing its  
1528 benefits (x's and solid line in Figure 7).

1529 Next, the sensitivity to agricultural value was analyzed by varying marginal value  
1530 of water in agriculture (P1 – P6). Figure 8 shows the trade-off curve of Pareto optimal  
1531 values of hydropower and irrigation benefits for P1 – P6 (See Table 3). A solution point  
1532 is Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible point that improves at least one objective  
1533 function without exacerbating another objective function. As described above, a higher  
1534 marginal value for agriculture assigns greater weight to agricultural production, which  
1535 could be interpreted as a higher agricultural profit margin. First, we note that for all  
1536 scenarios in Figure 8 the tradeoff curves flatten out at very high values of irrigation  
1537 benefit. This flattening reflects the fact that at high marginal values the agricultural  
1538 benefits are limited by the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement constraints. The trade-off curve  
1539 approaches horizontal because the same amount of water is allowed to pass downstream  
1540 through the turbines at Merowe while the calculated irrigation benefit per unit water  
1541 continues to increase when marginal value is set to higher values.

1542 Perhaps more interesting, Figure 8 can also be used to study how the marginal  
1543 value of agricultural water affects the impact that a change in flow regime has on optimal  
1544 water allocation. For the smoothed flow (upstream development) all marginal water value  
1545 sets (P1-P6) show no significant increase/decrease in agriculture benefits, due in part to  
1546 withdrawal restrictions imposed by the 1959 treaty and, perhaps, in part to the absence of

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** , thus leading to a slight decrease in hydropower but a total increase in the overall objective function

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** irrigation and

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** the

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** to both

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** changing the *AGM* factor.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** *AGM* ranging from 0.08 to 0.22.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** *AGM*

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** or as a higher perceived value of agricultural activity by policy makers.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** *AGM*

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** model is withdrawing near the maximum amount of water allowed under the 18.5 bcm constraint imposed

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** *AGM*

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Formatted:** Font:Italic

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** higher and

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** *AGM*

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** For example, the circles in Figure 8 highlight

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** same optimal points indicated by the circles in Figure 7—i.e., the inflection points for each scenario when *AGM* is set at 0.12. The boxes in Figure 8 indicate the same inflection points but for a case of *AGM* equal to 0.16. For *AGM* = 0.12 a scenario of

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** provides a win-win

1574 [a second cropping season in these simulations. All the P1-P6 marginal values, however,](#)  
1575 [provide a win for Sudan: greater hydropower benefits. In other words, smoothed flows](#)  
1576 [allow for more effective use of existing hydropower infrastructure.](#)

1577 [The SmoothPower simulation, \(smoothed flow with a drop in the price of power\)](#)  
1578 [shows a policy shift from a hydropower-centric solution to a policy that increases](#)  
1579 [agricultural production. Interestingly, this shift is relatively modest in all cases and is](#)  
1580 [extremely small for simulations with high agricultural marginal water values \(P1-P3\).](#)  
1581 [This in large part reflects the limitation on Sudan's annual water withdrawals imposed](#)  
1582 [by the model's downstream constraints, which guarantee flow to Egypt. For P1-P3 the](#)  
1583 [Smooth Flow simulation already runs up against these constraints, preventing larger](#)  
1584 [shifts to irrigation in SmoothPower.](#)

1585 We note that all of these results, including the shift to agriculture in  
1586 SmoothPower, are for existing cropping practices. [Figure 9 considers a shift in](#)  
1587 [management practices and introduces a second cropping season to the smoothed flow. An](#)  
1588 [additional cropping season shows increases in irrigation benefits particularly if](#)  
1589 [agricultural marginal water values are high \(P1 – P3\). Smooth2crop in Figure 9](#)  
1590 [introduces a second crop season to the smoothed flow, and SmoothPower2crop includes](#)  
1591 [this double cropping and an estimate of less expensive power due to upstream production](#)  
1592 [sold to Sudan. The modest increases in irrigation benefits for these flows, particularly in](#)  
1593 [scenarios of high irrigation profitability, illustrate Sudan's limitation due to the](#)  
1594 [constraints in the model representative of the 1959 agreement. The second constraint](#)  
1595 [guarantees at least three times more water passing Merowe downstream into Egypt that it](#)  
1596 [does allow for irrigation at upstream schemes, thereby forcing Sudan toward a](#)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** irrigation benefits and slightly higher

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** But for  $AGM = 0.16$  smoothed flow pushes back against irrigation use: there is an increase in hydropower benefit and in total benefit, but a decrease in water used for irrigation.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** and this pushes against the high irrigation allocations in the baseline  $AGM = 0.16$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** , driving Sudan towards hydropower. ... [3]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** In reality, upstream development will increase water availability during the dry months, which will incentivize farmers to change their agricultural practices. This has already been observed on the Atbara River, just north of the Blue Nile, where construction of a dam in Ethiopia has led Sudanese farmers to transition from a one cropping season to a multiple cropping season and to diversify crop types. This suggests that our model underestimates the total irrigation potential under upstream development scenarios because we do not include the potential for large-scale changes in agricultural practice. This would be particularly true for scenarios with low  $AGM$  where the 18.5 billion cubic meter constraint is not met. Methods to include a broader range of crop and seasonality options in the optimization modeling framework are the subject of ongoing research.



1630 [hydropower path and limiting its irrigation potential \(see Irrigation constraints Section](#)  
1631 [2.1.3, Equation 7\).](#)

1632 [To test for the restrictive nature of the 1959 agreement in our simulations, we](#)  
1633 [have included two additional runs that remove the second constraint of the 1959](#)  
1634 [agreement \(Smooth2cropNA and SmoothPower2cropNA\) but maintain Sudan’s long](#)  
1635 [term average water use at 14.5 bcm. SmoothPower2cropNA includes the reduction in](#)  
1636 [power price due to upstream control and the removal of the second 1959 constraint. Both](#)  
1637 [runs show a significant increase in irrigation benefits for cases P1 – P3 \(Figure 9\).](#)

#### 1638 **4. Conclusions:**

1639 This paper introduces a hydroeconomic model for Sudan (SHOM) that considers  
1640 hydropower and irrigation benefits under conditions of existing infrastructure and  
1641 practices. SHOM includes a nonlinear multiobjective optimization routine that allows us  
1642 to study interactions between component objectives under a range of flow scenarios and  
1643 valuation of agricultural returns. A number of our modeling results confirm or  
1644 complement previous hydro-economic analyses—for example, the fact that upstream  
1645 regulation can provide benefits to downstream riparians. [Ajoon et al. \(2014\), for example,](#)  
1646 [shows that including the GERD in a SDDP hydroeconomic model resulted in an increase](#)  
1647 [in hydropower generation in Sudan and Egypt.](#) Other results are intuitive, such as the fact  
1648 that under reduced flows there is a decline in hydropower and irrigation benefits.

1649 However, even in this simple sensitivity test the model returns some non-obvious results.  
1650 While one might expect that smoothing the Blue Nile hydrograph through upstream  
1651 regulation would [inevitably](#) lead to increased irrigation withdrawals, we find that [doing](#)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted: Indent: First line: 0"

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: this

1653 | so is only [beneficial under select combinations of marginal values of water and](#) if the  
1654 | upstream facility results in a drop in the price of electricity in Sudan. Otherwise the  
1655 | optimal development path is to increase hydropower production,  
1656 |         Another interesting result is [the restrictive nature of the downstream flow](#)  
1657 | [constraint](#). The more that economic considerations ([lowering of power prices and changes](#)  
1658 | [in agricultural practices](#)) push Sudan towards irrigation, the more expensive [these](#)  
1659 | [constraints—i.e., the restrictions imposed by a water sharing agreement—become](#) to the  
1660 | country. The [current](#) requirement to [deliver adequate flows to Egypt](#) is not a severe  
1661 | constraint as long as agriculture is economically inefficient, irrigation is hampered by  
1662 | siltation and seasonal flow variability, and hydropower is an economic driver to send  
1663 | water downstream. But if these realities are shifted by an upstream facility that regulates  
1664 | flow, reduces sediment load, and provides inexpensive electricity, the treaty-enforced cap  
1665 | on water use will quickly become a constraint on Sudan’s optimal hydro-development  
1666 | options.

1667 |         The modeling results presented in this study contribute to current understanding  
1668 | of Nile [hydroeconomics](#) by presenting a focused analysis of Sudanese options, performed  
1669 | with a multiobjective optimization model capable of capturing nonlinear interactions.  
1670 | There are, however, a number of important limitations that need to be addressed in future  
1671 | model development. First, the model does not include knowledge of current dam  
1672 | operating procedures or of stage-volume relationships for proposed dams (GERD) or for  
1673 | existing dams in recent years. Second, the model does not include the effects of siltation.  
1674 | A dam that controls siltation would affect the objective function by easing dam operation  
1675 | and significantly reducing dredging costs for canals that feed irrigation schemes. At the

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** true

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** , while the decision on whether to increase or decrease irrigation depends on the agricultural margin and/or to the ability of Sudan to shift prevailing agricultural practices beyond the existing cropping seasons included in our model

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** that when

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** price of electricity is cut in half Sudan shifts towards an irrigation development path. This is clear in our modeling results (Figure 8) and is almost certainly an underestimate of the push towards irrigation since we are not considering large-scale changes in agricultural practices.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement becomes

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** use no more than 18.5 bcm per year

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** hydro-economics

1695 same time, reduced silt load would increase the need for fertilizer in downstream  
1696 agricultural lands that currently benefit from natural nutrient input from silt-laden waters.  
1697 Third, limitations in current agricultural and economic data make it difficult to estimate  
1698 total agricultural benefits, so the marginal value of agricultural water essentially functions  
1699 as a tuning parameter in SHOM that allows us to study general sensitivity to the value of  
1700 agriculture. This could certainly be improved with access to more reliable and recent  
1701 agricultural data, though the perceived value of agriculture and the support of this value  
1702 through land and economic policies are always difficult to quantify.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** AGM

Saleh Satti 3/9/15 1:27 PM

**Deleted:** but that is not grounded in data

1703 The scope of SHOM is also a matter of ongoing evaluation. In focusing on  
1704 hydropower and irrigation we adopt the framework of many earlier hydro-economic  
1705 optimization models in the Nile and elsewhere. We recognize, however, that climate  
1706 change and river development can have a broad range of impacts, many of which are  
1707 difficult to quantify. These include ecological impacts, effects on fisheries, and burden  
1708 placed on particular populations living within the basin. These important considerations  
1709 must be accounted for in any application of hydroeconomic analysis to development  
1710 decision making, and it would be valuable to find ways to broaden Nile basin

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** hydro-economic

1711 hydroeconomic models to include a more diverse array of processes and outcome  
1712 variables. Lastly, we recognize that our use of a deterministic model presents a highly  
1713 idealized scenario of a decision maker with perfect foresight. Deterministic models do  
1714 not account for the uncertainties in some of the input parameters, therefore the results and  
1715 decisions presented in this paper will produce benefits that are higher than any real world  
1716 scenario.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** hydro-economic models to include a more diverse array of processes and outcome variables.

1723 Future operation of SHOM may be within a value of information framework that  
1724 aims to assess operational seasonal forecasts. A more in-depth study of the value of  
1725 information of seasonal forecasts will require the conversion of SHOM from a  
1726 deterministic model to a stochastic model in order to adjust to the stochastic nature of  
1727 forecasts. In addition, we would add that our analysis was performed for a portion of the  
1728 Blue Nile as well as the downstream main Nile stem within Sudan. Future development  
1729 of the model should incorporate other major tributaries such as the White Nile and the  
1730 Atbara. Inclusion of other Nile tributaries and their infrastructure in the model will  
1731 present a more holistic approach to analyzing Sudan's water resources decision making.

Saleh Satti 3/7/15 12:43 PM

**Formatted:** Font:(Default) Times New Roman

1732 The Nile River is a finite water resource shared by a number of emerging  
1733 economies, and the long-standing tensions regarding its equitable use are only increasing  
1734 as demand for food, water, and electricity rise across the region. On account of both  
1735 history (i.e., the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement) and geography, the Republic of Sudan is a  
1736 particularly critical player in determining the future of Nile development and related  
1737 hydroeconomic development decisions in neighboring countries. The effect of climate  
1738 change and upstream development, in turn, will be critically important in determining  
1739 Sudan's long term optimal development path and associated policy decisions. Here we  
1740 present a first analysis targeted specifically at Sudan's optimal irrigation and hydropower  
1741 development options under scenarios of changing Nile flows and upstream development.  
1742 Results reinforce the understanding that Sudan has the potential to weigh in heavily on  
1743 matters of regional water and food security depending on how it chooses to make use of  
1744 the Blue Nile and main stem Nile as it flows through its territory. Further research is  
1745 required to understand how these choices are affected by additional development, trade,

Saleh Satti 3/7/15 12:19 PM

**Deleted:** In further development we may also include the White Nile and other Eastern Nile tributaries in the model, add in future infrastructure currently included in national development plans, and consider the emerging external influence of foreign land purchases, which are opening up new frontiers in irrigation that are subject to systematically different optimization objectives and constraints.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** hydro-economic

1757 and policy decisions within the basin, and how Sudan's own infrastructure and  
1758 agricultural practices might evolve to optimize returns under evolving climatic and  
1759 economic conditions.

1760 **Acknowledgements:**

1761 This research was supported in part by the Environment, Energy, Sustainability and  
1762 Health Institute (E<sup>2</sup>SHI) Fellowship and NASA applied science program grant  
1763 NNX09AT61G.  
1764 Data is available at the Global Runoff Data Center (GRDC) GRDC Station NO.16663800  
1765 and NOAA National Climate Data Center (NCDC) Global Historical Climatology  
1766 Network-Monthly (GHCN-M) temperature dataset station Wad Medina nr62751 in  
1767 gcnm.tavg.v3.qcu v3.2.2.20140804, WMO Station code 62751.  
1768 (<http://climexp.knmi.nl>), as well as the Food and Agricultural (FAO) dataset  
1769 (FAOSTAT). (<http://faostat.fao.org/>).



1770 **Appendix:**

1771 **SHOM MODEL:**

1772 *Objective Function:*

$$\text{Objective} = \max \sum_{l,m,y} (D^y * bi_{l,m,y} + D^y * P_{m,y} bh_{l,m,y}) \quad (1)$$

1773 **Constraints:**

1774 *Hydropower:*

$$\forall_{l,m,y}, KWH_{l,m,y} = c * n * effh * rhe_{l,m,y} * h_{l,m,y} \quad (2)$$

$$bh_{l,m,y} = \sum_l (P * KWH_{l,m,y}) \quad (3)$$

$$\forall_{l,m,y}, r_{l,m,y} = rhe_{l,m,y} + nhe_{l,m,y} \quad (9)$$

$r_{l,m,y}$  = total release,  $rhe_{l,m,y}$  = hydropower release,  $nhe_{l,m,y}$  = non-hydropower release

$$\forall_{l,m,y}, rhe_{l,m,y} \leq Q_{dc} \quad (11)$$

where  $Q_{dc}$  is the flow capacity through the turbines.

*Irrigation:*

$$i_{l,m,y} = \sum_c (effi_c * Water_{c,l,m,y} * Area_{c,l,m,y}) \quad (4)$$

$$bi_{l,m,y} = \sum_{c,l} (effi_c * v_c * Water_{c,l,m,y} * Area_{c,l,m,y}) \quad (5)$$

$$\sum_{l,m,y} (i_{l,m,y}) + \sum_{l,m,y} (e_{l,m,y}) \leq Y * 14.5 \text{ bcm} \quad (6)$$

$$\sum_{l,m} (i_{l,m,y}) + \sum_{l,m} (e_{l,m,y}) \leq 0.28 * \sum_m (R_y) \quad (7)$$

$$\sum_{c,l} Area_{c,l,m,y} \leq 1.4 \text{ million ha} \quad (12)$$

1775 *Continuity:*

$$\forall_{l,m,y}, s_{l,m,y} = q_{l,m,y} + r_{(l-1),m,y} + s_{l,(m-1),y} - r_{l,m,y} - i_{l,m,y} - e_{l,m,y} \quad (8)$$

$$s_{l,m,y} \leq Vmax \quad (9)$$

$$\text{Non Negativity Constraints: } s_{l,m,y}, rhe_{l,m,y}, nhe_{l,m,y}, r_{l,m,y}, i_{l,m,y}, Area_{c,l,m,y} \geq 0 \quad (10)$$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted:  $\sum_{l,m,y} (D^y * AGM * I_{l,m,y} + D^y * P_{l,m,y} KWH_{l,m,y})$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted:

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted:  $\frac{effh * rhe_{l,m,y} * h_{l,m,y} (\text{seconds per month})}{3600}$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: Font:Not Italic

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: 10

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: Suppress line numbers

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted:  $\forall_{l,m,y}, I_{l,m,y} =$  ... [4]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted:  $\sum_c (effi * Water_{c,l,m,y} * Area_{c,l,m,y})$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: Centered

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: ... (4)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: Font color: Black

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted:  $\leq Y * 18$

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: ... (5)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: ... [5]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: ... [6]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: Centered

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: 11

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: 6

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: 7

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: 8

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Deleted: .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: Line spacing: single

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
Formatted: Font:Not Bold

1776 **References:**

1777 1. [Arjoon et al, Hydro-economic risk assessment in the eastern Nile River basin,](#)  
 1778 [Water Resources and Economics, 2014 \(in press\).](#)  
 1779 2. Awulachew, S., Rebelo, L., and Molden, D.: The Nile Basin: tapping the unmet  
 1780 agricultural potential of Nile waters, [Water Int.](#), 35, 623–654, 2010.  
 1781 3. Bernal, V.: Colonial moral economy and the discipline of development: the  
 1782 Gezira scheme and “modern” Sudan, [Cult. Anthropol.](#), 12, 447–479, 1997.  
 1783 4. Beyene, T., Lettenmaier, D., and Kabat, P.: Hydrologic impacts of climate change  
 1784 on the Nile River Basin: implications of the 2007 IPCC scenarios, [Clim. Change](#),  
 1785 100, 433–461, 2010.  
 1786 5. Bhattacharjee, P. and Zaitchik, B.: Perspectives on CMIP5 model performance in  
 1787 the Nile River headwaters region, [Int. J. Climatol.](#), in press, 2015.  
 1788 6. Blackmore, D. and Whittington, D.: Opportunities for cooperative water resources  
 1789 development 20 on the eastern Nile: risks and rewards, Report to the Eastern Nile  
 1790 Council of Ministers, Nile  
 1791 Basin Initiative, Entebbe, 2008. Block, P. and Strzepek, K.: Economic analysis of  
 1792 large-scale upstream river basin development on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia  
 1793 considering transient conditions, climate variability, and climate change, [J. Water](#)  
 1794 [Res. Pl.-ASCE](#), 136, 156–166, 2010.  
 1795 8. Block, P. and Strzepek, K.: Power ahead: meeting Ethiopia’s energy needs under  
 1796 a changing climate review of development, [Economics](#), 16, 476–488, 2012.  
 1797 9. Block, P., Assis Souza Filho, F., Sun, L., and Kwon, H.: A streamflow forecasting  
 1798 framework using multiple climate and hydrological models, [J. Am. Water Resour.](#)  
 1799 [Assoc.](#), 45, 828–843, 2009.  
 1800 10. Bureau of Reclamation, US Department of Interior, Land and Water Resources of  
 1801 the Blue Nile Basin: Ethiopia, Main Report and Appendices I–V, Government  
 1802 Printing Office, Washington DC, 1964.  
 1803 11. Cascao, A.: Ethiopia – challenges to Egyptian hegemony in the Nile Basin, [Water](#)  
 1804 [Pol.](#), 10, 13–28, 2008.  
 1805 12. Chesworth, P. M., Howell, P. P., and Allan, J. A.: The History of Water Use in  
 1806 Sudan and Egypt in the Nile, [Resource Evaluation, Resource Management,](#)  
 1807 [Hydropolitics and Legal Issues](#), Centre of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, 40–  
 1808 58, 1990.  
 1809 13. Cohon, J.: Multiobjective Programming and Planning, Dover Publications,  
 1810 Mineola, NY, 2003. Conway, D.: From headwater tributaries to international  
 1811 river: observing and adapting to climate variability and change in the Nile basin,  
 1812 [Global Environ. Change](#), 15, 99–114, 2005.  
 1813 14. Drud, A. S.: CONOPT – a large scale GRG code, [ORSA J. Computing](#), 6, 207–  
 1814 216, 1992.  
 1815 15. Elamin, A., Saeed, A., Boush, A.: Water Use efficiencies of Gezira, Rahad and  
 1816 New Halfa irrigated schemes under Sudan dryland condition, [Sudan J. Des. Res.](#)  
 1817 3(1): 62-72, 2011.  
 1818 16. Elshamy, M. E., Seierstad, I. A., and Sorteberg, A.: Impacts of climate change on

Deleted: . (2010)...: The Nile Bas... [8]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [7]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [10]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Victoria. "  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Moral Economy  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [9]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [12]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [11]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Discipline  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [13]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Development: The  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [14]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Scheme  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [15]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Modern  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [16]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: ." Cultural Anthropology  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [17]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: no. 4 (1997):  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [18]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: -  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [19]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: . (2010).  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [20]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: . Climate  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [21]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Volume  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [22]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Issue 3-4, pp  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [23]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [24]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [25]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [26]  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM



1936 Blue Nile flows using bias-corrected GCM scenarios, *Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci.*, **13**,  
 1937 551–565, doi:10.5194/hess-13-551-2009, 2009.

1938 17. Food and Agricultural Organization: FAOSTAT, available at:  
 1939 <http://faostat.fao.org/site/703/default.aspx#ancor> (last access: August 2013),  
 1940 2009.

1941 18. Gamal, K. A. E. M.; Impact of Policy and Institutional Changes on Livelihood of  
 1942 Farmers in Gezira Scheme of Sudan, M.S. Thesis, University of Gezira, Sudan,  
 1943 2009.

1944 19. Gebreluel, G.; Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: ending Africa's oldest  
 1945 geopolitical rivalry?, *Wash. Quart.*, **37**, 25–37, 2014.

1946 20. Georgakakos, A.; New method for the real-time operation of reservoir systems,  
 1947 *Water Resour. Res.*, **23**, 1376–1390, 1987.

1948 21. Georgakakos, A.; Extended linear quadratic gaussian control: further extensions,  
 1949 *Water Resour. Res.*, **25**, 191–201, 1989.

1950 22. Georgakakos, A.; Topics on System Analysis and Integrated Water Resources  
 1951 Management, chap. 6, edited by: Castelletti, A. and Soncini-Sessa, R., Elsevier,  
 1952 Amsterdam, 2007.

1953 23. Ghezae, N.; Irrigation Water Management. A Performance Study of the Rahad  
 1954 Scheme in Sudan, 1977–1996, Ph.D. thesis, Uppsala University Library, Uppsala,  
 1955 Sweden, 1998.

1956 24. Gleick, P.; Methods for evaluating the regional hydrologic impacts of global  
 1957 climate changes, *J. Hydrol.*, **88**, 97–116, 1986.

1958 25. Goor, Q., Kelman, R., and Tilmant, A.; Optimal multipurpose-multireservoir  
 1959 operation model with variable productivity of hydropower plants, *J. Water Res.*  
 1960 *PL-ASCE*, **137**, 258–267, 2010.

1961 26. Guariso, G. and Whittington, D.; Implications of Ethiopian water development for  
 1962 Egypt and Sudan, *Int. J. Water Resour. D.*, **3**, 105–114, 1987.

1963 27. Hai, H.; Sudan, Ethiopia.. Close Relations in All Fields, *Sudan Vision*, available  
 1964 at: <http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=229800>  
 1965 (last access: 10 January 2015), 2013.

1966 28. Hammond, M.; The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Blue Nile:  
 1967 Implications for transboundary water governance, *GWF Discussion Paper 1307*,  
 1968 *Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia*, available at:  
 1969 <http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2013/02/18/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-and-the-blue-nile-implications-for-transboundary-water-governance/> (last access: 4 August 2014), 2013.

1970 29. Harou, J., Pulido-Velazquez, M., Rosenberg, D., Medellín-Azuara, J., Lund, J.,  
 1971 and Howitt, R.; Hydro-economic models: concepts, design, applications, and  
 1972 future prospects, *J. Hydrol.*, **375**, 627–643, 2009.

1973 30. Hussien, H.; Egypt and Ethiopia Spar Over the Nile, Opinion Piece, *Al-jazeera*  
 1974 America, available at: <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/egypt-disputes-ethiopiarenaisancedam.html> (last access: 4 August 2014), 2014.

1975 31. Igunza, E.; Will Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam Dry the Nile in Egypt,  
 1976 British Broadcasting Corporation, available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26679225>, last access: 4 August 2014.

1977 32. Knott, D. and Hewett, R.; Water resources planning in the Sudan, in: *The Nile*,

Deleted: . Hydrology and  
 Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [54]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: System Sciences Discuss ... [55]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [56]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: (n.d.)

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [57]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: . Retrieved August 2013, from

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [58]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [59]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: ., (2009).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [60]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: policy

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [61]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: institutional changes

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [62]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: livelihood

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [63]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: farmers

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [64]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: scheme

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [65]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: (MSc).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [66]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: ., (

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Moved up [1]: 2014).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: Ending...nding Africa's ... [67]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Deleted: ., (1987)....: New ... [68]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 ... [69]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 ... [70]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [71]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted ... [72]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
 Formatted

2116 Sharing a Scarce Resource, A Historical and Technical Review of Water  
 2117 Management and of Economic and Legal Issues, edited by: Howell, P. P. and  
 2118 Allan, J. A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 205-216, 1994.

2119 33. Loucks, D. P., Stedinger, J. R., and Douglas, H.: Water Resource Systems  
 2120 Planning and Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.

2121 34. McCartney, M., and Girma, M.: Evaluating the downstream implications of  
 2122 planned water resource development in the Ethiopian portion of the Blue Nile  
 2123 River. *Water Int.*, 37(4), 362-379, 2012.

2124 35. McCartney, M., Ibrahim, Y. A., Sileshi, Y., and Awulachew, S. B.: Application of  
 2125 the Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) Model to simulate current and  
 2126 future water demand in the Blue Nile, in: Improved water and land management  
 2127 in the Ethiopian highlands: its impact on downstream stakeholders dependent on  
 2128 the Blue Nile, Intermediate Results Dissemination Workshop held at the  
 2129 International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 5-6  
 2130 February 2009, edited by: Awulachew, S. B., Erkossa, T., Smakhtin, V., and  
 2131 Fernando, A., International Water Management Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 78,  
 2132 2009.

2133 36. Nawaz, R., Bellerby, T., Sayed, M., and Elshamy, M.: Blue Nile runoff sensitivity  
 2134 to climate change. *Open Hydrol. J.*, 4, 137-151, 2010.

2135 37. Plusquellec, H.: The Gezira Irrigation Scheme in Sudan, Objectives, Design, and  
 2136 Performance, World Bank, Technical Paper 120, Washington DC, 1990.

2137 38. Professor Belay Simane, Addis Ababa University personal communication

2138 39. Soliman, E., Sayed, M., and Jeuland, M.: Impact assessment of future climate  
 2139 change for the Blue Nile basin, using a RCM nested in a GCM. *Nile Basin Water*  
 2140 *Eng. Sci. Magazine*, 2, 15-30, 2009.

2141 40. Swain, A.: Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: the Nile River dispute. *J. Mod. Afr.*  
 2142 *Stud.*, 35, 675-694, 1997.

2143 41. Taye, M. T., Ntegeka, V., Ogiramo, N. P., and Willems, P.: Assessment of  
 2144 climate change impact on hydrological extremes in two source regions of the Nile  
 2145 River Basin. *Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci.*, 15, 209-222. doi:10.5194/hess-15-209-  
 2146 2011, 2011.

2147 42. Taylor, K., Stoffer, R., and Meehl, G.: An overview of CMIP5 and the experiment  
 2148 design. *B. Am. Meteorol. Soc.*, 93, 485-498, 2012.

2149 43. Teodoru, C., Wüest, A., and Wehrli, B.: Independent review of the environmental  
 2150 impact assessment for the Merowe Dam project (Nile River, Sudan). Eawag  
 2151 aquatic research, Kastanienbaum, Switzerland, 2006.

2152 44. Thornthwaite, C. W.: An approach toward a rational classification of climate.  
 2153 *Geogr. Rev.*, 38, 55-94, 1948.

2154 45. United Arab Republic and Sudan Agreement (With Annexes) For The Full  
 2155 Utilization of the Nile Waters, signed at Cairo on 8 November 1959, in force: 12  
 2156 December 1959, 6519 U.N.T.S., 63, available at:  
 2157 [http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/uar\\_sudan.html](http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/uar_sudan.html),  
 2158 last access: 10 August 2014.

2159 46. Waterbury, J., and Whittington, D.: Playing chicken on the Nile?, the implications  
 2160 of microdam development in the Ethiopian highlands and Egypt's New Valley  
 2161 Project. *Nat. Resour. Forum*, 22, 155-163, 1998.

Deleted: .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [108]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: -

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [109]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [110]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: . (1981)...: Water reso ... [111]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [113]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: &

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [114]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: . (2009).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [112]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [115]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: Evaluation

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [116]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [117]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: Its

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [118]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: 78

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [119]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [120]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [121]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [122]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: . (2010).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [123]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: Runoff Sensitivity...un ... [124]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: . (1990).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [125]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [126]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [127]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [128]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [129]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [130]

2252  
2253  
2254  
2255  
2256  
2257  
2258  
2259

47. Whittington, D.: Visions of Nile basin development, *Water Pol.*, 6, 1–24, 2004.  
48. Whittington, D., Wu, X., and Sadoff, C.: Water resources management in the Nile basin: the economic value of cooperation, *Water Pol.*, 7, 227–252, 2005.  
49. Yao, H. and Georgakakos, A. P.: Nile Decision Support Tool River Simulation and Management, *Georgia Water Resources Institute, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, USA, 2003.*  
50. Yates, D. and Strzepek, K.: Modeling the Nile basin under climate change, *J. Hydrol. Eng.*, 3, 98–108, 1998.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** . (2004).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** (

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted:** Font color: Auto, Pattern: Clear

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [152]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [153]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [155]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [154]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** Policy,

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [156]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** ), 1-

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [157]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** . (2005),...: Water reso ... [158]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [159]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** ., &

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [160]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** . (2003).

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [161]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** .

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Formatted** ... [162]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:** ,... and Strzepek, K. (1 ... [163]

2288 **Tables :**

Parameters	Value Range	Units	Notes
Discount Rate (D)	3% - 7%	-	5% used in the simulation analysis
Flows(q)			
High	20%	Million m <sup>3</sup>	CI = Confidence Intervals
Low	-20%		
Smooth	3-month Average		
Bootstrapped Flows	5%, 50%, 95% CI		
Water Requirement(Water)			
Wheat	0.23 - 0.48	m <sup>3</sup> / m <sup>2</sup>	Value depends on Month (Plusquellec 1990, Ghezze 1998)
Cotton	0.48 - 0.73		
Sorghum	0.69 - 0.94		
Groundnuts	0.89 - 1.14		
Efficiency			
Effh	0.85	-	Hydropower Efficiency
Irrigation			Irrigation Efficiency
Wheat	0.233		
Cotton	0.065		
Sorghum	0.333		
Groundnuts	0.312		
Power (P)	0.08	cents/KWh	
Evaporation <sup>a</sup>	0.08 - 0.3	m <sup>3</sup> / m <sup>2</sup>	Evaporation is derived from the Thornthwaite equation (Thornthwaite 1948). Range Depends on Month and location.
e	1.9 - 76.5	Million m <sup>3</sup>	e = Ev*Dam Surface Area

2289

2290

Table 1: SHOM Parameters

Formatted Table ... [164]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: AGM ... [165]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [166]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted Table ... [167]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: D<sup>v</sup>

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted:

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [168]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [169]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [170]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: /Month

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [171]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [172]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: Yield (Y<sub>c</sub>) ... [173]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted Table ... [174]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted:

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [175]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [176]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [177]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [178]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [179]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Moved (insertion) [3] ... [180]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: effi

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [181]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted Table ... [182]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [183]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: 1.25

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: -

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Deleted: effh ... [184]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [185]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted Table ... [186]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Formatted ... [187]

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

Variables	Definition	Units	Notes
$S^b$	Storage	Million $m^3$	Storage volume is assumed to be cylindrical in the model
$r$	Release ( $r = r_{he} + n_{he}$ )	Million $m^3$	Release has two components, $r_{he}$ = Hydropower release, $n_{he}$ = non-hydropower release
$i$	Irrigation Volume	Million $m^3$	
Area	Area Irrigated	Million $m^2$	
$b_i$	Irrigation Benefits	\$	
KWh	Power Generated	KWh	Calculated from the hydropower equation. Function of hydropower release and head
$b_h$	Hydropower Benefits	\$	

Table 2: SHOM Variable definitions

Marginal value of water (\$/m3)						
	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6
Cotton	0.287	0.118	0.036	0.008	0.001	0.00001
Wheat	0.062	0.025	0.008	0.002	0.000	0.000
Groundnut	0.083	0.034	0.011	0.002	0.000	0.000
Sorghum	0.017	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000

Table 3: Marginal Values of Water for each Crop

Simulations	Description
High Flows	+20% Observed
Low Flows	-20% Observed
Smoothed Flows	3 month averaged
Smooth2crop	Smooth flow + 2 cropping season
SmoothPower	Smooth flow + 0.04 cents/KWh power price
Smooth2cropNA	Smooth flow + 2 cropping season + Removal of second 1959 agreement constraint
SmoothPower2crop	Smooth flow + 0.04 cents/KWh power price + 2 cropping season
SmoothPower2cropNA	Smooth flow + 0.04 cents/KWh power price + 2 cropping season + Removal of second 1959 agreement constraint

Table 4: Description of the simulations used in SHOM

- Deleted: s
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Deleted: /Month
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [199]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [200]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [201]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Deleted: /Month
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [202]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [203]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [204]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [205]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Deleted: /Month
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [206]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Deleted:  $m^2$ /Month
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [207]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [208]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [209]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [210]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Deleted: /
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [211]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [212]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [213]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [214]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [215]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [216]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted Table ... [217]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [218]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [219]
- Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM
- Formatted ... [220]


2337

2338

2339

2344

**Figures**



2345

2346 Figure 1: Map of the Nile and its tributaries A = Baro-Akobo-Sobat, B= Blue Nile, C =  
2347 Tekese-Atbara Basins, S = Sennar Dam, R = Roseries Dam, M = Merowe Dam and G =  
2348 GERD







Figure 2: Schematic of the Optimization Model



2349

2350


Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM



Deleted:










2352  
2353

Figure 3: Annual cycle of (A) observed flow, (B) storage and (C) hydropower release at the three dams over the 20 year demonstration simulation





2355 Figure 4: Annual cycle of (A) reservoir storage and (B) hydropower release at the three  
 2356 dams, and (C) irrigation withdrawals upstream of Sennar and upstream of Merowe in the  
 2357 base case simulation of bootstrapped historical flows and marginal values P4. Data points  
 2358 are the mean average value over the 20 year simulation and error bars represent the  
 2359 difference in output between the 5% and 95% confidence interval bootstrapped flow.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** AGM = 0.12


Saleh Satti 3/9/15 12:51 PM

**Formatted:** Font:Not Italic

Saleh Satti 3/9/15 12:51 PM


**Formatted:** Font:Not Italic

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM



2360


2361 Figure 5: SHOM hydropower vs. irrigation benefit trade off curves for three different  
 2362 water values (P2, P4 and P5).



**Deleted:**


Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** values of AGM.




2366  
 2367  
 2368  
 2369  
 2370  
 2371  
 2372

Figure 6: Schematic of the four possible ways in which changing conditions can shift the optimum model solution from a baseline set of solutions represented by the blue curve. Arrow 1 (shift to red curve) depicts a win-loss tradeoff where a loss in irrigation benefits is offset by an increased in hydropower benefits. Arrow 2 (shift to black curve) depicts a win-win outcome, with a gain in both hydropower and irrigation. Similarly, arrows 3 and 4 can be characterized as loss-win and loss-loss, respectively.




Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM




Deleted:

2373  
2374  
2375  
2376

Figure 7: Results of SHOM simulations in which the agricultural benefits are phrased as constraints, and the hydropower benefits are calculated for a specific agricultural benefit. The circles highlight the optimal values for each scenario.



Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM



**Deleted:** Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM


**Deleted:** as the *AGM* is increased from 0.08 to 0.22. Data points for each scenario are the Pareto optimal

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM

**Deleted:** with varying *AGM*. Data points circled are

2378  
2379  
2380  
2381

Figure 8: Hydropower vs. irrigation benefits in SHOM simulations. Points represent Pareto optima values for water value sets P1-P6.



2388  
2389  
2390

Figure 9: Hydropower vs. irrigation benefits illustrating adaptive management practices. Points represent Pareto optima values for water value sets P1-P6.

Saleh Satti 3/6/15 12:57 PM  
**Deleted:**  $AGM = 0.12$  and data points highlighted with a square are Pareto optima for  $AGM = 0.16$ .